



ANVIL Deliverable 1.1: Analysis framework

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1. Introduction

This report constitutes Deliverable 1.1 of the FP7 Security Program Coordination and Support Action 'Analysis of Civil Security Systems in Europe' (ANVIL, Grant Agreement no. 284678). The purpose of Deliverable 1.1 is to provide an analysis framework for the studies to be carried out in the project. The framework is in the form of a handbook (manual) on essential features and key indicators of civil security systems in Europe, clearly defining each feature and indicator, and explaining how to identify and collect information on these in practice. This methodology provides a set of empirical indicators to facilitate comparison between different civil security systems, and will be useful to both practitioners and scholars.



Figure 1: ANVIL study countries shown in red.

1.1 ANVIL brief description

ANVIL is an FP7 security research project that looks at how civil security systems function in different countries and regions. Civil security systems are the (non-military) processes and organizations in place to prevent, respond to and recover from crises and disasters. The main participants in these systems include the police, fire and rescue services and other volunteer organizations and private entities, as well as the general public. The main goals of ANVIL are to try to reveal what works and what doesn't work for civil security systems across Europe, to give advice to policy makers about this, and to identify emerging research needs for future EU research programmes.

The ANVIL design framework for data collection and analysis provides a practical handbook for studying essential features and key indicators of civil security systems, with each feature and indicator clearly and simply defined. It starts with a comprehensive mapping along four analytical dimensions: cultural and historical aspects; legal/constitutional aspects; relations between the civil

security system and the citizen; and the role of the private sector in maintaining civil security. The analysis part consists in looking at key indicators of effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy, and is based on an inductive evaluation of recent crises that have occurred in the different study countries. Finally, we examine the country or regional security system in the EU context: To what extent and how does the EU level have relevance for the civil security system in a given country?

The ANVIL investigations include desk studies and interviews with civil security system experts and experienced practitioners in crisis management and public administration. We look primarily and where possible at instances and evidence in which countries have evaluated themselves through professional assessments and/or political inquiries in the wake of these crisis incidents. This provides a basis for evaluation and comparison in our results that largely excludes subjective opinions, beliefs and biases that might cause ethical problems in carrying out the research.

Countries to be studied include Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The targeted regional associations are mostly in northern Europe and eastern Europe and include the following: Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Initiative for South-Eastern Europe (DPPI SEE); the International commission for the Protection of the Danube River (ICPDR); the Visegrad group; the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS); The Barents Regional Council, The Helsinki Commission (HELCOM), The Baltic Seam Maritime Cooperation and the International Sava River Basin Commission. We have started the data collection for the regional security association studies.

1.2 Outline of this document

Section 2 is an identification of the essential study features that are to be used in ANVIL. Each partner will map the civil security systems in their country studies on four analytical dimensions, which are outlined in section 3. A further objective is to measure and compare quality of civil security, and section 4 presents an outline of what indicators of quality we measure and how. Finally, the relations between the civil security system and international civil security organizations (EU, NATO, UN, other) or international agreements are mapped in each country study along the outline in section 5.

2. Essential Study Features Identified

2.1 Working method

The first task was to come to a consensus about the essential study features that need to be identified in order to accomplish the aims of the project, which are primarily centered around figuring out what works and what doesn't work in the different civil security systems in countries and regions in Europe. This means figuring out what to map and measure and how best to map and measure it in each case. To achieve this, we have done the following:

- During the ANVIL kick off meeting in Brussels, we presented the outline of Milestone 2 (Key WP1 study features identified) and discussed it with all partners present. Comments and suggestions were integrated in a revised version.
- The revised version of the Research Design has been emailed to all partners, asking for their reactions and comments in a second round. Comments and suggestions were integrated in a pre-final version.
- The pre-final version has been discussed more intensively with the leaders of the directly involved work packages (WP 2: UI, 3: IAI, 4: IFSH and 5: UEssex) that need to elaborate further on the research design (collecting data, analyzing and comparing, etc.)
- During the second consortium meeting/workshop in Utrecht in month 7, outside experts in public administration and crisis management were brought in to provide input and feedback on the out proposed framework for data collection and analysis

This has resulted in a research design outline with preliminary instructions for all partners on what the key study features should be in the country studies. The design outline is encompassed in sections 3, 4 and 5 below.

2.2 Ethical dimension

An important constraint in the project has been to carry out our studies and investigations in a way that can in no way be detrimental to our information sources. This means not only keeping interview objects anonymous, but also not asking them any questions that might result in expression of opinions or beliefs that could cause harm. Since the quality of civil security systems is by nature a subjective and possibly controversial area, we have chosen an inductive approach in which quality is determined through a look at evidence of self-evaluation of civil security systems by a country itself. That is to say, we look for instances where countries have done their own internal assessments (through publicly available reports, inquiries, analyses) of what works and doesn't work in their civil security systems, and draw all of our conclusions based on this type of evidence alone. Though this approach can arguably present limitations in the extent to which different systems can be comparatively assessed, the ethical dimension of FP7 research is overriding and requires that we move forward in this way.

2.2 Generic instructions

All partners employ the ANVIL definition of the civil security system: all government activities and government interaction with actors relating to the civil security system aimed at crisis preparation and response to enhance the safety and security of citizens. Crises are serious threats to the core values or life-sustaining features of the system or community, which under time pressure and highly uncertain circumstances necessitates making vital decisions.

ANVIL Country studies take a comprehensive view on civil security systems to cover the response to a wide variety of threats. A country study should not focus on one specific threat type only. Instead

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each country study should differentiate between threat types and the related institutions in the countries:

- Natural disasters (forest fires, floods, diseases, earthquakes, etc)
- Industrial and transportation accidents (chemical or nuclear incidents, plane or train crashes, etc);
- Terrorist attacks (bombings, shootings);
- Infrastructure failures (ICT, electricity, pipelines)

If countries take an explicit 'all-hazards' approach to crisis ('we focus on responding to the effects, no matter the causes', such as France), or if countries may have very specific legislation and authority delegation structure in place for specific threat types (Netherlands, UK), this should be registered in the study.

Countries tend to differ in their policies and priorities with respect to the different phases of crisis management: prevention, preparedness, response and recovery. ANVIL country studies have a particular emphasis on response.

All partners provide first and foremost a description of the formal system and policies. How the formal structure and policies work in practice can be explained in case examples.

3. Mapping on Analytical Dimensions

Mapping on Analytical Dimensions

Civil security systems in Europe display a wide variation in structures, policies, rules, and practices. Countries have organized differently in their efforts to protect citizens from a variety of threats to their security and safety: (1) Each system evolved in a unique historical and cultural context; (2) Each system is bound by different legal/constitutional frameworks, consists of different actors and is governed differently; (3) Each system relates to its citizens in unique ways; and (4) each system has different relations with private sector parties¹. This chapter provides an outline of how the consortium will map civil security systems on these four analytical dimensions in the country studies, providing specific instructions about what should be done.

3.1 Cultural and historical aspects of the civil security system

1. **Administrative traditions:** use existing political science categorization (unitary vs. federal state, etc). A specific categorization instruction or coding scheme will be provided.
2. **Government/societal culture:** use existing cultural grid/group theory country scores from literature on cultural theory (see for country scores based on outstanding academic study among IBM employees in 76 countries worldwide <http://geert-hofstede.com/countries.html>. Choose your country in the drop down menu, register and document findings).
3. **Dominant crisis management approach:** score civil security system of your country on (again: a specific categorization instruction or coding scheme will be provided):
 - a. Military vs. civilian
 - b. State-centred vs. decentralized
 - c. All hazards vs. specific threats

3.2 Legal/constitutional aspects of the civil security system

1. **Statutory basis:** Score whether the statutory basis of the civil security systems rests on a single law or fragmented statutory provisions? Recent or old? Formal legislation or executive orders? (A specific categorization instruction or coding scheme will be provided). Describe and document your findings.
2. **Executive responsibility and operational mandates:** on what level of government does executive responsibility for crisis preparedness and response rest? How much autonomy (rate on five point scale, will be provided) do operational agencies have in organizing preparedness and providing emergency response? To whom (Minister? Governor? Mayor? Department chief?) are they accountable? Describe and document your findings.
3. **Division of powers, presence of checks and balances:** are civil security responsibilities divided over several agencies or organized in a single agency? Which political and administrative executives are responsible for the performance of agencies in the civil security system? Describe and document your findings.
4. **Special agencies vs. mainstream departments:** Do special government agencies (at arm's length from government control and direct political intervention) design and implement civil security policy, or is this a task of mainstream Cabinet Departments? Which one(s)? Describe and document your findings.
5. **Delegation and upscaling:** Does authority and responsibility for crisis management preparedness and response rest at the central level, with delegation of tasks and mandates to decentral authorities when local or customized implementation is required? Or does authority and responsibility for crisis management preparedness and response rest at the

¹ Introduction text borrowed from ANVIL proposal, part B1.1, p.3

decentral (local) level, with upscaling of authority when a crisis overwhelms local capacity? What upscaling or delegation mechanisms and procedures are in place? Describe and document your findings.

6. **Accountability arrangements and processes:** are specific accountability arrangements in place for crisis management response (for instance a state of emergency enables that special authority can be executed with deferral of legislative control and democratic accountability)? Describe and document your findings.
7. **Major legislative changes in the past ten years:** Has specific legislation on civil security been changed or introduced in recent years? What was the content of the change (what was in place before, and what changed)? Does this legislative change refer to European directives or international conventions (indicating convergence of EU civil security systems)? Describe and document your findings.

3.3 The relations between the civil security system and citizens

1. **Expectations:** please provide us with any information you can find (preferably documented information such as the results of polls) on citizens' expectations toward government responsibility for civil security vs. citizen responsibility. Describe and document your findings.
2. **Education:** Do government agencies responsible for civil security design and disseminate programs for emergency awareness among citizens, transparency of risks, early warning on threats. Does government stimulate citizen preparation and activation, resilience and self-help among citizens and communities? Describe and document your findings.
3. **Information provision:** How does the government agency responsible for civil security inform citizens on severe incidents and the response by government and other actors? How do they issue an alarm upon outbreak, inform on sequence of events and operations, and publish inspections and evaluations? Describe and document your findings.

3.4 The role of the private sector in maintaining civil security

1. Role of societal/non-profit organizations: Do NGOs, faith-based organizations, or community-based organizations have a considerable role in crisis management preparedness and response efforts? Describe and document your findings.
2. Role of profit-oriented organizations: Do profit-oriented organizations have a considerable role in crisis management preparedness and response efforts? Describe and document your findings.
3. Formal division of responsibilities
 - a. Prevention: do private sector organizations have any formal role or tasks in providing disaster or crisis preparedness? Which organizations? Profit or non-profit? Which tasks?
 - b. Preparedness: do private sector organizations have any formal role or tasks in providing disaster or crisis preparedness? Which organizations? Profit or non-profit? Which tasks?
 - c. Response: do private sector organizations have any formal role or tasks in providing emergency response in your country? Which organizations? Profit or non-profit? Which tasks?
4. Inclusion of private parties:
 - a. Preparation: are private organizations included in innovation projects, training and exercise programs?

3.5 Conclusion²

Experience and research shows that the great variety amongst crisis management structures in national systems , processes and practices is not necessarily a bad thing. Analysts agree that there is not 'one best way' to approach crisis and disaster management for all types of contingencies. Given the variety of major threats faced by countries, some variety in practice and process is to be expected and respected. Different systems can provide similar or equal quality in terms of civil security. The next chapter outlines the assessment of quality in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy that we propose for the country studies. The methodology is based on an inductive evaluation of recent crises that have occurred in the different study countries. We base our investigative framework on looking at instances and evidence in which countries have evaluated themselves through professional evaluations and/or political inquiries in the wake of these incidents. This provides a basis for evaluation and comparison that to the greatest extent possible avoids subjective, third party opinions and assessments that might cause ethical problems for us in carrying out the research.

² text borrowed from ANVIL proposal, part B1.1, p.3-4

4. Measuring Quality: Key Indicators



Measuring
Quality

A crucial question is how we measure the quality—defined in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy—of civil security systems. We should keep in mind that different systems can be equally effective. Risks differ per country or region, and so do their crisis management structures in place. In recent years, we have seen forest fires in Southern Europe, a massive earthquake in Italy, flooding in central and Eastern Europe, terrorist attacks, in the UK, Spain and Norway, and infrastructure failures in Scandinavia. (to name but a few recent events). In response to different crises, and shaped by different administrative traditions, risk cultures and legal constraints, different systems have evolved. We would like to assess the quality of these systems in an impartial, feasible and acceptable manner³. This chapter outlines our approach.

4.1 Effectiveness

1. List recent crises and incidents since 2000 ('tests' to the system): please use existing database: <http://www.emdat.be/database> for reasons of efficiency and comparability or results. Please add events that are not included in the Emdat crisis definition (such as infectious disease outbreaks and terrorist attacks).
>> Based on the most frequently occurring incident types we may ask you in a second round to provide information on how your country has dealt with a recent major incident of this type (for international comparison). A specific survey instruction or coding scheme will be provided.

>> We may also select a crisis that affected all countries studied to some extent, for instance pandemic influenza (H1N1 type A: swine flu), to compare the main similarities and differences in response. A specific survey instruction or coding scheme will be provided.
2. Professional inquiries/evaluations (mandatory investigations by inspectorates and so on, following administrative procedure on ex post crisis accountability): Please provide a list of professional inquiries into civil security related issues or incidents in the past ten years (if more than ten: past three to five years). Describe and document for each case the inquiry or inspectorate's judgment on system, policy or agency effectiveness. Provide context on the frequency and impact of professional inquiries (do they often occur or not? Mandatory after each incident? What does it indicate if an inspectorate decides to evaluate an incident, policy or agency?) in general in your country.
3. Political inquiries: Please provide a list of political inquiries (ad hoc and demanded by legislative or political-executive authorities, beyond the mandatory administrative investigations requested under 3.2.ii) into civil security related issues or incidents in the past ten years. Describe and document for each case the inquiry committee's judgment on system, policy or agency effectiveness. Provide context on the frequency and impact of political inquiries (do they often occur or not? What does it indicate if an inquiry is called for, or when it is conducted?) in general in your country.

4.2 Efficiency

- For the list of incidents and crises under 4.1.1, please provide numbers of casualties, damage, other crisis costs

³ text borrowed from ANVIL proposal, part B1.1, p.4

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- Map the CM capacity in your country by providing numbers of:
 - Fire department: numbers of fire-engines, firefighters employed. If difference btw forest fire and urban fire fighting capacity: please describe.
 - Emergency health care: numbers of ambulances, people employed, trauma centers
 - Emergency rooms: number of emergency (112) rooms, people employed
 - Police force: number of police districts or agencies, people employed
 - Search and rescue (if not fire fighters) capacity
 - Coast guard capacity (if relevant)
 - Other

4.3 Legitimacy

- Political support: Describe and document executive interventions, parliamentary questions, parliamentary inquiries, legislative amendments of the past five years. Provide context on the frequency and impact found: what does this indicate?
- Popular trust and support: please provide us with any information you can find (preferably documented information such as the results of polls) on legitimacy of and citizen trust in government's CM capabilities. Do people feel safe, secure? Describe and document your findings.

In developing and elaborating these indicators, we draw on work done in the field of crisis management (effectiveness), public management (efficiency) and political science (legitimacy).

5. EU- Context: International Cooperation of Civil Security Systems

Examining
the EU
Context

Forms of international and even supranational cooperation and coordination of crisis management efforts are not new. Also at the sub-European level, regional organizations are increasingly adding a 'civil protection' dimension to their cooperation, complementing regional security architectures. The Mediterranean Southern European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), the Visegrad group and the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS - see for instance Hellenberg, 2006), are some examples of regional arrangements for civil security cooperation.

Moreover, ad hoc and bilateral cooperation agreements are also in place between EU countries. At the EU level, cooperation on civil security issues is progressing rapidly. This chapter aims to outline an approach to find indicators of the contours and extent of such international initiatives.⁴

5.1 Relations between the national civil security system and international civil security organizations (EU, NATO, UN, other)

- In what international organizations with a civil security task or policy domain (NB: not conflict resolution) does your country take part? Describe and document your findings.
- In what international (bilateral or multilateral) conventions and agreements with a civil security dimension (NB: not conflict resolution) does your country take part? With neighboring countries for reasons of threats crossing geographic borders? With countries threatened by a similar hazard? Describe and document your findings.

As nation states are increasingly confronted with so called transboundary crises and disasters (Boin and Rhinard, 2008; Boin, 2009; Lagadec, 2009; Rhinard, 2009; Ansell, Boin and Keller, 2010), their security systems must interact in an effective and timely manner. A study of existing international arrangements can help to enhance understanding of what works (and what doesn't). This will allow the EU to further expand its role and work towards enhanced interoperability between Member States.⁵

⁴ Text borrowed from ANVIL proposal, part B1.1, p.4-5

⁵ Text borrowed from ANVIL proposal, part B1.1, p.6-8

6. Conclusion

In this deliverable we have given background information about how the ANVIL design framework for data collection and analysis was developed, and then provided a practical handbook for studying essential features and key indicators of civil security systems, with each feature and indicator clearly and simply defined. The methodology consists of looking at key indicators of effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy, and is based on an inductive evaluation of recent crises that have occurred in the different study countries. That is to say, we base our investigative framework on examining instances and evidence in which countries have evaluated themselves through professional assessments and/or political inquiries in the wake of these incidents. This provides a basis for evaluation and comparison that to the greatest extent possible the generation in our results of subjective opinions, beliefs and biases that might cause ethical problems for us in carrying out the research.

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