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Part 1 – Country Studies

Executive Summary

This report maps the considerable cultural, institutional, legal and operational diversity of 22 national civil security systems in Europe. Understanding the tension between structural differences and underlying similarities is critical in order to explore the scope for European cooperation in the area of crisis and emergency management. The analysis reveals that civil security systems display limited similarities that could be attributed to common functional needs and the changed post-Cold War context. Beyond that, administrative responsibilities, legal frameworks and operational practices continue to differ markedly, backed up by national cultural contexts and historical experiences. Nevertheless, the case studies did not discover drastic differences in effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy. So while there may be room for improvement in specific areas and technologies, there is no single best or ‘one-size-fits-all’ model for civil security, but multiple equifinal methods of organizing this core state responsibility.

In particular, natural disasters generally are the bread and butter of crisis management agencies since the end of the Cold War. This is reflected in the transformation process from military-focused to more comprehensive, fully civilian-controlled systems that all ANVIL countries have basically completed, though the armed forces provide important assistance services during major nationwide crises in most countries. In this context, there has been a trend towards the adoption of all-hazards approaches taking into account a broader spectrum of threats. New risks and comprehensive approaches have also required states to enhance cross-level and cross-sector coordination in their civil security systems, for example through new umbrella laws. However, compared to other policy-fields civil security remains decentralised with fuzzy borders and divided responsibilities.

Overall, structures and approaches to civil security in Europe change in an incremental manner. For example, the outsourcing of core public tasks to private companies is not a major phenomenon, even though there are different forms of engagement with the private sector and new threats, such as the protection of critical infrastructures, which increasingly lead states to explore new ways of informal coordination. Information and education of citizens are mostly organised in a rather passive way and the use of new technologies remains limited in most ANVIL countries. The same applies to advanced methodologies for risk-based planning and management.

In other respects, case study findings document the diverse organisation of civil security systems, such as with regard to different degrees of centralisation/decentralisation. Decentralisation and bottom-up approaches are most marked in federalist states and – to a lesser extent – the Nordic countries and the Netherlands while many ‘new’ members and candidate countries, especially the
Baltic and South-Eastern European states, seem to prefer more centralised, top-down models. This basic differentiation resembles ‘typical’ cultural clusters in Europe, but classifications are not uniform and clear-cut. In general, national security cultures and idiosyncratic experiences seem to be more important than regional clusters or commonly perceived threats and hazards.

Distinct cultural and institutional traditions explain the emergence of specific practices, such as the principle of conformity in Nordic countries, or the varying ease and frequency of domestic military deployment and support. This diversity is equally evident in the different roles of societal non-profit organisations. Central European states with neocorporatist traditions embrace the formalised inclusion of officially registered organisations with large memberships and see this as one of the core strengths of their systems. Conversely, other countries, like the UK, prefer informal ad-hoc forms of voluntary participation while some former Communist societies still express a certain degree of scepticism towards volunteering. In turn, some smaller, new member states with fewer capacities seem to be more inclined to establish formal partnerships with profit-oriented actors and transfer some responsibilities than most Western and Northern countries.

In terms of quality, ANVIL case studies reveal a basic level of political, legal and popular support for civil security systems. Generally low levels of politicisation and contestation signal a certain degree of acceptance, but it is also important to remind that public debate about the risk to be tackled and the measures to be taken remains essential in democratic states. Moreover, citizens generally trust public institutions, resist alarmism and tend to feel rather safe, though scepticism and concern are clearly more marked in some Central, Eastern and South-Eastern countries. Efficiency assessments remain among the least developed aspects of civil security systems. Governments often do not have an overview of spending across levels and areas, while ethical and political concerns impede rigorous cost efficiency reviews with regard to measures against potentially life-threatening hazards. Furthermore, there is no generally accepted standard and methodology for effectiveness assessments, while ANVIL could not support unequivocal correlations between specific structural characteristics and systems performance in civil security. Processes of professional inquiries, exercises and post-incident reviews remain, on average, underdeveloped or lack transparency. When turning to specific functions and technologies of crisis management, however, cross-national comparisons and evaluations can be directly applied, allowing the identification of some ‘vanguard states’ or ‘good practices’. This applies, for instance, to emergency warning and communication systems.

Finally, arrangements for cross-border assistance in and outside the EU are generally well developed and widely accepted. The EU is not a very visible actor in civil security but EU coordination basically enjoys wide support among citizens, though some bigger member states remain hesitant to support further integration leaps.
1. Introduction

The following report synthesises the empirical findings from a sample of 22 case studies (ten interview-based, twelve desk studies) of national civil security systems in Europe (see Figure 1) that were conducted by partners of the ANVIL project according to a common analytical framework and mapping protocol. Based on an open definition of crisis, ANVIL focused on crisis preparedness and response activities. All case studies feature a qualitative analysis as well as quantitative, coded data. The amount of available data and information varies among countries, but the case studies answered all overall questions as far as possible. The synthesis report, in particular, documents the variety of legal and institutional structures as well as operational processes and inter-actor relationships of crisis management and civil security provision in ANVIL countries. Moreover, it reviews studied national civil security systems with regard to three quality measures: effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy. To structure the wealth of material, main findings under each analytical section are summarised in introductory paragraphs and highlighted in bold throughout the text. The conclusions develop some overarching patterns among European civil security systems, while more detailed policy implications and research needs will be developed in subsequent deliverables.

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Figure 1: ANVIL countries

Interview-based case studies: Croatia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Serbia, Sweden, and the UK
Desk studies: Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Norway, Romania, Slovakia, Switzerland

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1 Analytical framework and country reports are available via the ANVIL homepage: www.anvil-project.net.
2. **Analytical Dimensions**

Countries have organized differently in their efforts to protect citizens from a variety of threats to their security and well-being. Civil security systems in Europe are placed in unique cultural contexts, experience different crises and emergencies and display a wide variation in structures, policies, rules and practices. ANVIL therefore looks at a set of five analytical dimensions covering the diversity of 22 studied countries and systems: 1) experience and dominant crisis management approach, 2) cultural and historical aspects, 3) legal and constitutional aspects, 4) relations with citizens and 5) role of the private sector.

2.1 **Experience, definitions and dominant approaches**

First, ANVIL surveyed countries’ experiences with typical and signature crises, national definitions of ‘crisis’ and dominant crisis management approaches. In terms of crisis experience, the examination confirms the **dominance of natural disasters**, though exposure to specific hazards varies. Industrial/transportation accidents are regular but mostly limited local events whereas ‘critical infrastructure’ failures so far remain a largely hypothetical scenario. Violent events, such as terrorist attacks, and the experience of politically highly salient ‘signature crises’ are extremely rare and vary strongly across cases. When it comes to crisis definitions and dominant approaches to crisis management, we can observe a **basic level of shared conceptual understanding** and a clear **civilian primacy** following structural transformations after the end of the Cold War. However, we also find **many country-specific differences** in the details, including terminological variations and varying frequency and ease of domestic military deployment and support. The majority of countries tend towards an all-hazards rather than specific threats approach, but this is a matter of degree rather than a clear-cut distinction and there is a marked gap between rhetoric and practice.

2.1.1 **Crisis experience**

It is often not possible to estimate the exact costs of disasters in terms of fatalities, people injured or economic damage based on the available data, which is often incomplete or not comparable according to sound methodological principles. The ANVIL mapping protocol broadly understood ‘crises’ as serious (materializing) threats to the well-being of citizens and the integrity and functioning of critical infrastructures. However, this broad approach allows for an open definition of crises to account for different national understandings and perceptions of crisis, which are reflected in somewhat diverging scholarly judgments about crisis occurrences. Keeping these caveats in mind,
ANVIL country studies listed 252 crises for the period 2000-2012. Out of this number, 172 (68 per cent) were natural disasters and infectious diseases, 59 (23 per cent) were transportation and industrial accidents, 16 (6 per cent) were terrorist attacks and other violent, intentional threats and 5 (2 per cent) were infrastructure failures (see Figure 1). While absolute numbers remain problematic due to the aforementioned problems, the relative numbers show clearly that natural disasters are the most frequent type of crisis experienced by ANVIL countries. The number of fatalities is rather low for the vast majority of incidents. During the ANVIL period of examination from 2000 to 2012, there were only four events in the sample of ANVIL countries that killed more than 100 people: H1N1 (1992 people Europe-wide, more than 100 in several countries), the L’Aquila earthquake (309), the Kaprun funicular train disaster (155) and the Paris Concorde crash (113).

Aside from cases when concurrent vulnerability factors or exceptional circumstances lead to unusual degrees of devastation – such as the L’Aquila earthquake – natural disasters are the bread and butter of civil security systems. Especially floods and storms have affected almost every country during the period between 2000 and 2012. A country’s specific exposure to natural disasters, however, varies with many characteristics, such as climate and topography. Some natural disasters are more limited in their scope and/or frequency. Forest fires pose a special threat to Southern and South-Eastern countries while Italy has to face the special threat of earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. Consequently, the countries studied by ANVIL are generally prepared rather well for these kinds of ‘typical’ events and most natural disasters did not put nationwide crisis management systems to a severe test. However, natural disasters, such as the 2002 and 2005 European floods, can affect large

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2 The EM-DAT International Disaster Database (www.emdat.be) served as a first empirical basis, but country studies added and deleted specific crises as far as necessary in order to meet the ANVIL definition of crisis.

3 These numbers neither include the 2004 Asian tsunami, which occurred outside ANVIL countries, nor the 2003 summer heat wave, which unfolded over a long period of time and wide geographic space without becoming an acute civil emergency crisis in a concrete area.
geographic areas and can cause considerable economic damage. There have also been a number of epidemic diseases or health emergencies that have provoked nationwide crisis management efforts and had trans-boundary dimensions, most notably H1N1.

**Industrial and transportation accidents are another relatively frequent occurrence** in Europe, but their consequences are **mostly short-term and confined to the local or regional level**. Yet, it should be noted that singular major accidents, such as the *Costa Concordia* and Kaprun disasters or the Love Parade stampede, can cause a considerable number of fatalities. Furthermore, the 2010 red sludge spill in Hungary showcased the potential large-scale ecological impact of industrial accidents during the period of investigation of ANVIL.

Various European countries also consider large-scale and sustained **critical infrastructure failure** as an increasingly significant threat. Thus far, however, this has **largely remained a theoretical scenario**. Known cases of regional or nation-wide electricity breakdown, for instance, are rare and usually caused by extreme weather conditions, such as the storm Gudrun in Sweden or exceptional snowfall in northwestern Germany in 2005, while the known effects have not moved beyond economic damages. Still, the 2003 Italy electricity blackout demonstrated the dangers of potential cascading effects across borders.

Some countries included in this study have experienced **terrorist attacks** during the period of examination, though this is generally not a major phenomenon. Especially the 2005 bombings in London and the Oslo/Utøya attacks in 2011 required a large-scale response by genuine civil security authorities like fire brigades or emergency services.⁴ Terrorism and political violence raise many definitional as well as normative problems that cannot be comprehensively addressed here⁵, but it is clear that civil security considerations apply more to the hitherto hypothetical scenario of attacks using weapons of mass destruction or attacking critical infrastructures. Other singular terrorist events, such as the assassination of Theo van Gogh in 2004 or the 2010 Stockholm suicide attacks, **pertained more to questions of law enforcement or crime prevention** than genuine civil protection. This also applies to other violent intentional threats, such as the assassination of Zoran Đinđić and Anna Lindh in 2003, public protests in Genoa and Gothenburg in 2001 or the 2011 London ‘riots’. However, these events might still be considered a crisis in specific national contexts because they target specific societal and political values or invoke public fear and anxiety.

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⁴ Spain with its 2004 terrorist attack is not included in the sample of ANVIL.

⁵ For example, there are a number of unclear cases where no immediate responsibility was claimed, such as the explosion of a briefcase in Prague or the series of right-wing murders in Germany.
Not all ANVIL countries experienced a **signature crisis**, i.e. a crisis that is kept as a central feature of the collective memory, during the period between 2000 and 2012. However, there have been a few examples of signature crises, most notably the London bombings, the L'Aquila earthquake and the Oslo/Utøya attacks. There were also more regular crisis experiences that caused profound after-effects and led to broader reform efforts, such as the European floods of 2002. In some cases, even events occurring outside the borders of a country shaped the development of national crisis management structures. For example, the 2004 Asian tsunami served as an impetus for reform in Sweden. Last but not least, the 11 September 2001 attacks exercised a significant, if indirect, influence on crisis management structures throughout Europe.

### 2.1.2 Crisis definitions

ANVIL explicitly acknowledges that the definition of crisis is not just a matter of quantitative measures but also depends on a country’s cultural and institutional context, such as the requirements of upper level coordination or previous crisis experiences. At an abstract level, there seems to be a basic shared understanding of what constitutes a ‘crisis’ in European countries. National definitions typically stress that a crisis refers to situations that affect a large number of people, infrastructures, goods or other values and require some form of coordination above normal emergency structures. Hence, there are some emerging starting points for the development of a basic terminology in European civil security, though the term civil security itself is seldom used in national discourses.

Beneath these broad commonalities, however, differences across case studies are considerable, ranging from mere terminological divergences to different formal procedures for crisis management that hinge on specific definitions. Most case studies document the use of other general terms like ‘disaster’, ‘accident’ or ‘emergency’ while ‘crisis’ is often used as a more programmatic concept in the context of crisis management. Yet, the threshold of what is labelled a crisis is interpreted very differently, which is linked to different degrees of formalisation. Some countries add specific criteria, such as the unforeseen or sudden character of an event (Croatia, Ireland and Sweden) or its ‘uncontrolled development’ (Norway). Similarly, a few countries predefine a set of events that can be considered a crisis if they meet the above mentioned criteria (e.g. Finland). Another example of strict formalisation is the Netherlands where a crisis is defined as a threat to the country’s ‘vital interests’, which are listed in a handbook.
Such stricter definitions tend to go in hand with specific operational or political consequences, for instance by affecting lines of authority and the choice of responsible levels. In the Netherlands, for instance, a disaster is handled in a bottom-up fashion whereas a crisis is met with a top-down approach. In other cases where different official terms than crises are used, related assessments can be a precondition to declare a state of disaster, state of emergency or similar legal concepts.

In other cases, by contrast, it is difficult to determine which level of legal and official specification is required to speak of a common definition of a crisis. Some case studies just refer to a common colloquial use, vague operational concept or indirect definition. For example, the Czech Republic does not offer a substantial definition of a ‘crisis situation’ but simply assumes that it occurs when a state of disaster or emergency is being declared. Seven countries are coded as not having an official definition (Austria, Estonia, France, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania and Switzerland). Yet most of these countries have related provisions and definitions in their civil security laws and have an operational working consensus for crises. For instance, Austria, Germany and Switzerland have generally detailed legal frameworks for emergency and crisis management whose crisis definition converge around a specific set of main assumptions, but the legal definitions of crises or disasters can differ slightly at different levels of government due to the dominant legislative competences of regional authorities. Similarly, in Italy one can point to different legal concepts as well as to an informal common understanding, which is, however, based on a written inter-ministerial terminology.

6 In Poland, the constitutional court ruled that the previous definition was unconstitutional because it referred to the breaking of social ties as a criterion for a crisis, which was considered vulnerable to abuse for human rights violation.
2.1.3 Dominant crisis management approaches

All civil security systems investigated in the ANVIL project are primarily civilian, which reflects the wider structural transformation of civil defence systems since the end of the Cold War. Across all studied countries, command and coordination typically resides with civilian authorities at the responsible level of government. This development has been especially notable in ‘new’ EU members and candidate countries, where historically the division between civil and military security has been less entrenched. Some of these countries are still in this transition process.

However, in all countries studied by ANVIL military forces regularly contribute to civil security efforts at the behest of civilian authorities, at least when it comes to exceptional and prolonged crises. Specifically, the military can add considerable manpower and logistical capacities to the civilian management of exceptional crises, whereas the use of specialised military assets, such as with regard to WMD response, has so far remained hypothetical. But independently of differential exposure to risks and threats, the frequency and ease with which the military is employed varies considerably between countries. One logical difference lies in the overall resources of a country. For instance, in Malta the military reserve forces are important in light of overall limited capacities and human resources. Further (non-functionalist) explanatory factors are divergent national traditions. One can point to countries without a strong domestic military tradition where assistance is a rare occasion, such as the Netherlands, and to countries with a more frequent use of military capacities and resources to assist civil security. Such military support is particularly common in five studied countries (France, Italy, Norway, Slovakia and Sweden), where the military is employed in severe/particular cases or when the civilian resources are deemed as insufficient. The Italian case highlights the positive attitude of the public in this regard. The Nordic countries of Finland, Sweden and Norway have a tradition of total defence going back to their position during World War II and the Cold War, which is still visible in their possibility to mobilise civil defence components to facilitate rescue operations today. In France, military support is on special requirement of the civilian authorities. During the 2000-2012 period, for example, political authorities required the involvement of the military in the most severe/exceptional crises and military authorities never refused to provide assistance.

Conversely, sensitive national traditions limit the use of the military. Germany’s federal armed forces, for example, have provided much applauded assistance during recent flood crises, but there has been a contentious debate about the deployment of the army for counterterrorist purposes since 9-11, including genuinely military equipment like combat aircraft. This goes back to the country’s special historical experiences under Nazi rule that demands a strong separation of civilian and military spheres. Particularly in countries that have not made the full transition from militia/conscription
system to professional/voluntary armies the role of the military in civil security continues to be debated. In Austria, the scenario that a professional army might lack the personnel to provide disaster assistance was used as a central – and eventually decisive – argument by supporters of the militia/conscription system during a political referendum in January 2013. Hence, militaries seeking new justifications for their very existence might have a strong interest to portray their troops as civilian agencies piling up sandbags rather than armies engaging in controversial intervention overseas. In Switzerland, by contrast, where conscription remains unchallenged, the military is explicitly not an official partner of the integrated civil protection system, unlike the similarly conscription-based civil defence forces that are deployed prior to the military.

The majority of countries tend towards an all-hazards approach. Only Ireland, Lithuania, Poland and the United Kingdom (UK) are described as taking a specific threats approach. Conversely, the Czech Republic formally appears to put a strong emphasis on its all-hazards approach. However, all these classifications seem more a matter of degree, while one can question the practical relevance of the formally distinct approaches. In fact, it can be argued that all countries have elements of all-hazards and a specific threats approach. Even the four countries that were coded as specific threats countries have aspects that are more characteristic of an all-hazards approach and many aspects of their crisis management structure apply during various scenarios. That is, the typical core (local) actors for crisis response, i.e. fire brigades, ambulance services and the police in supporting functions, usually bear the bulk of operational responsibilities irrespective of the threat. One also needs to be aware that there is a difference between the rhetoric and practice of all-hazards approaches. In all countries studied by ANVIL, specialised agencies can take the lead when it comes to rare events requiring special knowledge, such as epidemics or radiological accidents. This threat-specific differentiation typically kicks in during regional or national crisis management – i.e. when moving beyond the handling of local emergencies. So, many states loosely refer to comprehensive approaches in their overall security strategies, but then have various additional strategies for various types of crisis.

Still, there are notable differences with regard to the threat-specific or all-hazard distribution of responsibility at higher or national political and administrative levels. Agencies with a comprehensive mandate like the Swedish MSB, the Romanian General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations and the Hungarian National Directorate General for Disaster are responsible for nationwide coordination during especially serious crises of various kinds. In other cases, there are flexible arrangements. In Poland, for instance, the all-hazard crisis management system is a common coordination platform, but in practice action is undertaken by specialised agencies for specific threats. This means that even if crises are addressed by the same basic administrative structure or institution at higher levels of government, the working principles and lines of authority often change.
from case to case. This applies to specific threats countries like the UK as well as to primarily all hazards countries like Switzerland. To operate such flexible arrangements is a special challenge for countries with strong federalist traditions and a legally mandated separation of civil defence and civil protection (e.g. Austria, Germany and Switzerland), where the coordination of a common approach across levels is difficult and usually requires some kind of formal, threat-specific differentiation. Nevertheless, some countries pride themselves on new overarching concepts, such as Austria’s ‘comprehensive security provision’, Sweden’s revitalised ‘total defence’ or Switzerland’s ‘integrated system for the protection of the population’.

2.2 Cultural and historical aspects of civil security systems
Civil security systems are embedded in unique cultural and institutional contexts. ANVIL case studies specifically looked at administrative traditions (e.g. centralisation vs. decentralisation) and governmental and societal cultures as well as their respective influence on civil security systems. Civil security systems usually mirror the regular setup of national governments, but they are often comparatively more decentralised than other policy fields. The degree of structural variation within and across cases is highest in formally unitary states, whereas federal states have made limited moves to counteract their particularly pronounced decentralisation of civil security. In this context, the influence of culture is difficult to determine and one needs to beware of cultural ‘stereotyping’. At least at a macro level one may link known cultural clusters to patterns of civil security. Within the ANVIL sample, North-Western countries prefer decentralised forms of organisation whereas ‘new’ members, especially the Baltic countries and those in South-Eastern Europe, feature, on average, more centralised, top-down systems. Yet these differentiations are not absolute and uniform and may be caused by multiple factors (e.g. country size or transition from military-controlled systems).

2.2.1 Administrative traditions
In most ANVIL countries, the crisis management structures mirror the regular politico-administrative system. In 16 of 22 studies, the levels used for crisis management purposes are identical with general governmental levels and structures. These countries usually have three (Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Norway, Romania, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland) or four (Austria, Germany, Italy, Poland, Slovakia) tier systems of administration. Malta seems to have corresponding systems as well, but over two (alternatively one) tier.7 Two cases clearly deviate from

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7 Whilst somewhat unclear from the case studies, it seems like the three-tier politico-administrative structures have been reduced to two-tire systems (national and local only) for CM purposes in Finland, Ireland and Latvia.
this state of affairs through special arrangements for security and crisis management purposes: the Netherlands’s 25 ‘Security Regions’ and France’s seven ‘Defence and Security Zones’.

ANVIL countries **cover the full spectrum from decentralised to centralised civil security systems.** In decentralized systems crisis management responsibilities may rest at local (e.g. Italy, Sweden) or regional levels (e.g. Czech Republic). Generally, civil security in many countries seems to be **comparatively more decentralised than other policy fields**, such as economic policy (see for example the role played by England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in the otherwise unitary UK). There also seems to be an incremental development from centralised to more decentralised systems in several countries, such as Italy, Poland and Serbia. At the same time, federal countries like Germany have taken steps to introduce some forms of limited central steering (see section 2.3).

The question of centralisation is directly related to arrangements for **up- and down-scaling** of crisis management responsibilities. Comparable to the divergent forms of crisis definition discussed above, countries differ with regard to the degree of formalisation. In the Czech Republic crisis management is taken up automatically by higher levels when a crisis cuts across regions while similar mechanisms are phrased more loosely in other countries, such as in Norway, Poland and France. In most countries, however, lower levels of government formally retain the authority to upscale responsibilities and request assistance from higher levels. Whereas the **decision for decentralisation and bottom-up solutions is very explicit and clear in federalist countries, many other countries have over time evolved into more mixed systems** of rather central and rather decentralised elements (see below).

With these internal differentiations in mind, one may distinguish **four groups among ANVIL countries in terms of the degree of centralisation** (Figure 3). This assessment takes into account the quantitative coding for systems of delegation (top-down vs. bottom-up) as well as the qualitative discussion of centralisation vs. decentralisation in case studies. Moreover, it is made in light of the distribution of legal, political and operational responsibilities covered below (section 2.3.1-2.3.3). This aggregation reveals overarching patterns of centralisation/decentralisation in civil security systems.

The first group of countries has a clear and explicit preference for **decentralised** and localised bottom-up solutions placing responsibility at the lowest possible levels of government in all or most respects. This applies fully only to the federal countries Austria, Germany and Switzerland who embrace a strong interpretation of the principle of ‘subsidiarity’. A second group of countries (Czech Republic, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK) tend towards **rather decentralised**, bottom-up systems but also include some elements of centralisation, though to different degrees. Within this rather diverse group, Finland, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden clearly

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The UK case study is inconclusive on this issue, but it seems like a four-tire system is used both in general and for CM specifics.
prefer decentralised arrangements, but also display limited elements of centralisation, such as the central role of the Swedish Civil Contingency Agency. The Czech Republic, Ireland, Italy and the UK are even more mixed systems. Thirdly, four countries (Croatia, Estonia, France, Poland and Romania) generally take rather centralized forms that constitute the basis for their civil security systems, but they have also taken significant steps to induce some forms of decentralisation and bottom-up solutions, such as the 'Defence and Security Zones' in France. Finally, there is a group of six countries (Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Serbia and Slovakia) with more or less markedly centralised systems. The borders between these groups are not always clear-cut and an even more fine-grained differentiation might be required, but the available evidence indicates that decentralisation is most established in Central/Northern European countries, whereas many ‘new’ and candidate countries in South-Eastern Europe the Baltic region have a higher propensity to adopt centralised models.

2.2.2 Governmental and societal culture

Despite its central importance to behaviour or attitudes, culture remains hard to measure and operationalize. The ANVIL approach uses two of the most established comparative data sets to assess the governmental and societal culture of ANVIL countries and their possible effect on civil security systems: the World Values Survey\(^8\) and Gert Hofstede’s grid group country scores\(^9\). First, the World Value Survey confirms that there are some distinct cultural groups in Europe (see Figure 4 – clusters

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\(^8\) http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ [Accessed 15 August 2013].

of the same size are marked in dotted lines), though there are some overlaps. Most notably, former Communist countries in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe (blue) tend to fall in one group that is generally characterised by a high esteem for secular values as well as survival values, such as low levels of trust and tolerance. In this group, Romania and Poland stand out for their traditional values and Croatia and the Czech Republic for their comparable emphasis on self-expression. The group of Northern Protestant countries (red) is generally characterised by a high esteem for secular-rational and self-expression values. A third group of primarily Catholic countries (brown), such as Austria, Poland and Malta, also displays more traditional values. The UK and Ireland (green) comply with the typical pattern for English-speaking countries, i.e. self-expression but more traditional values. In sum, when one compares these clusters one can argue for a partial correspondence between the green and red clusters and high levels of decentralisation and support for civil security systems, and vice versa for the blue cluster whereas the brown cluster is positioned somewhat in-between (see sections 2.2.1 and 3.3.3). Otherwise, cultural boundaries are fuzzy and the respective country groups and their civil security structures are internally diverse, while the limited number of cases does not allow for further valid correlation analysis.

Figure 4: National-level Value Scores (World Values Survey)


For historic reasons, there are distinct data sets for East and West Germany.
Gert Hofstede’s grid group country scores confirm the relative diversity of member states, but do not reveal strong systematic correlations between cultural features and different civil security systems either. The most significant patterns emerge regarding, again, the level of centralisation/decentralisation on the one hand and the acceptance of hierarchies and the level of individualism on the other. Countries with comparatively centralized civil security systems generally are more likely to accept hierarchies and unequal distributions of power (Romania, Slovakia) while countries with rather decentralized civil security systems mostly score lower on this dimension (Austria, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland). In a similar vein, the Nordic countries, North-Central Europe (with the partial exception of Austria) and the British Isles, all using a rather decentralized crisis management model, reveal relatively high scores for the individualism versus collectivism dimension, which relates to the relationship between individuals and larger societal groups. Other cultural indicators of Hofstede’s framework may be insightful for analysing social and political values, but do not reveal a clear pattern with regard to civil security.

Instead, individual case studies point to the case-specific relevance of distinct cultural factors for the emergence of specific national styles and legacies, which could be compared to the concept of a national strategic culture that is familiar from military studies. Many of these features are unique, but one may also outline some shared cultural and historical clusters. As alluded to above, the domestic role of the military is a sensitive issue that is regularly shaped by distinct cultural and historical aspects, such as a militia tradition (Switzerland), past paramilitary activities (Ireland) or problematic historical records (Germany). Moreover, it appears that egalitarian, individualistic and secular societies, such as the Netherlands and the Nordic countries, demonstrate a preference for openness, local solutions and a critical attitude towards authorities also during crises, whereas some former Communist countries, such as Latvia or Slovakia, do not prioritize active citizen participation and place great emphasis on the state as supplier of services and security. A further special feature of Scandinavian countries is the tradition of conformity according to which state and society operate under normal legal and political standards even during crisis situations. The neocorporatist and consociational traditions of Austria, Germany and Switzerland find expression in the formalised inclusion of volunteers, the legalised principal of subsidiarity and the incorporation of various actors in consensus-oriented coordination processes. These indicative cultural patterns should not be reified, however, and may be overwritten by other functional and structural determinants of security policies and institutions.

2.3 Legal and operational aspects of civil security systems
The third ANVIL analytical dimension examined formal statutory bases as well as the political, operational and external dimensions of civil security systems. As already discussed above, civil security tends to be a relatively decentralised field even in rather centralised countries. This becomes also apparent in the strong operational involvement of local and regional agencies, especially emergency services and fire brigades. Decentralisation, however, is often less marked when it comes to specialised, complex threats, such as epidemics or nuclear disasters, or to responsibility for legislation and policy formulation, which mostly resides with higher levels of government. Second, civil security generally is either not considered a coherent concept, or a nascent policy field with fuzzy borders and strong interference with other areas. Crisis management commonly relies on a number of cabinet departments and functional agencies, is often taken up by agencies as a temporary function and many related areas are regulated in various functional laws. This trans-boundary dimension fuels further reforms of civil security systems in many ANVIL countries over the last decade, following on from the major transformations after the end of the Cold War. The results are an increasing number of umbrella laws, some cross-national borrowing and updated functional legislation.

On a more operational level, one can identify a limited move towards more central and permanent coordination and monitoring systems. However, advanced risk planning, state of emergency/disaster declarations and communication systems are implemented very unevenly within as well as across the countries under investigation. Finally, the legal framework for external and cross-border assistance is generally well developed, notwithstanding a handful of exceptions due to extraordinary political situations between neighbours. Regional cooperation agreements are especially frequent in the Baltic area, South-Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, while multilateral frameworks are generally subscribed to by ANVIL countries. There is no evident pattern in the active use of such mechanisms, but some countries have been reluctant to request (more than local cross-border) external assistance during the period of investigation.

2.3.1 Statutory basis
The legal frameworks concerning civil security have traditionally had a close connection to national security, understood in a conventional sense of protection from foreign violent/armed threats and (in some cases) from internal uprisings. Statutory bases are often rooted in Cold War civil defence legislation. Since the end of the Cold War and continuing between 2000 and 2012, all systems underwent considerable reform. In the case of the new member states, the post-Cold War transformation has been particularly deep, not only with a view to EU enlargement but also with
regard to the general transformation of security authorities in previously militarized regimes.\textsuperscript{12} Comparative law has been extensively used in Central and Eastern European countries where legislators had to reconstruct their legal systems. Romania, for example, has borrowed its legal and structural system from the French. The legal framework concerning civil security in Serbia is a result of comparative studies that most resemble the Czech model. Meanwhile, in many Western European states - among them Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland - the reform process has revolved around the distribution of competences in multilevel governance and the development of specialized networks and coordination functions for new threat scenarios.

The emergent dominant solution for legislative frameworks are \textit{umbrella laws for emergency management that leave many more sectors and geographically specific tasks to other areas of functional legislation}. 13 out of 22 ANVIL countries, including especially the generally centralised (Croatia, France, Hungary, Malta, Romania, Serbia) but also some rather decentralised ones (Czech Republic, Ireland, Italy, Sweden, UK), have central statutory frameworks with one to two key laws. However, these central laws often go hand in hand with more narrow sets of legislation regulating distinct elements of crisis management, often alongside other issues. For example, in Sweden there are two main civil security laws, which are accompanied by ‘a myriad of additional acts and ordinances’ that regulate more specific aspects, such as health issues or the role of the armed forces.

Five ANVIL countries (Austria, Germany, Lithuania, Norway and Switzerland) have highly fragmented civil security legislation with more than six key laws. This fragmentation is mainly due to the existence of separate legal frameworks at national and regional levels.

The \textit{statutory competence for civil security is particularly complex in federal states} studied in ANVIL, namely Austria, Germany and Switzerland. In line with the importance of the subsidiary principle in the legal systems in these states, the legislative competence for peacetime crisis management lies primarily on the regional levels whereas federal competences originated from wartime civil defence, which results in a fragmented legislation. In Austria, for example, the federal level has the legislative competence regarding disaster prevention and preparedness, while regional \textit{Länder} have the competence relating to crisis response (with the exception of some areas, such as epidemics and mining disasters). In Germany a similar diversity of \textit{Länder} laws coexists with an extended federal law on civil protection that increasingly deals with natural disasters. Thus, both the nascent borders of civil security and the tendency for decentralisation are visible in the legal dimension, though to very different degrees.

\textsuperscript{12} Yet, other states, such as Finland, Ireland or Switzerland, also had to - and sometimes still have to - struggle with this transformation in particular respects. Furthermore, a few major countries, including Germany and Italy, still have separate systems of legislations for civil defence and civil protection including respective constitutional prescriptions.
2.3.2 Political dimension

Political responsibility for emergencies and civil security typically accords with the regular political structures and set-up of the country (see section 2.2.1). In six countries (Estonia, France, Latvia, Malta, Norway, and Slovakia), the central government had the main responsibility for civil security. However, in most cases executive responsibility for crisis preparedness and response is decentralized to the local/regional levels. In 14 studied countries, executive responsibility rests first and foremost with the local level while the Czech Republic and Poland award executive responsibility to the regional level. In most countries, elected mayors and/or district commissioners play an important role in local and regional civil crisis management and often lead civil security steering groups or commissions on the regional level. Again, local executive responsibility is particularly marked in the federalist states. In Italy, accountability moved progressively from central to local authorities. Overall, these patterns show a high degree of compliance with the four regional groups described above (see Figure 3) with regard to the levels of centralisation and decentralisation.

Policy formulation usually resides with central governments. Policy formulation is a central task in 17 of the studied countries and a regional task only in three federalist states (Austria, Germany and Switzerland). However, policymaking on civil security can be a complex exercise involving many different levels, departments and agencies as the issue touches upon many areas and the portfolio of associated actors. For example, in France the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, a joint agency under the authority of the prime minister, working closely with the president’s office, and the Ministry of the Interior, has a coordination function but ‘each ministry is in turn responsible within its area of competence for preparation and implementation of incumbent civil security and defence measures’. In strongly consociational and federal countries like Austria and Switzerland this coordination process across ministries and sectors is further complicated through various multi-actor and multilevel forums.

A declaration of a state of emergency can have different political and legal implications and can include situations such as war or conflict, civil unrest and natural or man-made disaster. Only three of the 22 studied countries do not have formal legal provisions allowing an emergency declaration, namely Austria, Sweden and Switzerland. The two latter states have not been part of the major European Wars of the 20th century and all three states officially embrace the principle of neutrality, which may explain the absence of the possibility of declaring a state of emergency at the state level. A declaration of a state of emergency typically includes the possibility of derogation from civil liberties and the constitutional separation of powers. The European Convention on Human Rights (of

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13 There is ambiguous evidence for Estonia.
which all studied states are parties of) restricts extensive derogation from human rights to the existence of a public emergency that threatens the life of the nation. Legislation regarding state of emergency is therefore most often focused on military aggression.

The new focus on natural and man-made hazards has challenged the traditional, military-oriented emergency laws. Such a situation triggers different needs than a state of war or conflict (and the activation of martial laws), though some limiting measures might be more important, as for example the derogation from property rights. Therefore, the majority of studied countries have made separate provisions for declaring a state of disaster. For instance, the new Polish and Hungarian constitutions separate between the state of emergency and the state of natural disaster, and despite its name, the latter relates to natural as well as man-made disasters. Italy allows for the declaration of a state of calamity, which regulates access to the National Solidarity Fund. Only six of the studied countries lack such particular legal provisions for peacetime disasters and emergencies that primarily enable facilitated operational coordination but may also justify some special rights and duties. These are France, Ireland, Malta, Netherlands, Sweden and UK. However, these countries can often draw on some other emergency clauses, such as ‘a variety of emergency laws in the Netherlands’. The remaining sixteen states have chosen different legal and constitutional solutions. The operational use of special disaster and emergency provisions in Norway and Sweden is especially limited by the principle of conformity, according to which authorities still have to follow normal standards and opportunities for extraordinary acts are constrained.

2.3.3 Operational dimension

The case studies reveal very different arrangements regarding the number and structure of implementing agencies for civil security, which do not fall into exclusive clusters. Typically, operational crisis management during most scenarios is a shared responsibility of several local agencies and emergencies responders, most notably fire brigades, emergency medical services, police and voluntary emergency organisations. These agencies have their daily routines, but also take up temporary extra responsibility in case of disasters and major crises. As mentioned above, they use different procedures for upscaling (from the local to regional to national or state level) and coordination. Especially when it comes to special, complex risks a number of functional agencies kick in and sometimes can resume overall coordination (compare section 2.1.3). This relates especially to events demanding specialised expertise, such as epidemics and incidents involving radiological materials, but can also pertain to more mundane scenarios such as traffic accidents.

14 While the state of calamity refers to crisis affecting specific sectors, the state of emergency is declared when crisis and disasters undermine the functioning of the majority of society structures.
Nevertheless, **nationally specific legal and political setups remain the primary variables** that determine the involvement, shape and competences of lead agencies in civil security, particularly at **higher levels of government**. Many countries have created **single lead agencies** with an integral responsibility for crisis management at the national level, but with **varying executive responsibilities and competences**. For example, the Croatian National Protection and Rescue Directorate and the Serbian Sector for Emergency Management are in charge of overall coordination from the central level in the case of disaster while the National Directorate General for Disaster Management in Hungary has ‘supervisory competence’ for other agencies. Where existent, the powers of national lead agencies tend to be more constrained in less centralized countries. The Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning or the Swedish Civil Contingency Agency might be considered ‘lead agencies’ at the national level but implementation here is directed towards the local level in a generally rather decentralised system. In Germany and Switzerland, federal civil protection offices primarily are mere platforms and service providers for regional/local crisis management forces, which clearly maintain operational control in most scenarios.

Similarly, countries have **different options for permanent or ad-hoc crisis coordination centres**. Croatia, Hungary, Italy, Malta, and Serbia use existing functional agencies as emergency response coordination centres during disasters and crises. In other countries, such centres are pre-designated, but not permanently staffed for the purpose (such as in Poland and Finland). Even federalist states like Germany and Switzerland have taken steps to design countrywide crisis coordination centres, but, except for specialised countrywide scenarios, they cannot exercise direct operational command. In many other situations and countries, coordination structures are organized on an ad-hoc basis, and therefore differ depending on the situation authorities are confronted with. The locus of the coordination centre then depends both on the geographic scope of the incident and the jurisdiction governing this area (with generally the lowest possible administrative level in charge), and also on the emergency disciplines or sectors involved (most notably in Ireland and UK, where the coordinating commander is appointed on the spot from the most relevant discipline).

**Risk-based planning and formalised risk assessments have proliferated to very different degrees and in different ways** across ANVIL countries. As a leading example, Switzerland has taken a number of steps to advance explicit risk-based planning for natural hazards management at various levels of government, including through special tools and guidelines, and requires agencies to check their investments based on risk calculations. Otherwise commitments and requirements vary strongly. Two countries formally base their efforts on national risks assessments: Hungary and Malta. However, these efforts are not always run regularly, as in the case of Malta. In France, risk assessment and emergency management plans are also drafted at national level, but other levels
(departments and defence and security zones) have also to draft their own assessments and plans according to the national document, taking into account their specificities. Conversely, seven countries require generic crisis or emergency management plans from their de-centralised jurisdictions (be they counties, states, regions or municipalities): Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, and Poland. In Norway, Romania, Sweden and the UK, municipalities and regions seem to mostly base their emergency planning on regional risk assessments, while Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland promote or require risk assessments at all levels of government and Serbia is planning to introduce a combination of centralised and decentralised risk assessment. Yet it is very difficult to assess how far countries make substantive use of such formal risk assessments and risk-based planning in practice. More detailed analyses from some case studies suggest fragmented or uneven implementation across issue-areas (Norway) or regional units (Germany), while most other national analysis do not report on risk mapping as an important feature.

The uniformity and compatibility of emergency communication systems seems to be an issue in some countries. Austria, France (ANTARES), Germany, and the Netherlands (C2000) have struggled with technological setbacks and/or difficulties of slow implementation in the regions. In other countries, problems occur in information exchange due to a lack of common operational standards and routines on situation assessments and reports (like in the case of Switzerland), or slow implementation of compatible technology in all regions (like in the Netherlands). Surprisingly, issues on uniformity or integration of systems do not clearly relate to geographic size of the country or its advanced technological infrastructures. Croatia, Lithuania, Romania, and Switzerland report well-functioning emergency telecom/radio systems (Croatia’s and Lithuania’s integrated 112 centres, and the Swiss Polycom system), while Romania reports efforts toward the establishment of an effective management information system (SMISU).

2.3.4 External dimension

Most of the countries examined in ANVIL have signed formal bilateral agreements on emergency assistance with nearly all of their neighbours. 11 countries have signed agreements with all neighbours and six (Austria, Croatia, France, Hungary, Italy and Poland) have agreement in place with all but one neighbour. The most important cases of non-agreements are those relating to past or present conflicts or difficult political relationships. This applies to the case of Poland and Belarus and most strikingly to Serbia, which does not have agreements with most of its neighbouring countries due its long-term political isolation after the Balkan wars of the 1990s. However, apart from existing treaties with Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro, agreements with Croatia, Hungary and Romania
are moving towards finalisation and negotiations with Bulgaria and Macedonia are underway. Finland, Norway and Sweden do not have distinct bilateral agreements because they are embedded in a multifaceted multilateral framework among all Scandinavian countries – including the Agreement on Rescue Services between the Nordic Countries (NORDRED) from 1989 – that already includes respective provisions. Overall, the legal basis for cross-border assistance, thus, is well established.

All ANVIL countries are firmly embedded in multilateral arrangements for civil emergency management. The states that stand out with regard to their number of memberships are Croatia, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Sweden. However, it is difficult to come up with exact numbers as most organisations either handle civil security as a minor issue alongside general political portfolios (UN, NATO, OECD) or broadly related functional concerns (e.g. river management, environmental protection). Regional cooperation is particularly well established in the Baltic area, South-Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean (see the ANVIL synthesis report on regional organisations).

There is no evident pattern in requests for assistance. During the period 2000-2012, only four ANVIL countries asked for and received large-scale assistance during major emergencies more than two times (France, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia) whereas six countries received assistance one or two times (Czech Republic, Ireland, Poland, Romania, Sweden, UK) and eleven countries did not receive assistance (Austria, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland). Thus, assistance does not systematically correlate with indicators like size, degree of decentralization, regional location or economic capacity. To some degree, it is simply a matter of the actual occurrence of major disasters. However, especially the German case study refers to an attitude that stresses the explicit belief that bigger countries should be able to handle large crises alone. Below the level of formal assistance during major crises, local cross-border cooperation during everyday emergencies often prospers on the basis of established contacts between ground-level officials and agencies. For example, there is long-standing cooperation between German and Swiss emergency services along the River Rhine and German fire brigades provided local assistance to Dutch colleagues during the Enschede fireworks disaster in 2000. Few case studies refer to specialised forces and arrangements that explicitly support deployment during international assistance missions alongside regular responsibilities for domestic crisis managements. Notable examples include the Estonian Disasters Relief Team, Germany’s Federal Agency for Technical Relief and Swiss Rescue.

2.4 The relations between civil security systems and citizens

15 Serbia did not receive major external assistance in response to a specific incident-related request but Russia regularly stations airplanes in Southern Serbia during the summer in order to fight forest fires.
ANVIL surveys three aspects of civil security systems’ relations with citizens: (i) state-to-citizens and citizens-to-state expectations, (ii) information on preparedness and response and (iii) education. Formal citizen obligations generally focus on **specific contributions during acute emergencies at the request of operational agencies** whereas more regular and general demands for crisis preparation are rare. Citizens expect government to ensure a basic degree of protection, but **disasters are not among the major concerns** of citizens, though levels of concern are higher in some countries (especially ‘new’ members and Italy). **Information and education** of citizens about preparedness and response are **mostly passive** and there is an overall **rather low level of informedness** among citizens. Traditional tools like TV/radio warnings and alarm sirens are still dominant, though there is a nascent trend indicating the more frequent use of new technologies and applications. Moreover, systems for alarming and warning during impending and unfolding crises seem to be more developed than those for outreach and education.

### 2.4.1 Expectations

As regards **state-to-citizens expectations**, the essential citizen obligation is to **comply with the authorities’ ordinances when a crisis occurs**, with potentially more invasive measures during states of emergency or disaster (see section 2.3.2). However, there are variations in the number and scope of legal provisions regulating citizens’ responsibilities in the case of disasters or major accidents. In 12 ANVIL countries (Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden, UK) citizens are formally obliged to temporarily and actively contribute in the event of a disaster upon request by public authorities. In six countries (Finland, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Romania and Switzerland), citizens have more formal obligations regarding crisis preparedness and responses including both temporary participation in disaster management when requested by public authorities and regular private responsibilities for disaster management, such as mandatory civil protection service or obligatory insurances. In contrast, citizens’ obligations and responsibilities in civil security are not formally specified in three countries (Malta, Netherlands and Serbia).

Compared with other issues, it seems that **disasters are not a major concern for citizens** of the ANVIL countries. According to the Eurobarometer report 383 from 2012 (see Figure 5), out of the 18 countries for which such data is available the generally lowest levels of concern regarding natural disasters, man-made disasters and terrorist attacks can be observed in three rather decentralised, high-capacity, North-Western member states (Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden). Overall, the highest rates of concern were found in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. **Variations by country regarding specific risks** complicate, but generally confirm this
clustering. The highest levels of citizens feeling ‘very concerned’ regarding natural disasters are indicated in Czech Republic (51 per cent), Italy (49), Poland (46) and Slovakia (45); regarding man-made disasters in Latvia (49), Czech Republic (47), Hungary (46) and Italy (46); and for terrorist attacks in Latvia (41), Czech Republic (45) Italy (36) and Poland (33). For each of the three types of risks, the lowest levels of concern are indicated for Finland (5, 15, 10), the Netherlands (4, 10, 5) and Sweden (4, 12, 8). Thus, in general many new member states – but also Italy – tend to be especially concerned while citizens in the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries are least concerned. Estonia seems to a positive outlier among ‘new’ member states. Yet, the data is inconclusive as to whether this is due to the high quality of civil security systems, a lower exposure to risks or some cultural predispositions (see section 2.2.2). Several case studies, including those with countries with comparatively high levels of concern, also highlight that concern about civil emergencies and crisis in general remains low in comparison to other national issues for concern, such as economic growth, unemployment or environmental protection.

Figure 5: Citizen concern and types of threats

Percentage of citizens feeling ‘very concerned’ about natural disasters, man-made disasters and terrorist attacks

Source: Special Eurobarometer 383

According to the findings on citizens’ willingness to voluntarily participate in emergencies, it seems that in most countries citizens are ready to actively assist, though in different formats and in the

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16 Not available for Croatia, Norway, Serbia and Switzerland.
face of growing challenges from broader societal trends (see also sections 2.5.1 and 3.3.3). A majority of 14 countries (Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Sweden) point to a high percentage of citizens who are generally willing to help and volunteer in a case of disaster. Yet forms of voluntary engagement vary significantly depending on cultural and historical background. Some countries, such as Austria, have highly established structures of voluntary organizations dealing with civil security issues, such as fire brigades and/or national Red Cross organizations, which are formally included in civil security arrangements. Although Switzerland made citizens’ participation mandatory in many areas through the militia system, there is also an increasingly important role of volunteerism, for example in fire brigades. In contrast, the UK, for example, defines the participation of citizens in much less formal and institutionalised ways. A striking finding is that case studies for some ‘new’ member states – most notably in Hungary, Poland, Romania and Serbia – note that citizens have ambivalent attitudes regarding voluntary engagement in emergencies, which may go back to volunteerism campaigns during Communist rule. Hence, these societies apparently tend to have high expectations of the state in the protection of citizens but also remain wary of state institutions and their efforts to incorporate citizens.

2.4.2 Information

Crisis management requires information to citizens on both preparedness and response. Overall, the case study findings indicate that conventional methods are still the dominant whereas the use of more recent technological developments is growing but still limited. Overall, mechanisms for citizen information tend to focus on warnings and immediate crisis communication. Information on preparedness, activation and self-help is mostly distributed rather passively via Web sites and brochures (see also the section on education below). Education tools, such as training in schools and by non-profit organisations or awareness-raising campaigns via TV, are not a very frequent occurrence. It is interesting that Norway and Finland appear to be particularly active in relation to almost all available instruments whereas some countries with traditionally rather passive political cultures, such as Austria, Poland and Switzerland, seem to be more reluctant in their efforts to inform and reach out to citizens in more active and unconventional ways.

The most common method for providing information on warnings and alarms during impending and unfolding crisis to the wider public is via TV and radio. Fourteen ANVIL countries have systems for radio/TV warning at both, local/regional and national level (Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Norway, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Switzerland, UK). Ireland, Lithuania and Sweden have those systems at national level, while in the Netherlands and Poland this
system is set at local/regional level. In most of the aforementioned countries, the broadcasting operators are obliged to emit information on potential risks and crisis occurred upon request of the relevant authority, usually free of charge. According to the respective case studies, it seems that Italy does not have a system for radio/TV warnings. Information is not provided for Latvia and Malta.

Nationwide systems of **alarm sirens** are the main mechanism for warning citizens during an **immediate crisis**. This is the case in fifteen ANVIL countries (Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden and Switzerland). Hence, when it comes to especially urgent tasks, such as evacuations, or exceptional scenarios like dam breaks, established technologies with the ability to reach all citizens in a targeted area without any technological barriers are still considered useful. However, the use and number of sirens have been questioned since the end of the Cold War and may further decrease. Germany and the UK have incrementally deconstructed their nationwide systems. The Finnish public warning sirens will be supplemented by mobile alarms, while the current system in France will soon be replaced by a new System for Alert and Information of the population, and after completed by diffusion of messages on mobile phones. The national system of alarm sirens in Serbia is not in a functional condition due to a lack of funding and equipment.

**Web pages are another popular mechanism** to inform citizens on risks and threat levels as well as during crisis situations. Central Web sites with updated information on crisis events at the national level exist in Croatia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden. Czech Republic has such Web site at local/regional level, while in France, Hungary, Italy, Norway and Romania this kind of Web site exists on both, national and local/regional levels. In six countries - Austria, Malta, Serbia, Slovakia, Switzerland and UK – there is no single comprehensive Web page on crisis information, but these countries often have a number of available sources on different issues. This information is not provided for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

There are also **significant variations among the countries regarding the use of new technologies**, including social media and mobile applications. In order to update citizens on relevant crisis issues, the governments of Finland, Italy, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Sweden use social media (Facebook, Twitter, etc.) at the national level; Ireland and the Netherlands at the local/regional level; while Hungary, Norway and UK inform citizens on crisis via social media at both, local/regional and national levels. The governments of Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Malta, Romania and Switzerland do not systematically use social media for these purposes. No information is provided for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Further, it seems that the **use of mobile applications for reaching citizens is not very advanced**. France is the only country that has a mobile application for crisis information at the national level, while the Czech Republic, Finland, Latvia, the Netherlands and
Norway have a mobile application at both, local/regional and national levels. It seems that all of the other ANVIL countries do not have this kind of application, though some of them currently run projects on this issue.

The proportion of citizens who feel informed about crisis preparedness and response in their countries seems partially related to these varying levels of technical investments (but see also following section on education). According to the special Eurobarometer report 328 from 2009 (see Figure 6), the countries with the highest proportions of citizens’ feeling informed on crisis preparedness and response are Finland (43 per cent/52 per cent, respectively) and the Netherlands (46/50). The countries with the lowest share for both preparedness and response are Ireland (17/14), Latvia (14/15) and Lithuania (18/12). In both cases, there are no definite indications for the reasons, but Finland and Netherlands are among the countries using various information and education technologies as well as among the least concerned countries. The EU average of 27 per cent suggests an overall low level of information among citizens regarding crisis preparedness and response, with values usually much below 50 per cent.

Figure 6: Information on Preparedness and Response

Percentage of citizens feeling ‘informed’ about disaster preparedness and response

![Graph showing information on disaster preparedness and response across different EU countries]

Source: Special Eurobarometer 328

Not available for Croatia, Norway, Serbia and Switzerland.
2.4.3 Education

Education and awareness-raising among citizens on civil security issues is generally the task of government agencies. With the purpose of informing citizens, the governments and/or NGOs of all ANVIL countries produce various information materials (guides, brochures, leaflets, etc.) that are usually offered both online and in paper. Yet as outlined above, this material is usually distributed passively or made available upon request. The case studies reveal only a few examples of more proactive outreach activities at the local level, such as the Austrian security information centres.

There are significant variations between ANVIL countries regarding TV campaigns on crisis issues run by governments. Six out of 22 ANVIL countries (Estonia, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway and UK) usually run these kinds of campaigns once per year, while other five countries (Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Romania and Serbia) run campaigns more extensively. An interesting character of the Romanian model is the relatively active way of using TV channels in campaigning. For instance, the collaboration via street TV-screens of messages for education, information and awareness of the citizens seems to be in active use.

Apart from basic first aid courses which several countries require for a driver’s license, civil emergency training is part of official school curricula in eight ANVIL countries (Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania and Slovakia). Interestingly, except for Finland and France, these are all among the rather concerned societies mentioned above, which may be taken as evidence for the mixed effects of school training or as a sign of positive threat awareness. In most other cases, civil emergency training is offered by various voluntary actors and/or respected agencies for voluntary staff, certain professional groups and the interested public. Specifically, in Hungary and the Netherlands these training activities are organized for professionals or members of respected organizations only. In Austria, Estonia, France, Germany, Ireland, Malta, Poland, Serbia, Switzerland and UK protection and rescue training programmes are mostly directed towards professionals with some limited public outreach. In Croatia, Finland, Italy, Norway, Romania and Sweden there are wide-spread training programmes aimed at both professionals and the general population. It seems that societal/voluntary actors do not offer civil emergency training in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, while this information is not available for Latvia and Lithuania.

There are also considerable variations among the ANVIL countries regarding government support for scientific research and/or technological developments on civil security issues. Austria was the first country in Europe to launch a national security research programme (KIRAS), modelled on the example of the European Commission security research programme. By now, fifteen ANVIL countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, Norway, Poland,
Romania, Slovakia, Sweden and UK) run programs to fund research/technological developments on civil security/crisis management, though the amount available and the degree of systematisation vary substantially. Although Switzerland does not have a formal security research program, public agencies fund numerous pertinent research projects and institutions dealing with the management of specific disasters. As regards Croatia, there is a lack of scientific research on civil security but the Mine Action Centre and its Centre for Testing, Development and Training as well as the role of the National Meteorological and Hydrological Service are relevant and active in this context. There is an official recognition in Serbia that to date there has been an inadequate use of knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience.

2.5 The role of the private sector in maintaining civil security

In addition to state-citizen relations, the ANVIL case studies investigated the active role of the private sector, both non-profit and profit-oriented, which reveals further substantial differences across countries. The degree of organisational coherence and formalisation of cooperation between public agencies and societal actors varies considerably. The official role of voluntary organisations is particularly pronounced in Central European states with a neocorporatist tradition, which also have the highest percentage of active volunteers. However, countries with a strong role of volunteers are also faced with growing challenges from societal trends, such as urbanisation and growing workloads, which may undermine the sustainability of their current civil security traditions. For citizens in some former Communist member states ‘volunteering’ and ‘partnership’ sometimes still echo badly.

There are also varying degrees and forms of interaction with profit-oriented actors. Outsourcing of core tasks in crisis management is not a major trend. Private companies usually play a limited role based on legal safety requirements and special tasks in local emergency management around production facilities or infrastructures. However, some smaller ‘new’ member states with weaker capacities seem to be more interested in striking partnerships between governmental agencies and profit-oriented private entities than North-Western European countries. One can also discern a nascent trend across all countries towards increased coordination and networking with for-profit actors with regard to new security threats, such as critical infrastructure protection or cyber-security.

2.5.1. The role of societal/non-profit organisations

In principle, civil security systems logically involve diverse organisations with different profiles and areas of specialisations. Voluntary fire brigades are particularly significant and in some cases even largely substitute professional forces. In addition to national Red Cross associations, which often
benefit from established privileges, there are also various other emergency rescue organizations. This includes many special national and local organisations as well as some that operate in several countries, most notably the St. John Ambulance Service and the Order of Malta. Further capacities are added by voluntary organisations for more specialised civil security tasks, such as mountain and cave rescue or lifeguarding.  

National civil protection organisations, which previously fulfilled armed-conflict focussed responsibilities in a number of countries, have generally undergone a successful transformation and assumed a wider range of responsibilities in civil security. For example, the Swedish Voluntary Defence Organisation and the Austrian Civil Protection Association focus on training and education to activate citizens and stimulate self-help with regard to various disasters and emergencies. The Irish ‘Civil Defence’ has come to encompass numerous specialized emergency voluntary services dealing with civil security issues, such as the Cave Rescue Teams and River Rescue Units. The Germany Federal Technical Relief Agency offers personnel as well as heavy equipment, such as water treatment units or bulldozers, for domestic and international disaster assistance.

Overall, voluntary organisations are cited as an important contribution for civil security activities in most ANVIL countries. In all cases, the management of exceptional crises should involve non-profit organisations. During regular emergencies, voluntary organisations play a legally mandated role in almost all aspects of civil security in nine countries (Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Malta, Norway, Romania, Sweden) and in specific aspects of civil security in eight countries (Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Switzerland). They do not play an official role in the regular provision of civil security in the UK. No data is available for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. However, there is still great diversity within these groups and there may be a large gap between formal designation of responsibilities to private actors and the actual level and frequency of voluntary engagement.

Organisational coherence and formalisation are highest in Austria and Germany with their strong neocorporatist traditions. Austria can serve as an illustrative example of a case in which voluntary organizations are an integral part of crisis management at all levels and in almost all respects. Voluntary fire brigades, emergency rescue services and specialised organisations are formally embedded in public structures and are also members of political consultation and coordination forums. Here, maintaining a high level of voluntarism is regarded importantly as the ‘operational

18 Nearly all voluntary organisations in civil security assume further tasks related to education and training of members, other professionals and the wider public (see section 2.4.3).

19 In Serbia, the general role and position of voluntary organisations are not defined, but the Serbian Red Cross and the Mountain Rescue Service can come into play during some specialised scenarios.
backbone’ of crisis management. The formalised inclusion of voluntary organisations in preparedness and response operations is similarly marked in Germany. In both countries, voluntary organisations do not only provide resources and personnel during crises on behalf of public agencies but also directly participate in crisis coordination centres and task forces building on their local chapters across the countries. This decentralised volunteerism is generally seen as a success model ensuring the availability of local resources and knowledge as well as a basic degree of legitimacy.

There are diverse formats for cooperation with voluntary organisations and **forms and degrees of recognition vary substantially**. Serbia offers a contrasting model to the Austro-German model as the relation between the state and voluntary organisations – with the partial exception of the Red Cross and, to a lesser extent, the Mountain Rescue Service – is not formalised and private participation in state activities is generally low. The UK prefers guidelines for individual and targeted voluntary engagement by citizens over the formalised and comprehensive inclusion of voluntary organisations. France presents a case of an intermediate model where volunteers are very active but the level of inclusion in public operations is rather low as state authorities display a lack of interest in and knowledge about non-profit organisations. Like other Eastern or South-Eastern European countries (see section 2.4.1), the Romanian case study explicitly refers to a wide-spread scepticism towards official ‘partnerships’ and ‘volunteering’ due to negative experiences during Communist rule. As a consequence, the country has only a few civil security NGOs and many of them focus on environmental issues. However, even in those cases there seems to be a basic mainstream model of volunteer involvement through voluntary fire brigades and emergency assistance through the Red Cross and emergency services. But there are also some exceptions to society-centred forms of organisation. At least formally, Switzerland applies the militia principle also to fire brigades.

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**Figure 7: Number of volunteers per 1,000 capita**
Consistent with these different traditions and organisational structures, the **listed number of volunteers varies considerably** across countries. Less than half of countries considered maintain official registers for volunteers and the numbers are often approximations or even not available. Moreover, the status of volunteers can be unclear and many volunteers work in several organisations, while other more hierarchical civil security systems may over-report on the number of volunteers in contrast to genuine popular involvement (see above on lacking institutional trust). This qualifies the inferences that can be drawn from a direct comparison (see Figure 7). Nonetheless, it is instructive to survey the range of numbers and practices that underlines the diversity of national civil security systems. In absolute terms, Germany can draw on the service of approximately 1.8 million volunteers whereas there are only about 8,000 in Ireland. When we take into account the size of the population, among the **fifteen countries for which any numbers are available** the highest numbers of volunteers per 1,000 capita can be recorded for Austria (49), Hungary (43), Czech Republic (31), Slovakia (31), Germany (22) and Switzerland (20) (see Figure 6). Though voluntary organisations in Norway and Romania seem to play an official role in almost all aspects of civil security, they have a rather low number of volunteers.\(^21\) Interestingly, Austria is followed by three countries with which it has close historical ties and two other primarily German-speaking countries. These countries share a certain **neocorporatist legacy** that benefits the emergence of formalised structures for societal participation through officially registered membership organisations.

\(^{20}\) Approximate estimates according to available sources. Data are available for only 15 of 22 countries.

\(^{21}\) Out of this group no data is available for Malta and Sweden.
However, voluntary organisations in these countries also face challenges from societal meta-trends, such as domestic migration, growing workloads and demographic change. Civil security agencies are searching for alternative models. Since 2007, Austria has run the ‘Team Austria’ initiative, which seeks to motivate people to volunteer for disaster assistance work without having to become a formal member of a voluntary organisation and having to commit to the resulting duties. This model was already adopted by Germany in a pilot project and Poland and the UK have expressed an interest in transferring the concept. This may indicate a growing convergence in the future, at least when it comes to the role of citizens in response to exceptional crises that require peak human resource capacities.

2.5.2. The role of profit-oriented organisations

In most countries, profit-oriented actors are clearly less involved in civil security and crisis management than voluntary, non-profit organisations. Outsourcing of core civil security tasks, such as emergency medicine, is not a dominant trend in European civil security systems, but there are marked cross-country differences. The basic model shared across cases is that profit-oriented corporations have to observe extensive legal requirements for safety regulations, emergency plans or the maintenance of private fire fighting and rescue services for hazardous production sites. In many cases this also entails the partial delegation of some emergency rescue services with regard to private assets, vessels, installations and related personnel, while exceptional crises may trigger mechanisms for forced cooperation or use of private assets.

In particular, all countries studied by ANVIL seem to require private actors to observe some form of industrial safety and building regulations and have special rules for companies operating hazardous materials or posing specific risks, such as mines or refineries. In some countries, such top-down cooptation is especially pronounced. In particular, countries with a strong civil defence tradition, most notably the Nordic and Central European countries, often mandate companies to store specific goods and maintain stockpiles for the case of sustained emergencies, which are a rare occurrence. In some cases, this also includes mandatory logistical services by railway, telecommunications or trucking companies as well as the duty to maintain critical services, such as energy and water supply, during crisis. Many of the relevant companies are former state-owned monopolists and, hence, have traditionally close ties to the government. Serbia is a somewhat special case as the industry is still undergoing a process of privatisation and many critical companies remain publicly owned.

Beyond these basic similarities and formal legal provisions, case studies reveal varying degrees and forms of regular engagement with private businesses. Some smaller, new member states with weak voluntary sectors seem to have been more willing to outsource civil security tasks in order to
substitute for the lack of public and voluntary resources. For example, the three Baltic countries pay particular importance to the role of the private sector at all levels of preparedness and response whereas the role of non-profit relief organizations is limited as this sector has not yet developed extensively after their independence in 1991. An interesting phenomenon is taking place, as during the past decade the private security companies have gained a more essential role in maintaining the civil security in Baltic countries. In Croatia and Poland, public civil security agencies actively outsource civil security tasks to private companies through subcontracting and tenders. This includes special tasks like the response to oil spills and mining disasters, but also the provision of shelters and sanitary equipment. Other small states, such as Malta, are also heavily reliant on active involvement of private actors to muster sufficient crisis management capacities. For instance, privately owned resources can be made available for the delivery of civil protection through informal decisions and agreements between the national civil protection department and the local communities.

On the opposite side, Austria with its extensive voluntary sector explicitly stresses that crisis management remains an ‘act of solidarity’ that should not be subjected to competitive market mechanisms. In Norway and Sweden, profit-oriented organisations also play a marginal role in operational crisis management. France appears to illustrate an intermediate position. There is a relative indifference from the public and a lack of knowledge and recognition from political authorities towards voluntary organisations and private companies are seen as more efficient, but public-private partnerships are still a nascent trend due to unresolved issues, such as funding. In the UK, with its traditional economic liberalism, engagement with the private sector is usually not formalised and legally mandated, but public agencies can and often do subcontract private actors for specific tasks through voluntary ad-hoc agreements. The Dutch civil security system has some special features when it comes to public-private partnerships. This stems from the historical bond between the government and companies in working for salvaging ships or shipwrecks after incidents at sea. Thus, the evidence suggests that Western and Northern European countries, on average, are less inclined to outsource official civil security tasks, but nevertheless form a variety of partnerships based on nationally-specific cultures of cooperation with private actors.

However, new functional pressures and growing EU activities in areas like critical infrastructure protection and ‘cyber-security’ have demanded the inclusion of specialised knowledge and enhanced outreach to the developers and operators of the central technologies and infrastructures, even in cases where private participation has been traditionally low. This translates into a series of public-private partnerships and common platforms for coordination and information exchange in various countries, such as Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy and Switzerland. These structures remain
under development and could not be consistently tested and compared by ANVIL, but there are tentative signs of a growing convergence in this specialised and recent area of civil security.

3. Quality Measures

ANVIL approached the challenge to measure the quality of civil security systems in terms of varying criteria and perceptions of effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy. In defining quality, it has been outlined above that different systems can work equally well and obtain the same degree of acceptance. In response to different crises and shaped by different administrative traditions, risk cultures and legal constraints in the different systems have evolved along different paths. The ANVIL project therefore takes an inductive approach towards the understanding of quality. Thus, civil security systems have been assessed in so far as one could identify national sources of evidence and preferences on the dimensions of effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy.

3.1 Effectiveness

In assessing effectiveness, the country case studies focused on the outcomes of incident-related political and professional inquiries as well as limits to national capacities expressed through calls for international assistance and/or the declaration of states of emergency. The number and methodology of professional and political inquiries differs significantly across ANVIL countries and they often do not explicitly examine the effectiveness of civil security systems. Generally, most evaluations suggest

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22 Effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy are analysed in 19 out of 22 countries, as there are no data in country studies on Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
stakeholders believe that their larger systems are rather well prepared for most crises while they also see some system-specific issues to be further improved as well as distinct deficits in the handling of concrete incidents. There is no evidence for a strong, systematic relationship between specific operational, cultural or political features of civil security systems on the one hand and quality measures on the other hand. Incidents and inquiries normally lead to targeted adjustments rather than full-scale reforms. Experiences of disaster and requests of assistance do not provide sufficient evidence on effectiveness, even if there are clear differences between countries.

3.1.1 Professional and political inquiries

The number of professional inquiries differs due to diverse inquiry cultures as well as varying exposures to disasters. For most of the countries, there is no precise data on the number of professional inquiries. This lack of data can be due to different review practices, transparency rules and the difficulty to trace administrative behaviour at multiple levels. Still, the following patterns apply. Some countries (Netherlands, Sweden) feature a strong professional investigation culture and a high density of evaluations and inquiries. In the Netherlands, the Inspection for Public Order and Safety even has a structural investigation program on ‘the state of the art’ in all security regions with respect to generic civil protection tasks. In most countries, the number of inquiries is rather low. Cited reasons include a small number of major crises (e.g. Malta), legalistic and consensus-oriented political and administrative traditions (e.g. Switzerland) or a fragile balance between political actors (e.g. Serbia). This does not mean, however, that inquiries, where they occur, cannot occasionally have major effects. In Norway, the 2011 Utøya and Oslo attacks served as a trigger event that shook the entire civil security system and initiated a series of investigations that produced a number of recommendations and initiated changes to the financial, institutional, operational, and strategic focus of the system.

There are also differences in style and methodology. In most of the analyzed countries professional inquiries are conducted by civil security agencies, but some, like Finland, also use external experts and evaluators. This country also has a particular overview body – the Safety Investigation Authority– that investigates all major civil security emergencies and accidents regardless of their nature. The Swedish National Audit Office is mandated to carry out independent assessments of public authorities and agencies to control whether existing rules and regulations are followed, whether results and goals are achieved and how government funds are spent. In 2008, it carried out an assessment of the government’s capacities in crisis management and its governance of societal preparedness during major crises. In other countries, assessments of civil security systems are conducted by disciplinary boards (Italy) or the General Accountancy Office (Hungary). In Austria, civil
security agencies and academic experts joined forces to evaluate the 2002 and 2005 floods, though the emphasis was on more technical issues like spatial planning and water engineering. All these inquiries are mainly incident-driven. An exception is the Euro 2012 in Poland—since there was no crisis, the report focused on the system’s organisation, novel solutions and lessons learnt. A further example of a non-incident driven review is the German large-scale civil security exercise series ‘LÜKEX’, which is based on highly formalised procedures for scenario planning and lessons learnt processes and often cited as one of the most important regular evaluation tools for the national civil security system.

**Political inquiries** are conducted by parliaments, official commissions and other political bodies. The number and nature of political inquiries is determined by the characteristics of the political system and national culture. This explains the significant differences among the analysed countries, while systematic data collection is further complicated by multiple political levels and different public record systems. Formally instituted political inquiries are not recorded in four countries (Czech Republic, Ireland, Malta and Slovakia), and are rather rare in most of the countries, except for France (at least 13) and the UK (11 really relevant). In the UK, political inquiries are initiated by the government or the Parliament. In Finland, the respective authorities have an independent role and their objectivity is highly protected by law, so the Parliament cannot exercise direct political control and surveillance in matters of crisis response and disaster management. Due to the limits on federal legal competences, the German Parliament cannot exercise close political control and review functions in matters of crisis response and disaster management. The only major incident-driven political inquiry during the last decade – the *Kirchbach* report on the 2002 Elbe flood – therefore was conducted under the auspices of authorities in the state of Saxony.

These diverse and intermittent evaluation practices underline the **difficulties of providing grounded, accurate and unambiguous assessments** of the overall level of effectiveness of a country’s civil security system. There are **no common standards** for effectiveness assessment in Europe, which could be expected to command wide acceptance and support. There is **no evidence for a strong, systematic relationship** between specific operational, cultural or political features of civil security systems (e.g. the degree of centralization or voluntary engagement) and effectiveness measures, as based on available national reports.

Yet in so far as national sources and data provide a reasonable inductive basis for judgement, various ANVIL case studies provide assessments of the respective national civil security systems. For example, the report on Croatia highlights how the effectiveness of the system depends on the type of the crisis event and on the particular actors that are involved. In some countries that boast comparatively high levels of human, institutional and technical resources for civil security (Germany, Sweden,
Switzerland, UK), reports refer to civil security officials’ assessments, which are generally positive and thus, perhaps, also more willing to publicly acknowledge further areas of improvement. Based on more specific experiences, a review of the UK’s reaction to the 2007 floods admits that emergency services confronted this severe crisis successfully, but also highlighted a number of lessons learnt. In Sweden, the SNAO attests an enhanced capacity to identify and alert when crises emerge as well as to analyse and coordinate crisis management actions but also notes a number of weaknesses due to the government’s insufficient monitoring capacities, lack of a comprehensive overview over existing crisis management capabilities and inadequate control over the actions undertaken by relevant authorities and agencies through government decisions.

The most common shortcomings identified in inquiries refer to problems in coordination, planning and preparation, forecasting and warning, control and overview, and expertise at the local level. Typically, the handling of concrete incidents often reveals unforeseen problems. But many of these problems, in particular coordination challenges, local expertise or a lack of forward planning, are also of a general nature and reach beyond the civil security system. Nonetheless, national actors tend to belief that their larger systems are adequate or well-prepared for most crises.

When it comes to consequences of inquiries, incidents normally lead to incremental adjustments. For instance, post-crisis inquiries and reports can lead to the amendment of certain laws, policy documents and plans, adjustments in the standard operating procedures, reallocation of resources, improvement in training and so on. On rare occasions, professional and political inquiries affect the entire civil security system in the aftermath of major crises. Among the countries in which the inquiries initiated profound reforms are France, Hungary, Norway, Sweden, UK and – to certain extent – Ireland. For instance, the 2004 tsunami influenced major changes in Swedish civil security. Similarly, the conclusions and evaluations after the mass killing on Utøya Island have produced a number of proposals for strengthening the Norwegian civil security system, a number of which have been backed by a revision of the national budget for 2012. But it is not always possible to link reform momentum to a single crisis experience. In Germany, the report on the 2002 Elbe flood accelerated and fed into larger debates about adaptations in response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks.

The Serbian case study presents the opposite perspective of how lessons learned are not easily transferred into rules, procedures and practice. The tone and level of criticism in the reports following inquiries vary, even within one country, depending on the organization that conducted the investigation. The culprits of any alleged wrongdoings are never named personally, but their organizations are. Only in Sweden one high official – the minister of foreign affairs – left her post in 2006 partly in response to the crushing critique put forward by the Parliament’s Constitutional Committee regarding the response to the tsunami disaster in 2004. In sum, this suggests that there
are significant qualitative differences between national inquiries and after-incident learning and review processes, but that these qualities cannot easily be generalised across types of crises and countries.

3.1.2 Limits to national capacities

As mentioned above, the understanding and function of the state of emergency differs across countries or may even be impossible from a legal perspective\(^23\), while its declaration does not necessarily signal a failure of the civil security system but may be an integral part of its functioning.\(^24\) Furthermore, in most national case studies, there is no data on the declaration of ‘states of disaster’ at the local/regional levels as this does not always require official registration. These considerations limit the inferences that can be drawn from the following figures: In eight countries no state of emergency at the national level was declared in the period 2000-2012 (Croatia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania and the UK).\(^25\) The Czech Republic declared a state of emergency three times (but mostly for specific regions), Serbia two times and France and Slovakia once. Mostly natural disasters were the reasons for declaring the state of emergency, except for France (riots in suburbs of French cities) and Serbia (assassination of prime minister).

When it comes to requests for international assistance, six countries (Austria, Croatia, Finland, Germany, Malta and Switzerland) did not receive external assistance during the last decade. Poland asked for help eight times, while Serbia, Romania and Slovakia requested assistance in four cases, Hungary in three, Ireland and Norway in two and the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK in one case. The four countries that received assistance most frequently are new member states. Yet, the data is somewhat ambiguous and partially deviates from data recorded in section 2.3.5.\(^26\)

Floods and forest fires were mentioned as the most frequent reasons for requests. In addition to requesting international assistance, almost all countries received assistance from neighbouring countries in the framework of cross-border cooperation in the event of emergencies. Interestingly, in the UK there seems to be a perception that requests for international assistance are not an indicator of limits and weaknesses of national civil security systems. Rather, the ability of civil servants to

\(^{23}\) To recall, in three (Austria, Sweden and Switzerland) out of 19 countries there are no formal legal provisions in place allowing the state to call for a state of emergency.

\(^{24}\) For example, in the Czech Republic the state of emergency is declared almost automatically when large territories are significantly affected by a crisis in order to adjust the level of crisis management. On the opposite site are the Nordic countries where the guiding principle of conformity – as mentioned above – means that states of emergencies are not prioritized as effective measures in times of crisis.

\(^{25}\) There is only inconclusive data on Italy while the Irish case study is inconclusive in this matter.

\(^{26}\) Differences might be due to the inconsistent (non-)recording of routine cross-border cooperation by case studies. No data is provided for Estonia, France, Italy, Latvia and Lithuania.
quickly evaluate the situation and ask for the right assistance at the right time is viewed as a signal of the responsiveness and interconnectedness of an effective civil security system. While this view may be, at least occasionally, contested due to concerns over burden-sharing\textsuperscript{27}, it remains a valid objection to simple numerical rankings of national capacity limitations in crisis management. Overall, declarations of state of emergencies and requests of assistance as such do not provide sufficient evidence of a system’s effectiveness, even if there are evident numerical differences between countries, and possibly between old and new EU member states, on that front.

\textsuperscript{27} Such concerns have regularly complicated discussions on the EU’s civil protection mechanisms.
3.2 Efficiency

Overall, ANVIL found that efficiency assessments are one of the least developed dimensions of national civil security systems. In so far as only a few countries have begun to collect more systematic data and to use investment review instruments, implementation of financial reviews remains sketchy and uneven. Overall, the perception is one of relatively adequate levels of expenditure with regard to the potential threats, so that efficiency does not frequently feature as a core concern. Strikingly, most reports note that even governments do not have a clear overview of the spending on civil security and crisis management. This is due to inherent difficulties of measurements but also to the fact that civil security in many cases is not a coherent political and administrative field but rather a cross-cutting task with fuzzy borders that, depending on the definition, infiltrates several other political and administrative fields, such as public health, transportation or energy. Moreover, the common decentralisation of crisis management often leads to multi-level financing, with regions and/or municipalities playing an important part in the financing scheme. In these cases, it is difficult to obtain integrated data. This is especially true for Austria, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. Hence, this problem applies not only to federalist states. Albeit not encompassing every aspect of civil security, in some countries (Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy and Slovakia) a clearer idea apparently exists on the central level.

Specific first steps to introduce efficiency measures were made in Austria (calls for enhanced efficiency through technological innovations), Croatia (2005 reform aimed for comprehensive and more transparent approach with better cost efficiency), Hungary (2010 flood led to recommendations for raising the efficiency), the Netherlands (efficiency was one of the reasons for reforming the police) and Switzerland (revised allocation of financial responsibilities in the federalist system). Yet due to the lack of data and normative concerns just outlined, these efforts usually did not include clear and systematic measures of efficiency in overall civil security spending.

The German report may serve as a typical case where the allocation of financial resources in civil security on the federal level is torn between efficiency-driven and political considerations. Similarly the Dutch and Norwegian case studies note that the efficiency of the civil security system tends to be based on functional (i.e. effectiveness) concerns in relation to new risks and challenges first, and then financial concerns. Some countries do run efficiency analyses, yet rather on an ex-post or ad-hoc basis. Slovakia (ad-hoc check of efficiency by the National Security Council in 2011) and Sweden (incident-related inquiries examining efficiency) belong to this group. Switzerland has taken a noteworthy approach that explicitly builds upon risk-based planning. Projects on natural hazard
management that induce costs of more than one million CHF need to prove their cost-effectiveness based on standardised tools and procedures taking into account desired protection levels and acceptable residual risks.

Overall, the scarcity of effectiveness assessments seems to indicate the normative and political pitfalls associated with relating cost-effectiveness to the protection of life and other essential goods as well as more mundane bureaucratic politics affecting the allocation of scarce resources among competing agencies and levels. Moreover, the relationship between spending levels and levels of protection is not always clear. As a consequence, there are no clear assessment standards allowing for clear statements regarding the delicate balance between the need to protect societies and prevalent fiscal constraints. Hence, any general baseline for desired or ‘optimal’ spending levels is likely to be contested on normative and functional grounds.

A minimal consensus seems to be that underfunding in civil security is more likely to be an issue than excessive spending. The regularity of crises and emergencies as well as the considerable role of voluntary structures render this assumption plausible. It also needs to be noticed that many countries cut their civil security significantly during the 1990s in order cash in on the ‘peace dividend’ following the end of the Cold War, for example by rebuilding siren systems and emergency shelters.

Some cases of increases of spending were also mentioned. These have always been triggered by a particular crisis: in Norway, the spending on civil security rose in the wake of the Oslo bombing and the shooting incident; the UK saw its Home Office budget sky-rocketing after the terrorist attacks in the USA in 2001 and later in London 2005; in Serbia, the floods of 2010 were mentioned.

Conversely, underfunding is problematised in the following countries: Croatia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Poland, Romania, Serbia and Slovakia. In four of these countries, the underfunding was particularly mentioned following a cross-regional flood: Germany (2002), Serbia (2010), and Slovakia (2010). In addition, countries where decreasing of spending on civil security was noted are Lithuania, Latvia, Czech Republic, Netherlands, Croatia, Italy, Romania, Slovakia and Ireland. In all these cases, the economic and financial crisis and the related austerity measures were the reason for budgetary cuts. Meanwhile, from the countries where underfunding in some form was reported, Poland, Malta and Germany seemed to have maintained relatively constant levels of spending, at least at the national level.

As funding rates in these countries are at very different levels, these assessments indicate a strong subjective dimension related to specific crisis experiences and general performance standards for national governments. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that wasteful spending is not a primary
concern in the area of civil security. Improved mechanisms for financial controlling and spending review may rather be used to defend or prioritise funding in an adverse economic climate and with a view to rare, but relevant, security threats.

3.3 Legitimacy

Each country study considered three principal factors in evaluating the degree of legitimacy of civil security systems: support from the political system itself; support from the judicial sector as issued by judiciary decisions; and popular support through citizens’ perceptions and attitudes towards public authorities. Overall, the case studies reveal a relatively high degree of political, judicial and popular support. There are few instances of visible, intense turmoil leading to the resignations of high-profile politicians, incisive court-rulings or popular unrest. Civil security generally seems to be characterised by a low degree of politicisation and contestation. A majority of citizens appear to have a positive attitude towards civil security and feel generally safe, though levels of support and safety differ somewhat geographically.

3.3.1 Political support

Since the end of the Cold War, most of the countries have restructured their crisis management systems towards a more comprehensive approach which is based on a shift in the priorities towards civil security and civil protection activities. In general, in the period 2000-2012 the majority of the states reformed the civil security system once or twice. Finland, Ireland and the Netherlands adopted more than three major reforms, while Austria and the Czech Republic did not undertake any fundamental reforms. Many reforms of national systems emerged as specific responses to concrete national crisis experiences, without being accompanied by major political controversies about the system as a whole. In addition, it is noteworthy that these reforms did not ‘revolutionise’ entire civil security systems but rather constantly contribute to and/or accelerate the ongoing process of evolution and adaptation of these crisis management systems (see above on incident-driven inquiries).

Moreover, crisis management structures or performances in disaster management have not been subject to major political debate in most of the studied countries. The trend shows a picture in which political debate tends to reflect each government’s priorities about its own homeland security (e.g. administrative responsibility overlap in the crisis management, privatization of the health system
and impacts on crisis management system). However, the 9/11 events evoked a sense of urgency in debates about new potential threats and the effectiveness of civil security beside the established focus on natural disasters and more common emergencies. In the UK, the 2005 London bombings produced a new round of political debate, but the more controversial parts pertained to questions of surveillance, policing and the appropriate balance of liberty and security rather than genuine emergency response. The 2004 Tsunami disaster and the Fukushima nuclear accident also re-generated new discussion about flood protection, the protection of citizens in foreign countries and nuclear energy supply.

Otherwise, the comparatively low level of controversy might be explained by a basic political consensus regarding the need to offer adequate protection against civil emergencies, but political processes still vary with different political cultures. For example, in consociational states like Austria and Switzerland discussions take place but are channelled through inclusive and incremental consultation procedures. In general, a lack of political contentions must not necessarily be read as a sign for legitimacy as it could also stem from a dominance of technocratic and governmental actors or a mere lack of interest. In turn, open political debates about the risks to be tackled and the appropriate countermeasures could be interpreted as an indicator for an active and deliberative political culture.

With regard to the formal inquiries/committees on civil security, it shall be noted that usually questions are addressed in the arena of the Parliament. The UK is the country boasting the highest number (11) of parliamentary inquiries which can be directly associated with civil security issues. As a result, it can be remarked that political inquiries/committees form the political system itself following a top-down approach (administrative and political actors) with only weak popular initiative. 

Neither extensive political turmoil, nor government resignations have been provoked by major crises, emergencies or disasters. Even in relevant cases – the London bombings in 2005, the 22 July 2011 shootings in Norway – no radical political reactions arose against the mismanagement of the crisis, in particular in case of terrorist attacks. Generally no collapses of government or resignations of major political figures occurred due to crisis management failures, apart from some local instances such as the removal of the mayor of Duisburg (Germany) following the Love Parade stampede in 2010. The few notable exceptions, which still fall below major political crises, are as follows: In Hungary and Italy, mayors or civil security personnel have been replaced after investigations, while in Poland (Smolensk air plane crash), the Netherlands (death of 11 asylum seekers at Schiphol airport) and Sweden (2004 Tsunami) even ministers resigned, but government stability was not at stake.

Electoral results have not been strongly and negatively affected by the management of a crisis during the last decade. In a few cases, however, national political leaders have exploited the state's
performance during an event to generate consensus or to oppose the government. For example, his appearances during the 2002 Elbe flood are cited as one factor in the re-election of German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in the 2002 federal elections and the confirmation of the militia principle during a politicized public referendum in Austria in 2013 is partly credited to the argument that the armed forces require conscripts to maintain its disaster assistance functions. Hence, ANVIL provides further evidence that public perceptions of crisis management can occasionally constitute a source of political support for politicians and public institutions. This does not contradict the overall assessment that the level of politicisation of civil security systems has remained comparatively low.

3.3.2 Legal support

Overall, general judicial oversight is guaranteed in all countries and there are few formal restrictions on judicial oversight powers over the regular civil security system. Nordic countries put an especially strong emphasis on the continuity of the legal order in normal and in crisis situations. However, in principle, crisis response operations – especially during states of emergency – can infringe upon civil liberties, such as the rights to property or free movement, and, where necessary, need to be reviewed accordingly. But, practical experience surveyed by ANVIL national case studies showed that civil liberties in the context of civil security crisis response operations have not been subjected to major national court trials nor considered a major critical issue for crisis response operations. In relation to terrorism such concerns focused on questions of policing and law enforcement, including extended surveillance, which generally fall beyond the scope of ANVIL.

Correspondingly, major legal cases in the area of crisis management are rare and mainly related to financial compensations after disasters in the recovery and reconstruction phases. On some occasions, they also cover victims and casualties among first responders (e.g. Kornat Island case in Croatia) and possible improper training, procedure or equipment (e.g. Netherlands fire service volunteers). An especially publicised case was the Kaprun trial in Austria, which investigated the reasons for the funicular train disaster rather than the crisis response efforts. Austria and Hungary count three main cases, while Germany, Italy and the Netherlands two and Croatia one (still in procedure) together with the Swedish case of the tsunami crisis commission. In Italy, the verdict against some members of the National Commission for the Forecast and Prevention of Major Risks of the Civil Protection Department has been subject to numerous criticisms from the national and international scientific community, which feared that the sentence might pave the way for legal actions against scientists who evaluate the risks of natural hazards which by their very nature cannot be forecast or ruled out with absolute certainty.
Landmark judicial rulings that affected the wider civil security legal framework were recorded for Poland and Germany. Yet in both cases the trials did not directly refer to the crisis response efforts. The Polish Constitutional Court questioned the definition of ‘crisis’ in the law on crisis management and the Constitutional Court decisions demanded changes to the Aviation Security Act primarily because the military should not be allowed to shoot down hijacked passenger aircrafts. However, the German case also dealt with constitutionally mandated division of civil and military competences during domestic crisis management. These constitutional rulings in Germany and Poland underline the close connection between national historical legacies and norms and the wider civil security system, and could not generally serve as a model of judicial accountability in this issue area (see above on other national consensual norms on the domestic use of military or non-formalised concepts of crises and disasters).

3.3.3 Public support

The comparative analysis seems to show a positive trend in popular perceptions. No substantial gap exists between citizens’ perspectives and the concrete crisis management efforts undertaken by the political authorities and civil servants. The percentage of people feeling unsafe is generally low, while the majority of people basically trust their government, confides in its capabilities and does not demand dramatic changes in crisis management activities. In managing natural and man-made disasters, an average of 50 per cent of citizens believe that their country is doing enough. However, it must be noted that citizens in ‘new’ member states, on average, are more sceptical about whether their governments are doing enough to manage natural and man-made disasters and terrorism. Nevertheless, also taking into account the scarcity of open political turmoil (section 3.3.1) and the rather low levels of concern in most countries (see section 2.4.1), it seems fair to say that a non-alarmist attitude regarding civil security is dominant in most ANVIL countries. On the one hand, this might indicate a lack of awareness for prevalent vulnerabilities. On the other hand, it could also be read as a sign for the resilience of European societies in the face of gloomy prophecies and global pressures. Additional popular support can be expressed through volunteerism as discussed above (see section 2.5.1).

Specifying these general trends, there are notable relative differences between ‘old’ and ‘new’ member states when citizens are asked whether their country is doing enough to manage crises, (see Figure 8). The highest percentages of support are recorded for Finland (72 per cent), Austria (69), Sweden (67) and the Netherlands (64). In contrast, Romania (27) and Slovakia (32) have the lowest percentage of agreement while almost six out of ten citizens in Romania (57) and three quarters of the population in Slovakia (75) believe that their country is not doing enough. In fighting terrorism,
the average of citizens agreeing that their country is doing enough is at 60 per cent. Finland (76) and
the Netherlands (71) have the highest percentages of approval. Again the lowest degree of approval
is listed for Romania (32) as well as Latvia and Lithuania (35 each). Estonia seems to a positive outlier
among the Baltic countries. Thus, there seems to be a **relationship between satisfaction with levels
of government activity and levels of concern**. All countries in which an especially large portion of the
society believes that their countries are doing enough to fight these two types of risk are also among
the least concerned countries, while all countries with particularly low percentages are among the
most concerned countries (see section 2.4.1).

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**Figure 8: Are countries doing enough?**

![Figure 8: Are countries doing enough?](chart.png)

The **relationship between the civil and military spheres of crisis management** yields diverse public
reactions in the analysed country cases. There is an overall trust in the capacity of the military in crisis
management actions. It is noteworthy that in Slovakia, according to a survey conducted in 2008, 72
per cent of the respondents declared to trust soldiers, more than medical doctors (54 per cent). In
the Czech Republic on the other hand, fire brigades are far more trusted (64 per cent) while the army
is definitely trusted only by 20 per cent of people. Trust in the military is also high in Romania due to
historical reasons. Indeed, public trust in institutions seems to be low while Romanians put more
trust in traditional institutions such as the army and the Church. In contrast, in Germany the domestic

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28 Not available for Croatia, Norway, Serbia and Switzerland.
role of the armed forces has historically been a hot button issue due to experiences under Nazi rule and controversies resurfaced with regard to a potential counterterrorist role of the military, but the army nevertheless provided disaster assistance during recent floods and was met with high levels of popular support in the affected areas.

4. National civil security in the EU context

Overall, one could not identify a systematic cross-national pattern on use of and contribution to EU mechanisms for disaster assistance (MIC, solidarity fund, training mechanisms), while there are clearly countries that are more active contributors or recipients than others. Popular knowledge of EU mechanisms is generally below 50 per cent. However, when asked more than 70 per cent feel that EU coordinated action can cope better with civil crises than isolated endeavours on behalf of the national civil security mechanisms. This wider support contrasts with the reluctance of some of the ‘bigger’ member states regarding a further deepening and centralization of civil security cooperation via the EU.

Member states have been inclined to activate the EU Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) for assistance requests to very different degrees. France has activated the MIC five, Italy four and Hungary two times. Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK each activated the MIC once. Yet, 13 of the 20 ANVIL countries participating in the MIC never activated it. It is very difficult to distinguish a qualitative pattern on MIC activation. Among the countries that have never activated the MIC are large and small, founding and new, centralised and decentralised members. In general, participant countries in the Civil Protection Mechanism are much more willing to channel assistance through the mechanism than accepting assistance from it through official activations. Thus, we see that for the period 2007-2011 all MIC countries in our sample have somehow granted aid to other countries by using the mechanism, often in relation to global humanitarian assistance to non-EU countries. How responsive they are to MIC requests varies. If the average rate for contributions is 11.5 times, then the countries surpassing this threshold are: Austria, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, Sweden, and the UK. Again, this group of states does not correlate with specific geographic or functional characteristics.

Training and exercises is one of the ways that countries can better prepare themselves while anticipating a crisis. All countries of our sample, apart from Serbia and Switzerland, participate in the training activities organised by the Community Mechanism. But again, we see a variation in the

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29 Serbia and Switzerland do not participate. Norway participates though it is not an EU member.
number of national emergency planners that countries appoint for being trained. The average number of national officials trained in the 2009-2010 training cycle is 29.2. The countries that generally surpass the thresholds of average are bigger and/or especially capacious states (Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and the UK). If one controls for the size of the county the ‘over-performers’ in terms of training are Austria and Sweden, and to a lesser extent Finland. On the other side, Poland does not participate so actively in EU organised training even though its population is rather large. Variation is also observed in the participation in simulation exercises organised and funded by the Mechanism during the last decade (2002-2012). Here, the average of the 22 countries is 6.86. We see here that Austria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden and the UK surpass the average of participation. The results do not unravel a decisive qualitative pattern but we do see that small countries tend to participate less in simulation exercises (for example Latvia, Lithuania, Ireland, and Malta) which may be due to budget and personnel constraints.\(^{30}\)

As far as it concerns financial assistance granted by the EU through the **Solidarity Fund**, aid aiming at the post-crisis relief of a country, three countries have benefited most frequently from the Fund. France and Italy have applied and received financial aid six times while Romania did so 4 times. The picture slightly deviates if our criterion for judging absorbability of the Solidarity Fund is the size of financial aid. Here, the great beneficiaries for the period 2002-2012 have been Italy, Germany, France, the UK, Austria and the Czech Republic (with the amount of funding descending from Italy to the Czech Republic). Thus, the four ‘richest’ member states in the ANVIL sample also received the largest amount of financial support. In general, different factors are taken into consideration when the EU receives a country’s application for the Solidarity Fund, most notably the occurrence and magnitude of a disaster. There are no signs for systematic horse-trading or patronage emerging from these numbers.

**Most EU citizens are not aware of EU coordination in civil security but still believe that coordinated action is more adequate to deal with civil emergencies than actions by individual states** (see Figure 9). The awareness for the EU’s role in civil security is rather low, though it slightly varies in the sample of countries. Only in the cases of Malta and Lithuania, the percentage of awareness of EU civil protection actions reaches 50 per cent (or more). Austria, Estonia, France, the Netherlands, and Poland score between 40 and 50 per cent of citizens’ awareness. The EU is least visible in civil protection in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Sweden. Overall, we see in our sample of countries that **the EU is not a very visible actor in delivering civil protection.** Interestingly and despite the

\(^{30}\) All these distributions patterns are to be interpreted with caution due to the relatively small sample and number of training activities.
visibility of deficits, Europeans feel that EU coordinated action is more effective in dealing with civil crises than isolated endeavours on behalf of national civil security systems. In all countries for which we had data available, the number of respondents who adopt a positive opinion towards EU coordination in civil security is more than 70 per cent, with the Slovaks and the Lithuanians agreeing the most with this statement (86) and the Romanians agreeing the least (75).

Figure 9: Awareness of and Support for EU Coordination

Question 1: Are you aware or not that the EU coordinates civil protection inside and outside the EU?
Question 2: To what extent do you agree with the following statement: A coordinated EU action in dealing with disasters is more effective than actions by individual countries?

Source: Special Eurobarometer 383

This general approval does not say anything about the kind, degree and depth of the EU’s involvement in civil security that is desired by citizens and their governments. Indeed, especially some of the bigger states remain sceptical towards further integration. The UK case study notes that the ‘Euroscepticism’ of British political elites also shapes their perception of the EU’s role in civil security. The actual protection of populations is regarded as a domestic issue directly related to the core of national sovereignty. Hence, British officials express a certain enthusiasm for common strategies, risk assessment, training, exercises and the exchange of best practices but show reservations when it comes to operational issues which should be handled based on national capacities. In a similar vein, German officials generally support more informal forms of coordination and exchange but oppose moves to establish operational capacities and command at the EU level. For

31 Not available for Croatia, Norway, Serbia and Switzerland.
one, this is due to Germany’s strong esteem for decentralised solutions under the subsidiarity principle. Yet, there is also a fear that EU cooperation might become a ‘one-way street’ with Germany having to bear the financial burden for Southern and Eastern member states. Comparable concerns were raised in Austria. French stakeholders support an EU role in risk assessment and best practices but could also envision some sharing of equipment while opposing more substantial harmonisations. These findings seem to mirror the ‘typical’ stances these countries take vis-à-vis the EU. Many other case studies do not provide details on governmental attitudes towards the EU.

5. Case study: the handling of H1N1 in comparative perspective

Each case featured a mini-study of the H1N1/swine flu epidemic in 2009 as an example of national security systems ‘at work’ during one specific crisis that affected all countries in the study, though epidemic diseases present some very distinct challenges. In 2009, the emergence of a H1N1 strain that had not previously circulated in humans was identified. As widespread community transmission was observed on at least two continents, the World Health Organization (WHO) raised the level of influenza pandemic alert to 6, the highest level. The pandemic was declared to be over in August 2010 and eventually turned out to be far milder than what was expected by experts, fuelling a number of controversies. The common finding is that central coordination mechanisms were set up in most countries, but their exact nature and setup varied depending upon the national division of competences. Countries also used different vaccination strategies but the case studies underlined shared concern about overly large number of vaccines purchased. Crisis communication similarly suffered from lack of a clear message in most cases. In the aftermath, one could point to some inquiries and debates but no major reforms or direct political consequences. Calls for enhanced cooperation and stronger EU role were also repeatedly voiced.

**Crisis coordination arrangements vary considerably** depending upon the division of competences among government departments and administrative levels. At national level, a specific task force or committee was activated in some cases. Given the nature of the crisis, executive responsibility for emergency response and coordination usually rested on the ministry in charge of health, even when the overall crisis management organization is complex, multilayered and involves a number of actors and agencies at several levels (e.g. in Sweden due to the responsibility principle in the civil security system, in Federal States such as Austria and Switzerland). Germany relies on another organization with ministries of health in the states coordinating through the Health Ministers Conference. The lack of central federal coordination and emergency decision-making during nationwide epidemics has been identified as a weakness. In Romania, even if the health sector was the main actor responsible for the elaboration and implementation of the response, the prime minister had to coordinate the
management at national level through the National Committee of Emergency Situation. In France, the Ministry of Health obviously also remains a key actor, but the Ministry of Interior drives the crisis management organization and is responsible for the coordination of the implementation of measures defined by the national pandemic plan, through the Inter-ministerial crisis committee.

Case studies mainly highlight two major recurring topics: vaccination and communication. Having taken into account the lessons learned from previous outbreaks, many countries had already developed national plans to deal with pandemic threats. However, the British central government, for example, did not take pandemics into consideration when strategically designing the *National Risk Assessment*, even if they were included in the risk profiles developed by the local resilience fora. In the face of prevalent uncertainties, most governments funded their decision on the precautionary principle and organized vaccination campaigns. As the HINI crisis passed, discussions mostly revolved around the vaccinations strategies, with the primary question of vaccines safety and of the number of vaccines purchased.

**Various strategies** were adopted. Some member states favoured the targeted distribution of vaccines to certain groups, such as health professionals, critically ill patients, pregnant women, seniors, or children (e.g. Italy, Germany, the Netherlands), while other adopted vaccination plans for the whole population (e.g. Finland, Sweden). Some countries gave first priority to specific groups, before widening the vaccination programme to the general population (e.g. Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, France, Slovakia and Switzerland). Irish experts for example proposed vaccination on demand, based on the availability of the vaccine. Regarding vaccination, Poland remains the exception as, after a meeting of the minister of health and the ombudsman, the purchase of vaccines was first postponed. And in the end, there was no purchase. Vaccination was usually free, at least for risk groups, and not compulsory but proposed on a voluntary basis, which has to be taken into account when trying to explain the rather low percentages of people vaccinated in many Member States. Authorities were then left to deal with significant numbers of unused vaccines. These had to be destroyed, donated or resold. In some cases, authorities managed to renegotiate contracts with drug companies.

Official strategies of *crisis communication* played an important role, as a lack of efficiency can be linked with the poor acceptance of vaccination that was observed. Weaknesses in governmental communication are associated with the multiplicity of interventions and the dissemination of overlapping or redundant messages from various sources. The role of media and public experts – usually harshly criticizing the vaccination strategy - but also in some cases of politicians, was also highlighted. Media reports were often mentioned as a factor explaining the poor results of the vaccination campaign observed in most countries, but health professionals refusing to get vaccinated
also greatly undermined the credibility of the vaccination in the eye of the public. The necessity to carry out mass vaccination was called into question and fears of side effects fuelled mistrust and controversies. Communication was criticized from two sides, having to face allegations of overreaction and fear-mongering in relation to an overblown threat as well as criticism pointing to the inability to convince people of the necessity of vaccinations.

The handling of H1N1 resulted in several discussions and debates. In Ireland, a number of parliamentary questions were posed to the Ministry of Health and Children throughout the crisis. They mainly focused on the progress of the vaccination programme, the conditions of treatment at hospitals and how to deal with the crisis at school. Accusations of overreactions by authorities were reported for many countries, in a context where the notion of the ‘securitization’ of such a public health crisis is questioned. Political decisions and implemented measures were not systematically assessed by official inquiries in most countries. A number of countries nevertheless conducted professional evaluations (the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland) or political inquiries (France, UK). Public–private sector relations raised specific questions regarding the purchase of vaccines. In Hungary, the Ministry of Human Resources thus triggered an investigation to check the conditions of the agreement with the vaccine supplier. After Dutch democratic representatives in Parliament became suspicious about pressure by the pharmaceutical industry on the minister of public health, the new minister of public health decided to commission an investigation. This went further in Serbia where controversies about possible corruption in the vaccination campaign emerged including a criminal affair involving frauds in vaccine procurement that led to the indictment of a number of actors, including the ex-director of the Republic’s Institute for Health Insurance. All in all, even in countries where inquiries were launched, the situation did not appear to have contributed to a political crisis or led to sanctions or the resignation of members of the government. However, in some countries, this highlighted the need to update the current plan in order to improve the national preparedness and response strategy (e.g. in France, an amended version of the pandemic plan was developed).

Outside exchanges of information with the ECDC, few elements relating to the EU level were included in the H1N1 annex of the cases studies, which is a result in itself. Coordination, including between Member States, obviously remained limited and the EU Civil Protection Mechanism is not mentioned as having been activated. In this respect, the French inquiry commission - mandated to assess the way the way vaccination was planned, explained and managed – called for the promotion of a better coordination among EU members in the field of health crisis management, including through the adoption of a joint strategy for the purchase of vaccines. It is worth noting that, afterwards, considering public health measures adopted in the member states, the European Union
Parliament labelled some of them as disproportionate. The report on evaluation of the management of the H1N1 influenza in 2009-2010 in the EU urges the member states to revise their national prevention plans ‘to gain in effectiveness and coherence’. Among other recommendations, it also requests clarification, and if necessary review, of the roles, duties, remits, limits, relationships and responsibilities of the key actors and structures at EU level for the management of medical threats. It also underlines the need to strengthen cooperation between Member States.

6. Conclusion

Over the last decade all countries studied by ANVIL were able to uphold the basic effectiveness and legitimacy of their national civil security system. In some specific cases, violent intentional threats posed a considerable political challenge, while in other cases extensive natural disasters or serious industrial accidents led to reforms, adaptations and increased integration of the respective national civil security systems. However, the available evidence does not allow for strong correlations between diverse national structures and institutions and observed differences in performance and quality of civil security systems. This speaks against a ‘one-size-fits all’ approach on the basis of seemingly evident functional needs of crisis management.

One over-riding and positive common trend in Europe has been the long-term transformation of civil protection from primarily a military responsibility – as during the Cold War – to a fully civilian-controlled system, even though military capacities are used to varying degrees in support of crisis management in different countries. This civilian transformation had already been formally completed prior to the ANVIL period of investigation of (2000-2012), but remains to be fully worked out in some cases (particularly some former Communist states and countries with traditionally conscription-based armies).

This trend is shadowed by a tendency towards ‘all hazards’ civil security systems. That is, all non-military crises are increasingly managed by civilian authorities that need to cooperate across functional boundaries to address the evolving nature of contemporary threats. However, depending on country and issue, certain scenarios remain tied to specific authorities and national crisis response protocols, such as in the case of an epidemic. Moreover, there is often a gap between rhetoric and practice when it comes to the implementation of comprehensive approaches and strategies.

Beyond these commonalities, there are varying connections between national political structures and the organization of civil security. In general, even in unitary states civil security stands out at as a

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rather decentralised field compared to other policy-fields. This is most apparent in the strong role of local fire brigades and emergency services. However, there are different degrees of centralisation/decentralisation. Decentralisation and bottom-up approaches are most marked in federalist states and – to a lesser extent – the Nordic countries and the Netherlands while many of the studied ‘new’ members and candidate countries, especially the Baltic states and those in South-Eastern Europe, seem to prefer more centralised, top-down models.33 In between these opposites one can point to a variety of organising principles of civil security in otherwise unitary states that integrated some elements of decentralisation into their systems. Smaller European member states are naturally more inclined towards integrated national civil security structures due to their size, but also feature considerable diversity when it comes to bottom-up or top-down mechanisms for the assumption of executive responsibility in crisis management.

This basic differentiation is in line with ‘typical’ cultural clusters in Europe, but classifications are not uniform and clear-cut. Apart from the question of centralisation vs. decentralisation, one cannot identify strong systematic relationships between specific values, such as ‘traditional’ acceptance of hierarchy, and national civil security structures. This means that national security cultures and idiosyncratic experiences seem to be more important than regional clusters or commonly perceived threats and hazards.

Against this background, ANVIL did not corroborate commonly held assumptions about the benefits of strong central top-down steering and command structures for the purposes of crisis preparedness and response. Tentative evidence on the basis of national professional inquires and needs for external assistance rather points to the strengths of highly decentralised and/or federal countries in terms of overall capacities and speed for crisis response. Nonetheless, over the last decade decentralised civil security systems surveyed by ANVIL have attempted to bolster central steering mechanisms to respond to new challenges and evident coordination failures. This led to more national ‘umbrella laws’ for civil security and a range of national coordination platforms or coordinating agencies. Thus, there seems to be a broadly shared consensus on the need for national integration, which can lower transaction costs and raise the efficiency of large-scale crisis management, and the strengths of locally grown structures and capacities. Yet the precise nature of this balance – i.e. whether one needs to create a single national agency for crisis management or whether formal mechanisms and agreements for cooperation between different levels and actors in government need to be set out in advance – cannot be prescribed across countries.

33 In the case of the new member states, this is accentuated by the still relatively recent tradition from a centralised military system for civil protection to a civilian controlled system for civil security, which represents the uniform norm in Europe by now.
This also reflects in the **continued diversity in terminology** for crisis management, emergency response, civil protection, etc., which mostly is tied to specific national legal systems and division of competences between governmental levels. A common European language on civil security may thus be desirable, but unlikely to reach beyond top-level administrators and managers. Each national system has to work on the basis of its own experience to find a realistic and adaptable compromise between these positions of local diversity and national integration (and international standardisation).

Countries studied by ANVIL also **diverge markedly on the role of private actors in civil security, and the respective weight of profit and non-profit organisations**. There seems to be a basic mainstream model of volunteer involvement through voluntary fire brigades and emergency and rescue services at the local level. However, there are very different degrees and forms of voluntary involvement. Generally, **Central European states with strong neocorporatist traditions put a particular emphasis on the formalised inclusion of voluntary organisations** in official emergency management structures and see this as one of the core strengths of their systems. However, the continued viability of volunteerism is also increasingly questioned due to changing social structures. Conversely, other countries, like the UK, prefer informal ad-hoc forms of voluntary participation while some former Communist societies still express a certain degree of scepticism towards volunteering. When it comes to profit-oriented organisations, it can be noted that **most states remain hesitant to outsource core tasks in crisis management** to private companies. However, there are **diverse models of state-business relationships** ranging from top-down co-optation to informal, voluntary engagement. While smaller, new member states with fewer capacities are generally more interested in cooperation with the private sector; Western and Northern states increasingly establish informal coordination mechanisms with private companies to manage new threats, such as in the area of cyber-security and critical infrastructures.

**Citizens largely trust and support their national civil security system**, even if there are differences in levels of support when comparing some South-Eastern European states, which generally feature lower level of institutional trust, with North-Western states. Overall, we can observe a **low level of overt political controversy** over the last decade. That is, the countries studied by ANVIL only rarely featured extensive political debates on the organization of civil security structures that could reveal deeper assumptions and values for cross-national comparison. The contrasting, but thankfully exceptional cases are provided by terrorism, which overall caused comparatively few human casualties and damages in Europe, but had a high impact on political debates and perceptions. Here the divergent crisis preparedness levels and subsequent societal responses are clearly visible, as evidenced by the surprise in Norway and the more seasoned, but also more repressive, response in
the UK. However, as external analysts we cannot rank these differential responses, which are seen as legitimate by the majority of national citizens.

When turning to specific functions and technologies of crisis management, however, cross-national comparisons and evaluations can be directly applied across cases, allowing the identification of some ‘vanguard states’ or ‘good practices’. This concerns, for instance, the role of information, warning and education, whereby some states (e.g. Finland, Norway) are more advanced with the installation and use of new technologies and/or have taken more effective decisions with regard to the use and maintenance of existing warning systems (Austria and sirens). Overall, all countries under investigation seem to be on a path of modernisation in the area of planning and coordination support systems, such as with regard to the use of websites. However, the **average of pace of innovation is slow**, which risks being overtaken by new and overseen crises. This is illustrated by the very incremental and fragmented implementation of advanced risk mapping methodologies, though Switzerland, for instance, has introduced a number of innovative concepts and tools for risk-based planning and management.

This can also be explained by the fact that there is **little pressure to improve national civil security systems on the grounds of efficiency**. On the one hand, this can be interpreted in a positive light in so far as the burden of civil security on public finances seems generally low and sustainable (not least due to the considerable role of volunteers in many countries). Given the possibility of severe and surprising crises, it is also problematic to subject civil security to a rigorous cost efficiency review, which tends to be based on normal rather than ‘spike’ demands. Financial cost-benefit calculations in civil security also face the difficulty of placing a ‘price tag’ on potential human casualties, which is not always accepted and can be politically sensitive. On the other hand, the wide-spread lack of coherent data on spending and planning tools makes it difficult to assess the level of preparedness and redirect resources towards new challenges, which accentuates the generally low level of technological reform outlined above. So even if civil security systems should not first and foremost be built on the basis of cost considerations, the lack of more coherent financial data should be addressed in the future.

From a legal perspective, it is positive to note that only few, if any, countries under examination put limits on regular judicial control when it comes to the action of crisis managers. In fact, some countries put a strong stress on the continuity between the regular political or social order and periods of crisis management. While the majority of countries have formal legal provisions for the declaration of a state or emergency and/or disaster, these have not been used to justify unduly wide

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34 The example of sirens illustrated that some older technologies may serve as cost-efficient and effective solutions, if they are properly maintained and integrated with other systems that serve more current crisis management needs.
executive leeway. Those countries that lack corresponding legal provisions (mostly for historical reasons) do not seem to be less effective and efficient in crisis response situations either. Ironically, one may instead point to singular instances of potentially excessive judicial accountability, which may not fully reflect the difficulties of crisis prevention and proportional response operations (e.g. Italy). Similarly, across cases one could rather point to excessive legal complexity and fragmentation in the area of civil security than to a dominance of executive orders over regular legislation.

The picture is less positive when it comes to professional review processes. Here the ANVIL countries feature a very diverse picture, ranging from very regular (even too numerous) public inquiries (e.g. Netherlands) to sporadic or publicly inaccessible after-incident reviews (several new member states). In most cases, it was the experience of one or two major crisis that mobilised after-incident reforms over the last decade. This indicates a basic level of responsiveness of civil security systems, but also that more regular and forward-looking adjustments and learning should be possible in many countries. In general, reviews suggest that stakeholders seem to be convinced that their systems, as a whole, are working rather well and can handle most crises, but they also point to distinct deficits in certain areas or in the management of specific crisis situations. Yet, there is no generally accepted standard and methodology for effectiveness assessments. Accordingly, it is not possible to set out a single best model in this regard that could do justice to the diverse institutional structures of different European states, while political interest in civil security is likely to remain uneven due to competing priorities. Nonetheless, processes of professional inquiries, exercises and post-incident review could generally become more transparent and predictable, so as to facilitate national and cross-national learning.

Systems and arrangements for cross-national crisis assistance – be it in EU frameworks, other multilateral forums or on a bi-lateral level – are otherwise well developed. With a few exceptions, all countries studied by ANVIL have respective provisions in place and are also regular contributors and/or recipients of such assistance. It seems that more regular learning and exchanges, as in the form of exercises and the exchange of experts, have comparatively greater need for further development at the international level.
Executive Summary

Regional organisations (ROs) are a regular feature of European governance in many issue areas and in different geographical areas, including in the field of civil security. However, the comparison of eight such organisations, primarily in South-Eastern Europe and the Baltic/Barents region, reveal that organisations are weakly institutionalised, have limited competences in crisis and emergency management and depend on often reluctant member states for financial resources and operational capacities. Nevertheless, regional organisations are capable of facilitating training and exercises as well as of deepening cross-border ties between national officials, with a special emphasis on prevention and preparedness. Furthermore, regional organisations can enable cross-national, technical cooperation even in regions that are otherwise prone to confrontation. This way, they can play an important symbolic, political function, especially in regions that have experienced major conflicts or are undergoing transformation processes. The civil security work of the studied organisations is generally not well known to a wider public and engagements with private actors are limited. However, it must be noted that the sample of cases comprises a diverse set of ROs ranging from general political fora to functional organisations for river basin management.

Organisations from one region that share common threats and cultural contexts occasionally cooperate, whereas cross-regional cooperation is rare. Multilateral organizations are not directly involved in regional cooperation efforts either, but they serve as an important source of funding and standards. On the whole, member states seem more likely to support a further intensification of regional operational projects and information sharing through established intergovernmental formats and there appears to be no need for the establishment of new ROs as this might intensify the danger of duplication and overlap. At the same, one can expect that the EU will continue to grow as an umbrella framework for existing regional organisations in terms of funding and legislation.
## List of Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>BEAC</td>
<td>Barents Euro-Arctic Council</td>
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<td>BEAR</td>
<td>Barents Euro-Arctic Region</td>
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<td>BRC</td>
<td>Barents Regional Council</td>
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<td>BSMC</td>
<td>Baltic Sea Maritime Cooperation</td>
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<td>CBSS</td>
<td>Council of Baltic Sea States</td>
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<td>DPPI SEE</td>
<td>Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Initiative for South-Eastern Europe</td>
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<td>HELCOM</td>
<td>Helsinki Commission</td>
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<td>ICPDR</td>
<td>International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River</td>
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<td>ISRBC</td>
<td>International Sava River Basin Commission</td>
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<td>RO</td>
<td>regional organisations</td>
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<td>V4</td>
<td>Visegrad Four (Visegrad Group)</td>
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1. Introduction

The following report synthesises the findings from eight case studies on regional organisations (ROs) dealing with civil security. It documents the considerable variety of legal and institutional structures and reviews the effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy of regional civil security systems. Each analytical section starts with a summary of main findings, which are subsequently developed and highlighted in bold throughout the main text. It must be noted, however, that the low profile and weak institutionalisation of the studied ROs as well as the small amount of available data and information have limited the analysis, so that some aspects of the ANVIL mapping protocol could not be addressed or had to be modified, as in the case of quality measures. Taking this lack of knowledge into account, the case studies and this report also serve as a basic inventory of what civil security ROs in Europe actually do and how they are structured.

To strike a balance between comparability and need for contrasting cases, ANVIL focused on regional organisations in neighbouring geographical areas, namely South-Eastern, Central and Northern Europe (see below). These are regions with a number of fora and important roles during recent conflicts at different times (Cold War, Balkan wars) but very different memberships leading to diverse cultural, political and economic contexts. The selected ROs constitute a variety of different organisational forms and models, ranging from formal institutions to more dispersed regional cooperation via several platforms and frameworks. As some of the ROs might not be well known, a brief introduction of the ROs and their main missions seems to be warranted at the outset. Specifically, the analysed ROs are:

- **The Barents-Euro Arctic Region (BEAR)** comprises two fora for regional cooperation in the Barents region: the intergovernmental Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAR) and the interregional Barents Regional Council (BRC). It has a specific working group for rescue cooperation.

- **The Baltic Sea Maritime Cooperation (BSMC)** refers to a loosely connected set of agreements and organisations for maritime cooperation on and around the Baltic Sea.

- **The Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS)** is a general forum for intergovernmental cooperation in the Baltic Sea region with 12 official members, which deals with civil security as one of five long-term priorities.

- **The Disaster and Preparedness and Prevention Initiative for South Eastern Europe (DPPI SEE)** functions as a platform to facilitate cooperation and capacity-building in disaster and risk management among its 14 full members in South-Eastern Europe.

- **The Baltic Maritime Environment Protection Commission, or Helsinki Commission (HELCOM)**, is a formal organisation tasked with the implementation of the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (Helsinki Convention).

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35 A separate synthesis report is provided for the 22 country studies. An additional final analytical report will focus on normative assessments and resulting policy recommendations for regional and country studies.
• The **International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River (ICPDR)** is a coordinating body for the implementation of the Danube River Convention, which addresses civil security concerns primarily through its work on floods and water pollution.

• The **International Sava River Basin Commission (ISRBC)** serves the purpose of implementing the Framework Agreement on the Sava River Basin with an emphasis on water management and hazard prevention.

• The **Visegrad Group (V4)** is an informal forum for regional cooperation in Central Europe and has occasionally addressed civil security concerns in its meetings, working groups and declarations.
2. Analytical Dimensions

Regional civil security systems in Europe display a wide variation in cultures, norms, policies and structures. ROs have organized very differently in their efforts to protect citizens from a variety of threats to their security and safety. ANVIL therefore looks at a set of analytical dimensions covering the diversity of ROs: 1) cultural and historical aspects, 2) legal and institutional aspects, 3) the relationship between ROs and citizens, governments and stakeholders, 4) the role of the private sector, and 5) the relationship with other ROs. This part of the synthesis report maps the empirical range of civil security ROs with regard to these analytical dimensions.

2.1 Historical and cultural aspects

Regional civil security systems are embedded in specific historical and cultural contexts, which are challenging to operationalize. ANVIL case studies looked at the establishment of ROs, the evolution of their membership, member characteristics and the ‘cultural milieu’ in which they are placed. Civil security ROs deal with varying degrees of cultural diversity despite the relative geographical proximity, so there are no necessary cultural conditions for cooperation. Instead, civil security cooperation in all studied ROs serves a basic functional imperative for coordination in an area with clear cross-border implications. In some cases, however, civil security cooperation also performs an important symbolic function in conflict-torn regions, where such a ‘neutral’ or technical agenda may support political reconciliation and détente. Such cooperation can be seen as particularly valuable, even if it is more limited than comparable efforts in culturally and politically more cohesive regions.

At a basic level, the establishment of the studied ROs can be explained by necessity – i.e. a functional need for regionalising the management of natural and/or technological crises. In the Baltic Sea region this pertains to shipping disasters or environmental degradation whereas South-Eastern Europe was repeatedly hit by forest fires as well as floods and water pollution along the Danube and Sava rivers. This basic outlook becomes apparent in the technical missions and mandate of ROs. Violent intentional threats, such as terrorism and violent unrest, are not a significant objective for regional civil security cooperation.

However, initial moves to cooperate also served symbolic political purposes in conflict-torn regions or regions undergoing transformation processes. Civil security has at times played a kind of precursor or facilitating role for reconciliation, at least at lower administrative levels. In South-Eastern Europe, where civil security ROs were created during or shortly after the Balkan wars of the 1990s (see the box below), regional cooperation on such ‘technical’ issues was a remarkable and politically challenging step. River basin management provided by the ICPDR and the ISRBC was especially fruitful, because it had obvious cross-border benefits and built on historical precedence.
The establishment of the DPPI SEE similarly addressed technical cooperation in the broader region. In the Baltic and Barents regions, civil security cooperation originated in attempts to overcome geopolitical tensions and divisions by the ‘iron curtain’ during the Cold War. For example, the establishment of the BEAC in 1993 followed a 1987 recommendation by Mikhail Gorbachev as part of his outreach strategy in the context of perestroika and glasnost. The founding of HELCOM in 1974 was an element of the larger détente process. By the same token, the BSMC and the CBSS helped to deepen ties between ‘East’ and ‘West’ after the end of the Cold War. The establishment of the ROs was also related to or even directly initiated by external actors and processes. The founding of HELCOM was embedded in the CSCE context, the creation of the DPPI SEE followed an initiative by the EU-led Stability Pact for South-East Europe and the Visegrad Group, among other things, aimed to coordinate its member states’ moves towards integration into NATO and the EU.

Most of the studied ROs expanded or changed their original mandate and scope. For example, the goals and ambitions of BEAR have grown to include projects, such as facilitation of visa regimes or the promotion of ‘green’ economic growth. The HELCOM adopted a declaration on the safety of navigation and emergency capacity that changed its mission towards more holistic civil security cooperation. It must be noted that – except for the DPPI SEE – civil security and crisis management is only one of several, often more prominent, issue areas for the studied ROs (see section 2.3).

There have been some changes in membership due to changing political contexts. For example, Serbia and Montenegro were added to the DPPI SEE, whereas Greece and Hungary were ‘downgraded’ to observer status once the organisation moved to full regional ownership. The successful integration of new member states and legally flexible management of membership underline the considerable adaptability of the studied ROs. For instance, a memorandum of understanding between the ISRBC and Montenegro authorized the country to participate in substantial technical cooperation efforts without being a member. The European Commission has an official contracting party status in the BEAC, CBSS, HELCOM and ICPDR and cooperates with the other regional forums. The BRC’s membership features a number of Arctic regions and counties, mostly with partly indigenous populations.
The eight ROs comprise members with very different characteristics, such as size, economic development, etc. (see box on the right). The four ROs in the Baltic/Barents region (BEAR, BSMC, CBSS and HELCOM) have largely overlapping memberships. A notable feature is the inclusion of Russia, which bears particular clout and has traditionally difficult relations with some other member states. ROs also display different degrees of cultural diversity, as indicated by the World Value Survey36 (see Figure 1 below). It reveals two main cultural groups in the Baltic/Barents region. On the one hand, the Scandinavian countries and – to a lesser extent – Germany reveal liberal-secular values typical for Protestant Europe whereas Russia and the Baltic countries – like many former Communist states – also value many secular beliefs but, at the same time, show a strong preference for survival over self-expression values. As a predominantly Catholic country, Poland stands out for its marked esteem for traditional values.

Levels of cultural diversity vary significantly in the ROs in South-Eastern Europe. As indicated on the chart below, the four member states of the ISRBC are relatively similar, which can be explained by their linguistic and historical ties. However, Croatia and Slovenia value self-expression more than Bosnia and Serbia. Conversely, 14 members of the ICPDR display a wide range of beliefs. There at least two groups within this organisation, while each of these groups still displays considerable

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internal diversity. First, Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Germany and Slovenia tend towards secular and self-expression values. In a second group, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Hungary, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine seem to favour secular and survival values. Romania is an outlier due to its esteem for traditional and survival values. The DPPI resembles this basic cultural setup, though with the first group being significantly smaller and the second group being clearly dominant. Moreover, here Turkey stands out due to its especially high value for traditional beliefs. The Visegrad countries have a comparatively high degree of coherence, but the Czech Republic tends more towards self-expression and Hungary clearly more towards survival values whereas Poland stands out for its emphasis on traditional as opposed to secular-rational values.

So overall, the ‘cultural milieu’ of the ROs studied by ANVIL can be described as high diversity within most organisations, while there are sub-groups of members with more shared beliefs and histories. However, compared to the realm of global, multilateral cooperation cultural cohesiveness within European civil security ROs is rather high. For example, except for three countries (Poland, Romania, Turkey) all countries are rather secular than traditional according to the World Values Survey. The regional proximity also limits political and legal differences as all member states of the studies ROs

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37 For historic reasons, there are distinct data sets for East and West Germany. Data is taken from the latest available survey round.
are democracies. Meanwhile, shared culture and history can be both a **facilitator and/or obstacle of cooperation**. Language can, for instance, be both a facilitating and polarising issue. A dominant state in a certain regional organisation can lead to the adoption of a common technical working language (Danube Commission), whereas a post-conflict situation can also lead to strong requirements for formal multilingualism. Common history on the basis of geographical proximity can similarly be a uniting force, as between the Baltic and Scandinavian states and among Central European countries, as well as a polarising factor, as between the Baltic countries and Russia.

### 2.2 Legal and institutional aspects

The legal and institutional nature of the eight ROs is highly diverse. Under the general umbrella term RO, we find formalised organisations with established norms and procedures as well as shallow legal agreements and informal coordination fora. The names of the entities range from ‘Council’ and ‘Commission’ to ‘Initiative’. Nonetheless, some common patterns emerge. The studied ROs generally follow an intergovernmental mode of cooperation that limits organisational autonomy. This results in an emphasis on information exchange and the coordination of cross-border projects, whereas independent rule-setting and implementation by ROs is rare. Though still weakly institutionalised, ROs in South-Eastern Europe display a somewhat higher degree of legal and institutional centralisation and formalisation than those in Central and North-Eastern Europe.

The eight ROs variously feature a **fragmented or single statutory basis**. The Visegrad Group and the BSMC are platforms for regional cooperation rather than formalised organisations, and are based on a limited number of fragmented, often bilateral legal provisions. With the Kirkenes Declaration, Copenhagen Declaration and Helsinki Convention respectively, the BEAR, CBSS and HELCOM have acquired a more coherent statutory basis. The three South-Eastern European ROs (DPPI, ICPDR and ISRBC) are explicitly based on a single legal document (i.e. Memorandum of Understanding on the Institutional Framework of DPPI SEE, Danube River Protection Convention, Framework Agreement on the Sava River Basin). Hence, no specific regional pattern is apparent. One also needs to note that statutory provisions only provide the framework for cooperation, while the **general degree of legalisation** (e.g. in the form of binding regulations for specific cooperation objectives) **remains low**.

Most studied ROs have **formal ruling bodies**, such as occasional ministerial meetings (in case of the CBSS even summits of heads of government) or of heads of delegation. This political level is underpinned by more regular interactions between senior officials and in thematic working groups, usually under the auspices of a rotating chairmanship. BSMC is a special case insofar as it does not

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38 From a formal point of view, this includes Russia. External judgements on the quality of Russian democracy clearly diverge

39 Case studies are not fully conclusive as to whether these three declarations/conventions can be considered singly statutory frameworks, but the qualitative discussion suggests that they serve as core references.
have independent structures, but rather denotes several national activities that are coordinated through other multilateral fora, including HELCOM and the CBSS. The Visegrad Group does not have an institutionalised ruling body (apart from a rotating presidency), but there are frequent informal interactions between member states at all levels.

The studied ROs clearly rely on **intergovernmental modes of cooperation** with strong national control. Typically, decisions are taken by government representatives based on the unanimity rule and without legally binding character. Some exceptions pertain to the three South-Eastern European ROs. If there is no consensus in the ICPDR, decisions can be adopted by a four-fifths majority vote and are binding for all countries that voted in favour. In the DPPI and ISRBC (only in relation to safe navigation), consensus decisions are formally binding. Yet none of the organisations have any enforcement mechanisms and depend on implementation via national legislation. Only in HELCOM, information about national compliance records is open to the public. The ISRBC and the ICPDR have different decision-making procedures for emergency response activities. This is based on the core mandate of ISRBC and ICPDR in the areas of water accidents, water pollution and river flooding, which may well escalate into major emergencies.

All ROs, except for the Visegrad Group and BSMC, have permanent secretariats, but their **institutionalisation remains shallow**. The BEAC/BRC permanent secretariat was established only in 2007\(^{40}\), while the DPPI SEE secretariat consists of two persons that were initially contracted from the International Migration Organisation. The 12 permanent staff members of the ICPDR secretariat are placed in the UN Vienna headquarters while the ISRBC has its headquarters in Zagreb. In short, the studies ROs have a **basic support structure but no full-fledged administrative machinery**.

This lack of resources is aggravated by the **lack of distinct civil security budgets**. Three case studies (ICPRD, ISRBC and Visegrad) explicitly note this deficit. In general, the small regular budgets of ROs barely suffice for basic administrative structures. The 2013-2014 budget for HELCOM, for example, approximated not more than 2 million EUR. Substantive cooperation requires case- or project-specific funding from member states or external donors (compare section 3.1). The search for funding is complicated by the diverse agendas of the studies ROs, where – except for the DPPI – crisis and emergency management is not the only task of the organisations.

In sum, there is only one overarching pattern with regard to institutional and legal aspects. Though their institutionalisation also remains constrained through the consensus principle, limited resources and the lack of enforcement powers, the three **South-Eastern European ROs display a somewhat more advanced level of formalisation and centralisation**. Not only do these organisations have permanent secretariats and ruling bodies as well as single statutory provisions. Most importantly, their decisions are officially binding (with partial exceptions for the ICPDR). This might be because

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\(^{40}\) Before that date, the organisations had to be supported by the Norwegian Barents Secretariat.
they are more relevant in issues of civil security/civil protection, which is likely to be aggravated by the more hierarchical bureaucratic/administrative cultures in the South Eastern European ROs. The greater formalisation of the South-Eastern Europe ROs can also be a result of the especially conflict-torn history of the region that requires stronger formal frameworks for cooperation and the related establishment of these regional organisations under EU/Western European auspices.

2.3 Activities related to civil security

Among the ANVIL sample, the DPPI SEE is the only organisation with a genuine focus on crisis and emergency management whereas most ROs pursue civil security tasks alongside other – often more prominent – issues, which were crucial to their foundation. ROs usually focus on specific types of crisis and hazards determined by their overall mandate as well as the types of crisis occurring most typically in their respective regions. Four organisations (HELCOM, ICPDR, ISRBC and MCBS) have an original focus on maritime and river management, which also is a central concern for the BEAR. Related civil security work focuses on crises and emergencies, such as oil spills, ship accidents and maritime rescue, but these ROs more regularly deal with environmental issues and safe navigation. Two organisations (CBSS, Visegrad) have a general political mandate. Based on political discussions on energy security (Visegrad) or nuclear safety (CBSS), these organisations have come to address a broader range of general scenarios like floods, forest fires or mining disasters. Civil security is only one aspect mentioned in underlying agreements and seldom reaches the top of the political agenda for high-level meetings.

Typically, ROs focus on informal coordination and facilitation in the areas of prevention and preparedness rather than operational response during unfolding crises. All organisations engage in some form of training, joint exercises, information exchange, data collection and the coordination of cross-border projects in areas like flood protection. Many ROs house distinct civil security bodies, such as the joint committee on rescue cooperation in the BEAR, and run targeted programs, such the EUROBALTIC programme for civil protection of the CBSS. Hence, they do have close contacts with national civil security organisations and provide services for specific threats and aspects of civil security.

The ROs aim to enhance the capacities of and exchange among member states and partner organisations to prevent, plan for and react to crises, but do not themselves maintain operational capacities for a direct involvement in response and recovery efforts. For instance, the BEAR sets rules for cross-border assistance during crisis, but the provision of assistance remains a fundamental responsibility of members. Similarly, emergency warning systems used by the ICPDR and ISRBC to warn downstream countries are operated by member states and do not encompass actual response capacities and responsibilities. Militaries can be included in exercises and training exercises, but all
studied ROs are **civilian controlled**. A further discussion of specific civil security-related activities can be found in section 3.1.

### 2.4 The relations with citizens, governments and stakeholders

Domestic public opinion clearly recognizes the governments’ duty to protect citizens. Such significant and meaningful relations do not exist between citizens and the studied ROs, which are not publicly elected, often not well-known to the wider public and usually dominated by governmental actors. The ANVIL case studies generally confirm that the connection between most ROs and citizens is rarely developed or extensive. All ROs make efforts to inform citizens, but, with a few exceptions, information is disseminated passively and with limited evident effects. In contrast, as all ROs are intergovernmental in nature, relations with national governments are necessarily close. In addition, the studied ROs have developed formal and informal mechanisms – e.g. implementation of joint projects or participation in official meetings – for the inclusion of public and private stakeholders (NGOs, private actors, etc.).

#### 2.4.1 Citizens

There is no survey or interview data allowing for general assessments of public knowledge about the existence and civil security activities of the studied ROs. Yet case studies point out that they are **largely invisible actors** in national media and political discourse. The HELCOM case argues that citizens are ‘well aware’ of the existence of the commission, which is plausible due to the historical political salience of the organisation during the Cold War, but does not provide further evidence. Similarly, Czech citizens seem to be familiar with the term ‘Visegrad Group’, but lack more precise knowledge of the organisation. In Poland the group is known only to experts and its specific role in civil security is even less recognised.

Information and outreach activities of ROs are limited. All studied organizations use their Web sites as the principal tool for informing the wider public. Although these Web sites usually offer a great amount of relevant information, citizens cannot be expected to actively access and process this information. **Crisis communication with citizens remains the exclusive responsibility of member states** and ROs do not use or maintain respective mechanisms. The BEAC, CBSS and DPPI have developed distinct information and communication strategies, but these efforts target ‘stakeholders’ and ‘end-users’ in national agencies, NGOs, private companies or other international organisations (see below). The same applies to newsletters, conferences and consultations organised by the ISRBC, HELCOM or the ICPDR.
However, this does not mean that ROs’ outreach activities to citizens are necessarily superfluous. Some case studies note the introduction of more advanced and active information tools. The ICPDR and ISRBC are clearly most ambitious in their public communication and information strategies, which may be related to the visibility and ideational importance of the two rivers for the respective regions. The ISRBC celebrates the annual ‘Sava Day’ and hosts a youth parliament. The ICPDR also organises an annual ‘Danube Day’ and the children art competition ‘Danube Art Master’, publishes the ‘Danube Art Watch Magazine’, and offers a notable and successful teaching tool called ‘Danube Box’ (see Showcase Practice 1). However, to date there is no evidence in how far such innovative tools positively impact on public awareness or support.

2.4.2. Governments

Member states are committed to their respective regional organization by financial support and by participation of high-level policy officials at official meetings. High-level meetings can include summits among heads of government as in the CBSS or the V-4 as well as ministerial meetings or meetings of heads of delegation (see section 2.2.). Equally as mentioned above, all of the ROs covered within this project are intergovernmental, which translates into close and regular interactions at an executive level. For instance, in the framework of the DPPI SEE, the heads of disaster management authorities, appointed by their respective national governments, provide strategic and policy guidelines at DPPI SEE Regional Meetings. Most ROs primarily serve as comparable platforms for consultation and coordination among national governments, including, and going beyond, the area of civil security.

Showcase Practice 1: The Danube Box

The ‘Danube Box’ was designed and produced by an Austrian expert team in close cooperation with the ICPDR and additional experts from the Danube countries. It is a trans-boundary educational kit to address needs for awareness raising materials targeting children, developed within the framework of the ‘Green Danube Partnership’. The idea for the production of the Danube Box was generated from national workshops taking place in several Danube countries, where problems and needs of the countries were discussed and collected. The kit has been translated and will be promoted in various projects and activities in at least five Danube countries – Austria, Germany, Hungary, Romania and Serbia – in cooperation with relevant national ministries, pedagogical institutes and school authorities. The ‘Danube Box’ has served as a model and inspiration for the German Saar Box, the Black Sea Box and soon it will be developed for the South African Orange River Box.
However, there are differences between regional organizations regarding the role of national parliaments. In particular, national (and regional) parliaments play an important role in the Barents region (although their links are still not institutionalized), and in the case of DPPI SEE and ISRBC national parliaments have a role in ratifying key documents and agreements as well as related protocols. In contrast, national parliaments do not have direct or notable relations with ICPDR, CBSS and Visegrad Group.

2.4.3 Stakeholders

All studied ROs aim to foster and strengthen cooperation between relevant business, private and state-based organizations. One can find different instruments, ranging from targeted projects, networks and occasional meetings, to strategic partnerships and third-party participation through wider regional strategies (CBSS). The most common approach is to conduct joint projects and/or ensure stakeholders’ participation in official groups meetings. The RO case studies show that DPPI SEE and Visegrad Group activities are mostly focused on governmental actors, while those of CBSS, ICPDR, and ISRBC include a wide variety of stakeholders, such as relevant NGOs, research institutes or business organizations. For example, the ISRBC regularly cooperates with national institutions responsible for the implementation of its plans and programmes and considers their views as relevant corrective factors of its work. In general, relevant stakeholders participate in simulation of exercises organized by ROs (BEAR, HELCOM), RO expert groups (CBSS) and projects (MCBS, CBSS, ICPDR, ISRBC), as well as in some of the organizations’ meetings and consultations (CBSS, DPPI SEE, ICPDR, ISRBC, Visegrad Group). It seems that ICPDR and ISRBC pay special attention to the awareness raising and information sharing of stakeholders, while DPPI SEE significantly contribute to the education of emergency management professionals in participating member states through seminars and conferences.

A noticeable and successful practice in stakeholder relationships is the BEAR joint working groups (see Showcase Practice 2). Under the auspices of the CBSS, the Civil Protection Network (CIVPRO) convenes governmental, academic and profit-oriented actors for the facilitation and coordination of research projects. In another case, the ISRBC is moving towards the establishment of the ‘Sava Water
Partnership’, which is intended to serve as a sustained platform for systematic stakeholder dialogue. There are also a number of additional formalised ways of including the private sector and especially profit-oriented organisations through public-private partnerships or other formats (see section 2.5 below).

2.5 The role of the private sector

ANVIL case studies covered the role of voluntary/non-profit organizations as well as of profit-oriented organizations in civil security. All studied ROs maintain relationships with private sector organisations, though in different degrees and forms. Voluntary organisations participate in exercises or training whereas private companies occasionally offer financial support for specific projects. Some ROs have initiated special mechanisms for sustained and systematic dialogue with the private sector.

**NGOs are typically preferred as part of the public sphere, whereas the profit-oriented private sector is seen as an external force** which is not trusted (per se) but is welcomed to spend financial resources. Voluntary organisations like the Red Cross regularly participate in exercises and training while NGOs representing specific societal groups and interests contribute to relevant consultation processes. Due to their superior capacities, private companies occasionally provide funding for certain projects. Beyond that, the actual level of engagement with the private sector is challenging to measure. Instead, one can only roughly distinguish between ROs that are clearly active in terms of legal, contractual bases at place to cooperate with private entities and those that are rather not and identify a number of noticeable practices.

The DPPI SEE and the Visegrad Group are examples where interaction with private actors is sporadic and mostly limited to attendances in conferences and information-exchanges, while there are also some examples of NGO funding (Visegrad Fund). The two river organisations covered by ANVIL, the ICPDR and the ISRBC, already show closer engagement with business and local communities to encourage active participation in flood risk prevention as well as regional economic development. This kind of cooperation may or may not be formalised, but seems well suited to the interests and mission of the alluvial communities. The ICPDR has established a constant dialogue with the business sector through the ‘Business Friends of the Danube’, which primarily seek to facilitate funding for specific projects from private companies. These efforts build upon earlier effort in the ‘Green Danube Partnership’, featuring major companies like Coca-Cola which, among other things, support the Danube Day and the Danube Box.

**Cooperation with private actors is most systematised and extensive in the Baltic region**, where full public private partnerships are becoming more regular. A notable example that goes beyond the studied organisations is the Baltic Sea Action Group (BSAG) which is an independent non-profit foundation founded in 2008 in Finland. Its work ‘is based on constructive cooperation with
authorities and the private sector’. In February 2010, the BSAG together with the Finnish president and the prime minister organised a Baltic Sea Action Summit which gathered together heads of state and more than 140 companies and organisations around the Baltic Sea. These activities take place under the umbrella of HELCOM that has a long history of inter-organisational partnerships for regional development for business and scientific exchanges among non-profit actors. However, there are no specific conventions existing on maritime cooperation with the private sector with regard to prevention, preparedness and response to crisis as of yet.

2.6 Relations with other regional organisations

Cooperation is most intense among ROs working within the same region, but there are also relationships with external organisations, among which the EU is particularly important. The EU provides assistance and funding for many RO projects, while ROs help to implement EU policies and raise awareness at the regional level.

In general, ROs prefer bilateral rather than multilateral relationships and are more inclined to work primarily with organizations in their own region with which they share common interests (e.g. the ICPDR and ISRBC). There is more evident political will to support operational regional coordination, as in the case of dense horizontal networks in the Baltic region, than to shift decision-making processes towards multilateral frameworks (see also further below). Case studies do not explicitly elaborate on whether the work of several ROs within one region leads to duplication or mutual enrichment. The descriptions of their work indicate not fully identical, though overlapping, activities.

Nevertheless, the EU is an especially influential partner. In most studied ROs, the majority of member states are EU member states and the European Commission is itself a contracting party to four ROs (BEAC, CBSS, HELCOM and ICPDR). Regional cooperation in South-Eastern Europe is embedded in the EU enlargement process and neighbourhood policy, as evidenced most clearly by the EU initiating role for the DPPI SEE. This is directly related to the influence of EU legislations, strategies and policies, which shape the work of member and candidate countries. This generates convergence pressure on non-EU member states as well. For example, the EU Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) and the EU Flood Directive (2007/60/EC) are central guidelines for the work of many of the ROs, especially with regard to the ICPDR and ISRBC’s focus on rivers and the maritime components of Baltic and Barents cooperation.

The EU also is a crucial source of funding and assistance for specific projects and the implementation of EU policies in basically all ROs covered by ANVIL. Such partnerships provide the EU with an avenue for the advancement of regional policies. For instance, even though the ISRB and EU have no formalized relationship (contrasting EU relations with the ICPDR), it receives considerable EU assistance. Funding can come from various instruments, such as pre-accession funds, regional funds
or the research framework programme. In addition, EU agencies and Commission Departments provide technical assistance and support to the implementation of EU Directives. Examples include the work of the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) in maritime cooperation in the Baltic region and the cooperation of DPPI SEE with DH ECHO and DH Enlargement. DPPI SEE members that are not EU members have also gained limited access to some EU civil protection training activities. In turn, the **ROs act as a transmission belt** for the decisions reached at EU level **and act as organized platforms** for hosting EU funded projects and conferences. However, ROs can neither rely on legal enforcement mechanisms nor on substantial economic or functional incentives. **The influence of the EU has downsides or limits** as well. In the BEAR and CBSS, participation of Russia, as a non-EU member state, has not been so active due to domestic tensions and economic-political frictions with the EU.

The studied ROs’ **network of cooperation with other international and regional specialized organizations** (UN, NATO, EFTA, OECD, Council of Europe and International Federation of Red Cross) is **not as dense and specific** as the one established with the EU. Particularly the high number of regional organisations in the Baltic region generates horizontal referrals at the expense of multilateral frameworks, such as the UN and NATO initiatives that include Russia. However, in South-Eastern Europe cooperation with UN agencies is pertinent, especially for the DPPI SEE and ISRBC. In particular training activities and research have been organised in cooperation with the NATO - Science for Peace initiative, the UN Disaster Management Training Program (UN DMTP) or the UN Civil Military Coordination Course (UN-CM Cord).

### 3. Quality Dimensions

As outlined above, different regional systems of civil security have evolved in response to different crisis experiences and cultural and political contexts. The ANVIL project therefore takes an inductive approach towards the understanding of quality. ROs have been assessed in so as far as one could identify sources of evidence and preferences on the dimensions of effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy within organisations. The low public profile and operational impact of ROs explains the limited basis for such inductive assessments. The following section therefore presents more summary and indicative findings.

In terms of effectiveness, RO training activities, exercises and workshops have served as platforms for the establishment of cross-border contacts between national officials and surveyor belts for functional knowledge. Yet due to the limited competences and capacities of ROs, one cannot establish direct causal links between regional improvements and the work of ROs. Efficiency is not a major concern as budgets of ROs are very small and rarely reach beyond a nucleus of administrative staff. Judicial oversight and popular debates in relation to the studied ROs are essentially non-existent, but a basic level of transparency and debate must be in place. The degree of an RO’s
legitimacy thus depends on the direct support from national governments and executives. These actors do not raise fundamental concerns about the legitimacy of ROs, but focus on case-specific and limited issues for improvement.

3.1 Effectiveness and efficiency

ANVIL’s approach to assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of national civil security systems draws on political and professional inquiries, public cost-benefit calculations, and instances where crisis response capacities have been in need of external assistance. However, such data is largely unavailable for the studied ROs. The primary purpose of the studied organizations is to serve as platforms for bilateral and multilateral exchange and coordination, not as actors for operational crisis management with respective resources and powers. The ROs’ strict intergovernmental and often informal character further obstructs external assessments. Therefore, this section presents practices and performance problems noted for individual ROs, set in relation to their budget. This additional treatment must be read in conjunction with the broader discussion of the ROs’ work in section 2.3. This showed that the budget of ROs is mostly dedicated to general administrative structures. Civil security-related projects are instead directly funded by member states or external donors on a case-by-case basis.

In the BEAR case, cooperation through joint training activities and exercises, exchange of experts and the development of a joint manual has helped to establish national contact points in the case of crisis and to streamline rules relating to cross-border activities. Border crossings into Russia have been a point of concern which has partly been resolved by reducing the time for emergency personnel and equipment to cross the border. Bi-annual exercises have also been organized regularly during the last decade. There is no fixed annual budget for the BEAR.

The BSMC is not based on an organizational framework and has thus no capacities on its own. Overall, cooperation regarding maritime safety and security has increased in the region and the number of ship collisions has decreased even though the traffic volumes have increased. However, there is no data allowing for direct links between these developments and the effects of maritime cooperation.

In the related case of HELCOM, the environmental status of the Baltic Sea has been improved in several respects. According to the case study report, HELCOM’s ability to successfully shape the regional environmental agenda and suggest concrete action based on scientific evidence has significantly contributed to this success. However, it remains impossible to prove the degree of HELCOM’s influence, when one considers its limited resources and the intervening influence of various other political and economic developments affecting the region during the last two decades.
The CBSS functions primarily as a platform for discussions and support for bilateral and multilateral civil security initiatives. Exercises and activities in the field of emergency training are organized by other frameworks in the region, such as HELCOM. CBSS has been effective as a forum for discussions. In particular, the inclusion of Russia as a member has been seen as positive. Its recent civil security-related activity has been limited, however. CBSS does not have a general budget or any project funds. Member states are responsible for funding various programmes administered through the CBSS and the organisation relies on powerful financial backers, such as the EU. The secretariat itself has a budget of 2.7 million Euro (2012), which is predominantly provided by Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Russia, Poland and Germany, while the Baltic States and Iceland each pay 4 per cent of the costs.

The DPPI SEE focuses on the prevention of and preparedness for natural and man-made disasters through various exercises, workshops and training among national officials. In this context, smaller groups of states have initiated and started projects that do not involve all the member states, such as a project on ‘Joint Fire Fighting Units’ and ‘Border Crossing Protocols/Procedures’ between Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Montenegro. In addition to training and education projects, the group noticeably engages in limited asset sharing and/or asset procurement, for example for fire-fighting equipment. The DPPI SEE also runs a ‘Seismic Maps Project’ and another project regarding joint emergency response units in the case of floods. Many of these and other activities are organized jointly with other organizations, such as UNDP, which could be evidence of a lack of ‘in house’ knowhow and financial resources. The highest annual budget of DPPI SEE has been around 600,000 EUR, but has recently been downsized and currently each member state’s contribution equals the minimum fixed amount of 25,000 Euro, adding up to a total 275,000 euro. Some member states do not regularly pay DPPI predicted contributions and the organization requires the adoption of internal regulations for managing its financial matters, such as the procurement of goods.

Most the activities of the ICPDR in the field of civil security regard capacity-building for prevention and preparedness in relation to floods and reduction of water pollution. One activity that is being organized by ICPDR that should be highlighted is an Accident Emergency Warning Systems (AEWS) which is tested twice a year through unannounced alarms to which the member states are to respond. The operability of the principal international alert centers, which have a 24/7 preparedness, are tested and then evaluated. A recent test has confirmed that this system is working as expected. Even though there have not been any professional or political inquires made of the effectiveness of the ICPDR, it is often used as a ‘good-practice example for trans-boundary water management at conferences’. This may be evidence that the organization is perceived as an advanced and effective river-commission by other actors. Part of its success should be attributed to the prominent role of
expert groups which prepare all decisions. As mentioned above, it is also more visible than others through public outreach activities like the ‘Danube Day’ and the ‘Danube Box’. In 2011, the total annual budget of the ICPDR was slightly above one million EUR. In order to reserve funds for emergency situations a ‘Working Capital Fund’ has been established, while the general budget is mostly for administrative expenses. Moreover, alert and warning systems are operated and maintained from the member states’ budgets, since a majority of the ICPDR’s work is done directly by member countries. Member State’s contributions in staff and material are considerable while project-related funding also comes from the EU as well as from external sources, such as UNDP. The ISRBC functions as a platform to improve and harmonize regulations in river management along the Sava River. The organization has proven to be a meeting point where networks and personal relationships have developed facilitating informal cooperation, as during the floods in Croatia in 2010. As part of this, Principal International Alert Centers (PIACs) have been established in the ISRBC member states. However, it is reported that the PIACs function as planned in only two of the four member states. Training is therefore being organized to increase the capacity of the PIACs. The Sava Commission has an ambitious number of programs and activities. It is in a developing process “for further development and intensification of cooperation”. However, the fact that Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have not harmonized with the EU’s *acquis communautaire* has been brought up as an obstacle for improving the organization’s effectiveness. In addition the slow implementation of the Sava Commission’s work by its member states is also a hamper to its effectiveness. The annual budget was 546,700 Euro for 2011. All parties contribute to the financing of the Sava Commission on an equal basis. The annual contribution decreased during the last two years, (by more than 9 per cent), while the amount of externally provided funds increased.

With regard to the Visegrad Group, the original V4 agreement has largely played out its role as facilitating the access and political position of central European states vis-à-vis the EU and NATO, and thus the platform’s significance has weakened. In relation to anti-terrorism measures there has however been some effective cooperation and a number of new issues, such as energy security, have revived cooperation to some degree. The cooperation is not institutionalized but based on periodic meetings. In this RO all countries share the costs equally. In 2012 the overall budget was 7,530,701 euro, most of which was not dedicated for disaster management. Roughly 10 per cent of the overall budget consists of administrative costs. There is a financial tool for cooperation, the Visegrad Fund, but based on the analysis of expenses of all accepted projects, civil-security related projects were less than 2 per cent.

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41 In addition, the cooperation has resulted into a single shared hydraulic model of the entire Sava River. Flood risk maps are developed as well as a comprehensive database mapping out the Sava River.

42 See further references in the ANVIL paper on the Visegrad Group under section 4.1.
In conclusion, the ANVIL reports show that almost all of the studied regional organizations function primarily as platforms for discussions and multilateral agreements, most of them with a special emphasis on river and maritime issues. The exercises and training organized by some of the organizations work as a **platform for networking and for building personal relations** between national practitioners, which can be of great importance in trans-boundary crisis situations. Organizations are generally **very dependent on the interest of (and funding by) their member states** for their effectiveness and goal achievement. Member states’ engagement in the organization also depends on the overlap with the work of other multilateral organization such as the EU and NATO. The Visegrad Group is a good example of such development. It played a more important role before its member states became members of EU and NATO, organizations which have overlapping and more developed cooperation and functions. Worsened bilateral relationship between member states can also affect the effectiveness of the organization. At the same time, the organizations can make a contribution – albeit limited - to the improvement of relations and resolution of conflicts.

Despite the difficulties of overarching comparisons between these different organisations, it is clear that **organizations with clear agendas, organizational structures and yearly budgets, such as the ICPDR and HELCOM, have more activities and thus could be perceived as more effective.** Yet the CBSS suggests engagement by member states remains the most crucial basis for tangible outputs.

The regional organizations **differ with respect to their members' contributions to the organizations’ budgets.** In four of the cases (DPPI SEE, ICPDR, ISRBC and Visegrad), the member states' contributions are equal and evenly distributed. Although having the principle of equal contributions by all members, in the case of DPPI SEE this does not function entirely well in practice as some member states do not regularly pay the predicted contributions. The second group is formed by organisations in the Baltic/Barents region where the contributions of member states are not even. In the case of HELCOM, this is openly perceived to be a problem. The organizations with uneven contributions from member states typically do not have a firmly set budget. Asset sharing and joint procurements are - at least so far - not very typical for countries within a regional organization. This was reported only by the DPPI SEE (namely fire-fighting equipment) and to an even lesser extent by the ISRBC.

### 3.2 Legitimacy

ANVIL indirectly defines legitimacy by different indicators of political, legal and popular support. Yet the low public profile of ROs means that they are **not subject to regular political and public debate or judicial oversight mechanisms** and **the lack of operational powers and resources prevents them from directly interfering in public goods or people’s everyday lives.** Moreover, as civil security is usually one issue handled by the ROs their overall legitimacy might be determined more by other spheres of activity. Therefore, the legitimacy of ROs **can practically be assessed only in relation to**
their central stakeholders, i.e. national governments. Even in this regard, the ‘real’ motives and opinions might not be observable from the outside.

All ROs are assessed (explicitly or implicitly) as, more or less, legitimate. This is apparent in the data coded in the country studies (see Table 1). There were no cases recorded in which RO involvement in crisis management strained political relations between member states or undermined the legitimacy of a national government. Three of the eight ROs’ mechanisms are used in crisis situations, while five RO mechanisms are being by-passed in crisis situations in favour of the EU (MIC) or other supranational/bilateral arrangements. Solely the ICPDR is used in crisis situations and not by-passed in favour of other organisations. There are some cases in which the legitimacy of ROs was put into question. For instance, the future viability and use of the CBSS was questioned in 2006-2008 when the remainder of the permanent members, except for Russia, joined the EU. Conversely, the absence of Russian governors in the BRC in the last few years underlines a possible legitimacy problem for this organization. This absence is most possibly the result of domestic tensions between the provinces and Moscow as external affairs conducted by the Karelia and Komi provinces may be seen as a threat to the unity of the Russian Federation, and should not directly be attributed to the workings of the BRC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Legitimacy (coded data)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Using RO mechanism in crisis</td>
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<td>BEAR</td>
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<td>ISRBC</td>
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<td>Visegrad</td>
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Source: ANVIL case studies

Particular problems can undermine the legitimacy of certain ROs and their successful cooperation, like existing tensions between Hungary and Slovakia within the Visegrad group. On the other hand, there are ROs that can contribute to resolving the conflicts between states, as is the case of ICPDR that helped Romania and Ukraine over the Bystroe Canal Project in the Danube Delta. An important challenge seems to be that within ROs the contracting parties often tend to preserve their sovereignty at the cost of intergovernmental cooperation. Moreover, cooperation continues to take
place largely outside public, parliamentary and judicial oversight. While this appears to be due to a lack of interest rather than by the preferences of the ROs, a basic degree of transparency and a certain level of debate about overarching priorities remain important to come to a positive assessment of their legitimacy.

The EU and NATO accession of most countries led to overlaps in the original mandates of the ROs with EU and NATO. Those new NATO and EU members tend to by-pass regional organizations in crisis situations in favour of the EU and NATO. They invest less resources and efforts in regional organizations, being more preoccupied with the EU and NATO. Differences in interests and perceptions among member countries within the framework of ROs result in the loss of enthusiasm, energy and willingness, or disappointment and frustration of some countries in ROs.

4. Conclusion

ROs are a regular feature of European governance in many issue areas and in different geographical areas, including in the field of civil security. However, all surveyed organisations generally pursue a multiplicity of objectives, while they also have relatively limited resources and administrative structures at their disposal. They also remain strongly intergovernmental and exercise supportive functions, rather than giving authoritative direction, to participating national governments - particularly in the area of operational response to unfolding crises and emergencies that touch upon core national executive functions. One should not overstress their importance in operational security provision, and they cannot compete with the resources and competences of other relevant multilateral organisations in Europe, notably NATO and the EU. It also must be acknowledged that efficiency and effectiveness measurements are even more limited in the area of regional organisations than with regard to national civil security systems.

Nevertheless, the ANVIL case studies show regional organisations are able to catalyse and support cooperation in areas where geographical and natural conditions indicate the need for more than ad hoc and local cross-border cooperation in crisis management. The functional need for a common organisational perspective on these natural ‘common public goods’ is supported by a growing membership and expanding range of tasks and responsibilities of several, but not all, ROs studied by ANVIL. The limited available evidence on the performance of ROs with regard to their mission statements shows that there are common obstacles in terms of organisational capacities, financial resources and some political internal tensions, but that the majority of organisations are also on track to contribute at least some notable aspects to the overall objectives of regional development and security. Their main value appears to be the facilitating of training and exercises and the deepening of cross-border ties between national officials, with a special emphasis on prevention and preparedness. Whether these more modest functions as such constitute a sufficient rationale for
further or intensified cooperation remains a political question that must ultimately be answered by the governments and citizens of member states.

In some cases, regional organisations can present a significant symbolic value in so far as they enable cross-national cooperation even in areas that are otherwise prone to confrontation. Historical and cultural similarities ease cooperation, but technical formal cooperation on civil security can also take place under different conditions. During the Cold War, this argument applied to the Baltic region (while the inclusion of Russia still counts today), while the support for cooperation in South-Eastern Europe has been prominent over the last fifteen years. As such, regional organisations are an important preparatory and long-term support structure for civil security.

The civil security work of the studied ROs is generally not well known to wider public audiences and the direct involvement with society and private actors is limited. The ROs’ activities seldom make their way into mainstream media and attention is largely constrained to expert circles, with no major public and political debates being recorded. Communication and exchange with citizens is rather passive. Still, there are some examples of interesting specific instruments for popular involvement, such as the ‘Danube Box’. This gives reasons to hope that one may expect a long-term common upward convergence across all surveyed organizations in this regard. Regular dialogue with the private sector is often limited to organised stakeholders. Profit-oriented organisations occasionally compensate for the lack of financial resources and fund specific projects while non-profit organisations often participate in consultation processes. Redefining objectives of ROs together with all participating stakeholders in both the private and the public sectors should be on the top of the agenda in the near future, which will require enhanced visibility and outreach. Politicisation and contestation currently are not demanded by any visible constituencies, but regional civil security cooperation should not hide from public attitudes and oversight to the degree where it becomes a mere functional technocracy. This is also crucial to ensure the ROs’ continued acceptance and legitimacy.

Turning to the relations between regional organizations and other multilateral organizations – most notably the EU – one can make out two diverging patterns. On the one hand, all regional organizations tend to prefer region-specific and bilateral coordination projects to multilateral frameworks. Member states are, on the whole, more likely to support regional cooperation in an intergovernmental format, even when there may be a duplication of efforts (in the Baltic region) and no pressures that speak for or against a particular regional organisation. On the other hand, the EU will continue to grow as the key European umbrella framework for regional organizations in terms of funding and framework legislation, such as its Water Directive.