ANVIL Deliverable 5.1: Report on EU-added value for policy stakeholders

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1. Introduction

This report constitutes Deliverable 5.1 of the FP7 Security Program Coordination and Support Action 'Analysis of Civil Security Systems in Europe' (ANVIL, Grant Agreement no. 284678). The purpose of Deliverable 5.1 is to provide a report on the achievement in the project of EU-added value for policy stakeholders. Our definition of EU value-added for ANVIL follows a dual rationale. In administrative terms, the concept means the value-added of the project itself for the civil security policy-making communities in Europe. Simply put, it asks how beneficial the results of this EU-funded project are for the national end-users in their everyday practice of drafting civil security and civil protection recommendations. A second definition of the EU value-added draws upon the nature of our study and its content, and explores whether EU actions related to crisis management can have a positive impact on the delivery of civil protection at national level. In WP5 we have been taking into consideration both definitions. Milestones 4 and 5 are mainly based upon the administrative definition of EU value-added. Milestones 18 and 19 draw upon the content-based definition of the term. WP5's final evaluation workshop oscillates between both definitions. Each of the following sections provides a description of each MS so as we do not present them here in order to avoid duplication.

2. WP5 input given to WP1

This part of the draft report is MS5 which was due in Month 5.

Introduction to Contributions

In the frame of MS4, the consortium has created an inventory of ANVIL's potential end-users in the countries covered by the project. For MS5, the consortium researchers have been asked to establish solid channels of communication with these policy-makers so that the latter can be further engaged in ANVIL's research; and also in order to ensure that ANVIL's progress can continue being acknowledged not necessarily because of the consortium's intervention but through the policy-makers' own initiative to spread the news about the project. What is more, MS5 describes the initial impressions, thoughts and reactions towards ANVIL on behalf of civil security's stakeholders. The milestone is sent to the WP1 lead team (University of Utrecht) in order to inform the preparations of the first evaluation workshop with direct engagement of policy-makers.

Primary estimations about ANVIL have been submitted for the following countries: UK, Ireland, Malta, Italy, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Croatia, Norway, Romania, Poland and Germany. In what follows, we summarise some of the main concerns and points raised about ANVIL's initial stages. We subsequently present the consortium's contributions with minimal editing so as to retain intact the emphasis put by the fellow researchers and also due to respect towards contributions coming directly from the policy-makers. Besides, the different way of reporting opinions about civil security reflects once more ANVIL's basic idea that "not one security fits all".

Starting with issues of content, policy-makers have expressed a concern about civil security's definition as proposed so far by the consortium. What ANVIL understands as civil security should be better delineated and clarified (Italy, Romania, Finland and the Baltics), taking into account that the different countries in our research perceive civil security and civil protection in different ways. More precision is required about the role of the military in civil security (Italy, Finland and the Baltics) and about the overall role of the EU as civil security provider (Norway). One additional matter bearing gravity for policy-makers is whose responsibility the declaration of a civil crisis or emergency is (Finland and the Baltics).

The Italian policy-makers/experts have expressed an interesting opinion regarding the role of the private sector in civil crisis management. The issue of private property and how this is managed during emergencies (e.g. public handling of private property when the country is declared in state of emergency) should be seen as an important aspect of a country's civil security system.

Civil security stakeholders seem to greatly appreciate the mapping exercise that ANVIL has promised to deliver. And this is due to the extreme complexity of the actors involved in civil security and civil protection in each of the countries under consideration (Finland and the Baltics). Towards this end, policy-makers have proposed refinements in the mapping criteria set by ANVIL. Firstly, that the French case should be included in the Mediterranean cluster when examining regional regimes of cooperation (Italy); and secondly, that the cases grouping under the label of Nordic countries should also include Iceland, Denmark and Norway (Norway).

With regards to methodology, a significant observation has been raised by a Romanian expert. It appears that the current approach of the consortium has created some confusion about the nature of the study, whether it is based upon qualitative or quantitative scientific inquiry. This is mainly because even though ANVIL is based upon qualitative research, it endeavours a formalisation of the civil security systems in Europe, using concepts that may not totally suitable for quantification. Hence, the consortium should make more explicit the study's methodological profile. Feedback from the UK has pinpointed another issue that lies within methodology and refers to data collection. To what extent the data necessary for describing civil security architectures deal with public and accessible information? Because particularly in civil-military cooperation, information we seek can be classified. The consortium should provide a general stance towards this matter.

ANVIL's dissemination has not always been easy. The case of Malta has shown us that different attempts to diffuse the project's existence may not thrive if a country's administration is not responsive and cooperative enough, possibly having a detrimental impact on data collection in later stages of the project. Such a worry can become more intense for countries in which the consortium is only allowed to conduct desk research. Furthermore, problems of locating potential

end-users of ANVIL in the policy-makers' community depends upon how quickly public requests and inquiries are processed by a country's bureaucracy (Poland). Finally, it might be the case that policy-makers are more intrigued by civil security projects of a clearly national focus and thus be reluctant towards a project owned by the EU Commission (Germany). If so, ANVIL has to convince them in the long-run about the project's value-added.

In general, though, policy-makers have so far expressed a positive view towards ANVIL and willingness to participate in our research during the whole duration of the project. They are interested in providing feedback and advice as well as getting informed about ANVIL's progress and research findings (Croatia, Ireland). Following the examples of the consortium's researchers in Finland, Germany and Croatia, we continue to encourage fellow researchers to disseminate ANVIL through all possible paths: in conferences and workshops related to civil security, by electronic means (such as newsletters and links on their web-pages), as well as through social networks (LinkedIn, Twitter, Facebook).

University of Essex

ANVIL's Dissemination in the UK, Ireland and Malta

Since April 2012, the University of Essex has proceeded in numerous efforts to publicise the ANVIL project and spread the news about it among the policy-makers' communities and other stakeholders of civil security. We initially investigated the civil security systems of the three countries in order to find the key policy-makers in crisis management. Adding to this, we scanned the field for public agencies as well as civil society organisations which are involved in the delivery of civil protection. In this way, ANVIL's long-term end-users were located. We then tried to establish channels of communication with them by sending informative emails, presenting the project and asking for their first impressions and advice.

More precisely, our up-to-now efforts have thrived as follows:

United Kingdom

We have attempted to establish channels of communication with civil servants from the Cabinet Office, the Home Office and the regional emergency services. The most promising contact has been the *Civil Contingencies Secretariat*, which is part of the Cabinet Office and the main governmental actor managing civil security in the UK. CCS has commented positively on ANVIL and has promised to interact with us during the whole duration of the project. Civil servants from CCS have already been interviewed, shedding light on the initial stages of our research. Even more important is the fact that CCS is directly networked with other branches/bureaus of the Cabinet Office, such as the *Emergency Planning College* and the *Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure*. Our acquaintances in CCS have stressed that we can count on their intervention when we try to interview civil servants from these offices. What is more, we have sent emails promoting ANVIL to administrative units in the Home Office such as the *Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism* and the *Office for Cyber-Security and Information Assurance*. Their response is still awaited but we will intensify our efforts in order to reserve future interviews. Last but not least, we successfully spread the news in specific "corridors" of the Ministry of Defence, namely the *MoD Counter Terrorism Science and Technology Centre* and the *DCBRN Centre*. Our military contacts consider ANVIL a fascinating study but they have raised **explicit concerns about the**

confidentiality of information it can bring to the fore. In short, they feel that part of the project deals with issues of restrictive access and classified information.

Concerning, our engagement with the civil society, we have acknowledged the scope of our project to the *British Red Cross* and St. John Ambulance. From the academic perspective, we had a thorough conversation with Sir David Omand, leading UK expert on civil security. Prof. Omand is an ex-Permanent Secretary of the Home Office.

In the UK, to date efforts to disseminate ANVIL initially concentrated on the central government for the sake of safeguarding research for completing the WP2 country report. We then investigated possible contacts in parliamentary committees dealing with civil security and more intensely inform civil society organisations about the project. Objective factors distorting dissemination have been the summer period of vacation and the organisation of London Olympic Games 2012, an event that kept busy the policy-makers (we presume that otherwise they might have provided more initial feedback about ANVIL).

Ireland

In the case of Ireland, we have tried to disseminate ANVIL within the Ministries of Defence, of Justice and of Health. We have primarily addressed the Irish *Office of Emergency Planning* (MoD) and the *Civil Defence Ireland* (MoD), the two key organisations for delivering civil protection in the country. In the former's case, we ensured the participation of a representative at the Utrecht Workshop. In the latter's case, we initiated communication with a member of the Civil Defence Board. From the Department of Justice and Equality, we have been provided with some positive feedback concerning ANVIL, confirming that in the Department "we are always interested in security related issues". Last but not least, there has been correspondence with the *Health Service Executive*, one of Ireland's Principal Response Agencies. This contact has significantly facilitated the progress of our research in Ireland, helping us with further contacts and with the primary resources we should pay attention to for mapping the Irish civil security system. One of the key events to bear in mind about Ireland at present is that recession has forced about 3,000 civil servants out of the public sector. This implies that people have been transferred to new posts, thus hindering efforts to diffuse information about the project amidst practitioners. Meeting the

Office of Emergency Planning representative at the Utrecht Workshop helped us consolidate our "information flux" from Ireland.

Malta

Dissemination of the ANVIL project has been problematic in Malta. And this is not because policy-makers have not been responsive to our emails but because they have provided very limited information and feedback and guidance about ANVIL. We have even tried to acquire information about Malta through the embassy in London but no specific advice or feedback has been proffered. Our most promising contact in Malta has been an academic at the University of Malta. If we combine our rather limited communication with Maltese civil security stakeholders and the extreme paucity of available information (official documents) about crises, emergencies and disasters in the country, in the long run this can have a detrimental impact on compiling WP2's country report. To avoid this, we have started considering to visit Malta and collect available hard-copy material.

L'Istituto d'Affari Internazionali

ANVIL – MS5: Key informants' inputs on ANVIL

1) ANVIL's aim and impact

The aim of the project is considered interesting but also rather ambitious. The fact that policy recommendations will be formulated is very much appreciated.

The ANVIL's added-value is not only to address an important issue, but also to consider what can be done at European level. In this field there is national resistance to share responsibilities at the EU level, but steps forward have been made: for example the adoption of the EU directive on critical infrastructures, which among other things pushed some member states to fill a legal vacuum on that issue.

It is very good to start the dialogue with stakeholders at the beginning of the project and not just at the end. Then the outputs shall be disseminated through the network of contacts established through this dialogue. In Italy, ANVIL's outputs would be useful for the policy-makers, particularly at the level of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers.[1]

2) Civil security definition

Generally speaking, a clear definition of what civil security is should be spelled out. Otherwise, there is the risk that key informants/policy-makers/stakeholders misunderstand what is the ANVIL's focus, for example by thinking it is only about civil protection. It may happen that at the EU or national levels, there may be reluctance to explicitly talk about "defence" and "military". However, such reluctance has decreased in recent years and shall further decrease, as security challenges do not make distinctions about civil and military or civil security and defence – think for example cyber-security, which by definition has no boundaries.

3) ANVIL's Methodology: analytical dimensions

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[1] The Presidency of the Council of Ministers is the administrative structure that supports the Italian Prime Minister in dealing with various issues including security ones, as well as in coordinating Italian Ministries.

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The four analytical dimensions to examine the case studies are considered appropriate. However, it is important that research goes further into details and such dimensions do not remain only general headlines.

➢ First dimension.

Within the first dimension (Cultural and historical aspects), the 9/11 represented a change also for the European approach to internal security/civil security. Culture is also very important, as it deeply influences the relations between a state's security system and the citizens (third dimension).

➢ Second dimension.

Within the second dimension, it has to be clarified what is the role of the constitutional framework.

➢ Third dimension.

The third dimension (The relations between a state's security system and its citizens) may be the most complicated to deal with. In this case factors specific to each nation, such as cultural and historical experiences (the latter may be the basis of different aspects of society today), impact any form of comparison. It is suggested to analyse the current relationship with citizens but also the past experiences to understand the evolution and trends of the civil security system.

The societies are very different, i.e. the difference between Nordic/Anglo-Saxon and Mediterranean/Latin areas. It is suggested to modulate the analytical framework to take into account peculiar differences, in order to mitigate the risk of adopting benchmarks that claim to be too "comprehensive" and that in reality would not always be applicable to all countries/regional security associations.

We must also consider that security is a "relative" value, as it depends on its "perception" among citizens. In fact, even if a country is considered in-secure in the eyes of external observers, its citizens could consider themselves not in harm's way because they were always exposed and accustomed to dangerous situations. This can let them perceive a sufficiently high level of security which is not perceived as such by an external observer.

➢ Fourth dimension

The fourth dimension (The role of the private sector in maintaining civil security) is considered to have a U.S. origin that rightly reflects today's reality, as security is increasingly managed and operated by private actors which own key security assets or infrastructure. The analysis should take into account how in different countries private property is differently protected vis-à-vis the common good. For example in Italy, according to some observers, private property has been subjected to protection for a relatively short period of time (100 years), and there are rules strong enough to restrain the right to private property in case of war, emergency and crisis. This aspect of private property is suggested in addition to those explored within the fourth analytical dimension.

An important thing is that in the past, private actors were largely passive, i.e. they expected to be protected by the state. Nowadays the private sector is becoming aware that it should also act. For instance, there are specific tasks in Italy for private actors regarding the protection of critical infrastructures.

4) ANVIL's Methodology: WPs

➢ WP2

The WP2 mapping approach risks being obsolete or inadequate if France is not included in the Mediterranean cluster. For instance, cooperation and synergies regarding but not limited to fire prevention, Search and Rescue (SAR) activities at sea and naval control of the Mediterranean are well developed between Italy and France (e.g. more developed than those between Italy and Malta, which is instead included with Italy in the Mediterranean cluster).

It is suggested that talks and interviews are less focused on the national level and more focused on the macro "functional" regions, where nations face the same issues and challenges regardless of national frontiers.

➢ WP3

The WP3 mapping may provide added-value, even if the resulting assessment highlights the scarce relevance of regional security associations examined. According to some observers, the most valuable organizations are those starting with a bottom-up approach: for example, this is underlined in Europe by the fact that bilateral, mini-lateral and multi-lateral agreements often precede the EU ones; for instance, in Italy the regional civil protection took shape before the national one. The part of these structures that arises from national initiatives is very useful and functional in the early stages of a crisis. In the long term (e.g. post-crises reconstruction), the strategic/higher parts of these organizations can work well, unless being disadvantaged by too

many bureaucratic and administrative layers and by budget management divergences among offices and countries.

The WP3 mapping could perhaps also consider the reality of some private organizations and NGOs that are operating at regional/international levels, not neglecting those less considered but powerful as the Catholic ones.

It is appreciated that the mapping will be instrumental to a comparison aimed at analysing how member states can work better at EU level. It is not intended as a mapping *per se*: the WPs shall be accurately connected.

5) Italian case study

For the Italian case, it is not defined what "civil security" is. Italy has no official national security strategy even if politicians and scholars have showed interest on this topic in recent years. Different security areas such as energy security or food safety are not brought together in a comprehensive framework: these areas are rather treated with different normative tools without proper coordination, while there should have existed a centralised overview (if not planning). What is more, there are different opinions on the matter: for example, according to some observers' civics focusing on shared values should fall into civil security, according to others a large part of civil security is about societal resilience.

The above concerns make difficult the analysis for Italy and the comparison with other countries. It is suggested to assess at least three points. Firstly, the rules regarding public and private levels, that means analyse what the State allows public and private sector/citizens to do in case of state of an emergency declaration. Secondly, how the mechanisms of crisis management can translate the potentiality provided by rules and institutional arrangements into effective response capability (effectiveness). And thirdly, concerning hierarchical structure, how much is the weight of the top management and how much is the weight of the operational level?

It is moreover suggested to consider the civil-military cooperation. For example in the NATO civil protection and security framework, the President of the Italian delegation is a civil servant of the MoI assisted by a military officer. In recent years elements of opposition between civil and military are going down.

It is thus suggested to evaluate the relationship between civil defence carried out by MoI and civil protection, which recently has changed in Italy with the renewal of Civil Protection Department. And to also evaluate the protection of critical infrastructures, cyber-security and the role of space assets in providing space situational awareness. This is increasingly important. For example, think about space weather i.e. solar storms which may disrupt electronic devices and communications.

Hellenberg International Oy (HI)

Analysis of Civil Security Systems in Europe

WP 5 Deliverable

__Feedback from Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania__

Hellenberg International (HI) has conducted fact finding missions among key civil security operators, policy makers and stakeholders in Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. This first round of study has been conducted during May-July 2012. The overall feedback concerning the "Anvil project" has been positive and encouraging; however, there have been a few remarks which need to be tackled and taken up here separately.

The fact finding strategy of the HI is based on the applied, cross cutting and multi-disciplinary research methodology. The key activities will be interviews of key informants and screening of written and open source material. Multiple meetings and discussions with the essential stakeholder groups, both public and private, will support this data collection. Collecting quantitative research information was done by Dr Timo Hellenberg and Dr Pekka Visuri during a fact finding trip in June in Finland and the three Baltic countries Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Additionally, MSc Marju Eeriku has collected data and reports from the open sources and summarized and translated them into English.

It is important to recognise that most of the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) countries are Member States of the EU, and Russia and Norway are closely connected with them. Secondly, there is no non-ambiguous definition of the concept and substance of "civil security" among the BSR countries. While it is usually understood as being a part of larger concepts such as "civil protection", traditionally it refers to rescue activity in exceptional situations such as emergencies, disasters, crises or catastrophes. However, the dividing lines are still obscure. On the one hand, sometimes crises do not come accidentally but are rather "creeping crises", such as serious epidemics, which may require the attention of civil protection authorities. On the other hand, all emergencies require some preventive and preparative measures as well as post-disaster reconstruction. Thus, the range of activities and actors included in civil security can be rather wide. Moreover, *civil* security's relation to *military* security is not always clear, because in many countries civil protection has traditionally been part of a "total defence" or "civil defence" structure, thus originally connected to wartime emergencies. In other countries, civil protection authorities

consciously avoid the very connection to "security" and prefer using more positive and less threat-related terms, such as "safety" or "sustainable development".

How is the BSR civil security system like at the present? First of all, it consists of several national subsystems, which are connected together with multiple bilateral and multilateral ties. Hence, describing the BSR civil security and civil protection system is challenging and also a somewhat frustrating task. Only dealing with the ten BSR countries' national systems brings us into a jungle of administrative bodies, operational officials and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Adding to this the international organisations and transnational contacts in the field of civil protection further complicates the picture.

The BSR countries share a common interest in practising and developing the civil security and emergency response cooperation. However, there are several underlying facts that partly hinder the more systematic approach and deeper cohesion in this matter. The most important in this regard is the cultural and historical context which varies heavily among these countries, particularly when comparing the Nordic (Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland) and the Baltic (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) countries. In this regard, the Anvil Project has been welcomed and seen as a tool to overcome the differences and to pave the way for mutual understanding of heterogeneous systems.

A second key element which has been raised is the legal and constitutional system base, which is very different when comparing for instance the current Finnish civil security and crisis management mechanisms and the Baltic countries legal basis. In Finland, the current system was derived from the Cold War era and further developed since the experiences of the 2004 South East Asia Tsunami disaster. In the Baltic countries, the legal basis has been inherited from the Soviet Union and it has faced dramatic and comprehensive reform during the past two decades. In all three Baltic countries the essential legal question remains: which instance is in charge in case of a large-scale civil security crisis (for instance the PM office or the State Fire and Rescue Committee)?

The Anvil Project has been welcomed by the key operational and strategic level actors and we are confident that we can get the help and support along the way for implementing this project. What has been expected from us is a high level of information and exchange of viewpoints from the early stages of the project. Also a request for informal meetings has been raised to make sure that the information collected will be sufficient and balanced in order to cover the relatively wide scope of topics and countries. Finally, all interviewees have welcomed the preliminary idea of being invited to upcoming Anvil workshops and they have all promised to disseminate the research's findings among other essential national institutions.

Moreover, the Anvil Project has been regarded as a necessary gateway to transfer thoughts and proposals to the European Commission and EU agencies on behalf of the national authorities and agencies. The independent, "external" evaluation and applied research have been welcomed during times of reform of national civil security systems. As such, Anvil has been regarded as an opportunity to do something new with new methods and a fresh approach towards civil security issues in general. Our impression has also been that Anvil can be deemed a pilot project generating concrete follow-up and permanent networks of experts and institutions in the field of civil security and its research.

Institute for International Relations (IMO)

ANVIL Channels of communication – first responses in Croatia

IMO approach

Step one – contribution to WP1 MS3

- Based on the contribution for WP1 MS3, IMO continued preparations for WP5 MS4. The wider **group of key informants was identified** in Croatia and it included some 45 potential respondents. The preliminary list included (i) civil servants from central state administration bodies (16 persons), (ii) representatives from legal entities (11 contacts); (iii) academic community (8 experts); (iv) NGOs and private sector (10 contacts). Furthermore, IMO made an initial screening in the South-Eastern European countries (SEE) and identified about 20 potential contacts at national level (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Slovenia) and at regional level. Regional organizations, whose experts were selected, include the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Initiative for South Eastern Europe (DPPI SEE), the South-East European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) and the Central European Initiative (CEI).

Step two - verification of identified key informants

- The next step was **verification of identified key informants**. Through the continued communication and informal contacts, the IMO team tried to find out if there was some overlapping in terms of responsibilities or functional interest for the subject among the identified key respondents and, secondly, if there are any potential informants of crucial relevance that were not identified in the first step. The channels of communication included targeted personal contacts with leading policy-makers and potential end-users. Other available ad-hoc communication channels were also used for this purpose.

- A good example of ad-hoc channel was the participation of IMO team on the 4th International Conference "Crisis Management Days", organized by the University of Applied Sciences Velika Gorica in Croatia on 24th – 25th May 2012. It opened the possibility to identify some key experts in Croatia and from SEE region dealing with specific aspects of civil security, disseminate information and present the project. IMO will take part on the next conference (2013), present some project results and share the knowledge achieved through ANVIL with civil security experts.

- Another possibility was linking the ANVIL goals with the IMO regular activities which opened the possibility to inform relevant, high ranking experts or politicians about the project. One of such examples was the exceptional occasion when the Croatian president paid an official visit to IMO in spring 2012. Having in mind that he is also a university professor of Law, the president showed strong interest for being further informed about the project.

- The above mentioned efforts resulted in further spreading the information about the project and in identifying about 20 new potential key informants or end-users for the project.

Step three - contacts established with major policy-makers

- **Contacts with major policy-makers were established in Croatia and at the regional level** through different channels in the period from May to July 2012 with the aim to inform them about the ANVIL project's content, methodology and the IMO's role.

- IMO has sent official requests to the central state administration bodies which are most relevant for civil security to identify key contact points (experts or decision-makers) for the project. Some relevant state bodies have responded positively and have nominated civil servants for this purpose (the official responses were received from four institutions - the National Protection and Rescue Directorate, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Environmental and Nature Protection and Ministry of Agriculture).

- The letter with the information about ANVIL project and invitation for eventual cooperation was sent in June via e-mail to some 50 key informants in Croatia together with ANVIL's official fact sheet. IMO thus expressed its willingness to intensively cooperate with relevant stakeholders during the project cycle, aiming to share project's insights and experiences but also to include stakeholders in the project's implementation, where this would be possible and appropriate. The response was moderate and only few respondents sent back written comments. However, the information was spread around, which sets good ground for future contacts regarding interviews.

- IMO has offered to share the knowledge and research findings from ANVIL with the Croatian public administration institutions for the purpose of building an institutional framework for the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Initiative for South-Eastern Europe, which is part of the National Strategy for Development Cooperation implementation, coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (MFEA). The possibility to practically implement this is via the Inter-sectoral working group of MVEP in which IMO has its representative.

- At SEE regional level, preliminary contacts were established with the most important regional initiative, DPPI SEE (located in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina), where the feedback and interest for some kind of their involvement was high.

Step four - information about project activities was disseminated through electronic media

- The **information about project activities was disseminated through electronic media**. IMO set a hyperlink for ANVIL's page within its web site, with the description of the project activities.

- Thanks to the fact that IMO is a member of the Trans-European Policy Studies Association - TEPSA, Brussels, the information about the project was disseminated widely through the TEPSA Newsletter (April Edition 2012). The Newsletter is regularly sent to some 40 European academic and university institutions dealing with EU integration issues.

- A short note on the ANVIL project was prepared for the „Lisbon Watch" Annual Report, Issue 2, published in May 2012. This report is being issued as part of the ERASMUS project "LISBOAN - Linking Interdisciplinary Integration Studies by Broadening the European Academic Network", where IMO participates. The project seeks to analyse impacts of the Lisbon Treaty on the policy-development in the EU. In that sense, the report referred to the linkages between ANVIL and the Lisbon Treaty-related provisions in the domain of civil security.

Response of policy-stakeholders

- Policy-makers and other stakeholders gave positive feedback regarding the ANVIL project. The general attitude is that the project is focusing on an interesting and relevant topic for Croatia. Secondly, the reactions show that the project comes in the right moment, having in mind some recent accidents and disasters in Croatia that should be further analysed and discussed.

- Four key state institutions formally appointed their contact person to become a direct link with the project.

- Some experts voiced particular interest for the ANVIL project and their readiness to be involved to the extent possible through exchange of expertise. Based on preliminary contacts, certain experts could be recommended to take part in future workshops

SWEDISH NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE

NORWAY's feedback on ANVIL

Provided by **a** Senior Adviser in the Rescue and Emergency Planning Department, Ministry of Justice and Public Security

'Our first impression is that ANVIL seems to be a very interesting and useful project for enhancing knowledge concerning civil security systems in Europe. As mentioned in the description of the project, the security challenges that European states face now and in the future, are indeed daunting, broadening and deepening. The chosen approach within the six main objectives and the four analytical dimensions in the project therefore seems to cover the most important areas within this field to obtain a broader knowledge and understanding.

A short comment concerning mapping of regional security architectures: The selection of cases, a number of geographic regions is selected. One of these are the Nordic countries, named by Sweden and Finland, due to the core similarities that these countries share. From our point of view, we think it is important to broaden this perspective, in the sense that there are, and over time has been a close cooperation within Search and rescue (SAR) and civil protection between the Nordic countries involving Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Iceland and Norway. In this connection, we also find it important to mention the Haga Declaration, which the Nordic ministers with the responsibility for civil protection agreed upon in 2009. Since then, the ministers have had their annual meetings discussing topics of current interest, and have agreed upon conclusions in each meeting.

Question: In what way will the proposal for a Union Civil Protection Mechanism be taken into account in this project? The reason for this question, is that the intention with this proposal is to secure a more efficient, structured and coherent disaster management, and to shift to a more pre-planned and predictable system. Furthermore, particular attention has been given to ensure close coordination between civil protection and humanitarian aid, as well as consistency with actions carried out under other EU policies and instruments, in particular in the fields of justice, liberty and security policy, including consular support and protection of critical infrastructure, environment, in particular flood management and control of major accidental hazards; climate change adaptation; health; marine pollution; external relations and development.

ROMANIA's feedback on ANVIL

Provided by a Presidential Counselor in the Department of Strategic Affairs, Security and Foreign Policy

Civil security systems in Europe – critical/observation points

Overall, the initiative of the study is to be applauded and, if developed correctly, which is most likely given the quality of the project, shall be extremely useful for the quality of Europe's civil security systems. However, the general observation to be made is that the definition of the concept and objectives should be more detailed and in some places need to be reformulated.

The <u>indicators</u> used with regard to the concept – effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy – cannot measure the quality of an entire civil security system, as they are not quantifiable;
- suggestion: to replace the term ,,indicator'' with a more appropriate concept, one which does not suggest a possible measuring and is more suitable to a qualitative study.
We are talking here about a qualitative approach, not a quantitative one, even though it could be useful to know the type of systems of civil emergency – fire-fighters, standard fire-fighters intervention cars, ambulances, etc. per 1000 inhabitants, or per 100 square km, but this only cannot cover a qualitative approach.

The initial description of the concept leaves unclear how the main <u>aim</u> stated, *,,if, and to what extent variety affects the safety of Europe's citizens"* is linked to the stated <u>objectives</u>; the identification of similarities/differences between the systems does not imply an analysis of the way in which these differences may affect the efficiency of the systems or fit in the cultural background and institutional framework in each of the countries, being known that the civil emergency is a local and regional based service, linked to local authorities, rather than a national one – even if rules are adopted nationally.

Regarding the <u>selection of cases</u>, selection only based on region and similarities at the national level will not give insight on the main aim, *,,if, and to what extent variety affects the safety of Europe's citizens''*, as it will not be possible to identify the larger and more significant varieties amongst national systems.

In pp. 13-14, there is an incomplete list of advisers, if I understand correctly I should be in that list.

Please also do communicate the exact attributes and expectations as well as time frames for that activity.

Adam Mickiewicz University

In Poland, we have sent letters about ANVIL to some top administrators as potential end users. As the Polish administration is a hierarchical structure, we have focused on the top administrators. In the letter, we have presented ANVIL and asked for the possibility of cooperation in terms of meeting with experts of the institution/agency (who would assess the current system); we have also asked about the possibility to send our research plans and reports - for comments and review. Due to slow administrative operations and the holiday season, the responses have been quite disappointing so far, but we have received a letter from a member of the Planning Dept. of the Government Centre for Security. He was appointed by the Director (to whom we have sent the letter). This representative asked whether the Centre's role would be only reviewing or it would also have a more formal support for the project.

The Centre (http://rcb.gov.pl/eng/) is one of the few crucial institutions in Poland with regards to security (although it covers security from the national point of view, civil security is only a small part of it). The aforementioned answer is promising and we will try to further engage. The Centre organises conferences, so participation in the Centre's activities is something we could imagine as initiating cooperation at first place. Inviting an expert from the Centre at the Utrecht Workshop would also be reasonable.

What is more, we have reached via email the Director of the Department of Rescue Services and Citizen Protection in the Ministry of Interior. He is the person responsible for drafting the new law on citizen protection, a task recently started. At the end of June 2012, there was a critical report on the civil security system in Poland, published by the Supreme Chamber of State Control. Therefore, the Ministry of Interior was mandated to prepare the new legislation. We have declared our willingness (as a part of ANVIL) to cooperate and the Ministry of Interior is interested.

Adam Mickiewicz University

Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH)

ANVIL's dissemination in Germany

Between April (start of ANVIL within the IFSH) and August 2012, researchers from the IFSH attended several workshops and conferences with officials and policy-makers in the area of civil security. In particular, Raphael Bossong participated in the following events:

1. National policy conference on civil security research, Berlin (17-19.4.2012)

2. Scientific workshop to define further research needs in relation to national exercise series on civil security, organised by the Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance, Bonn (13-14.05.2012)

3. Workshop on transformation of the security culture and related emergency management practices in Germany, Witten (13.6.2012)

Generally speaking, ANVIL has been met with positive, but limited feedback. Officials were supportive of the idea that more detailed knowledge about national civil security systems in Europe would be useful. However, national research projects on different aspects of the German civil security system attract far greater attention. This was evident during personal conversations during the national policy conference on civil security research as well as during the more focused workshop on scientific research for national exercises. While the workshop allowed for extended and open-ended discussions between researchers and officials, it was clear that the latter prioritised research projects that speak to specific operational concerns of German emergency services. In addition, officials are strongly influenced by the bottom-up approach to the organisation of emergency management in Germany, which regularly hampers activities at the Federal level. This adds to the fact that to date Germany has not requested external help for emergency operations. Therefore, EU initiatives can be seen as overly distant whereas Germany's security system is occupied by internal debates over division of competences and allocation of resources.

ANVIL research may challenge these assumptions. However, it seems necessary to complete some initial milestones and early research results, before more in-depth discussions with stakeholders could held in a fruitful manner. Thus, the IFSH will complete a first draft case study on Germany this September, which will allow to approach interview partners and stakeholders on a more focused and selective basis. The participation in another scientific workshop in June, which was attended by representatives of professional organisations in the area of disaster management, opened up a range of potential contacts.

Furthermore, the IFSH will participate in a series of events from September to November. On 13.9, an institute researcher will take part in a policy-forum on civil protection in Berlin before attending the main annual stakeholder conference in this issue area on 18-19.9 in Bonn. On 22-23 October, the IFSH will participate in a policy conference on CBRN protection in Berlin. On 12-14 November, the IFSH will attend another large-scale professional conference on disaster management with a wider international perspective (Bonn). These outreach activities should ensure the visibility of ANVIL in the German expert community.

3. WP5 input given to WP2

This part of the draft report is MS18 which was due in Month 14.

Introduction

WP5 is an iterative exercise with a dual objective. The first is, in line with the consortium needs, to keep national civil security stakeholders informed about the progress of the project. Our intention is to convince the project's potential end-users that ANVIL's results are reliable and should be taken into consideration while drafting civil protection policy at national level. The second , WP5 objective is to see what the EU can do for the MS in the field of civil security. Simply put, what can be the EU value-added in the areas of civil crisis

management and emergency response?

With the creation of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and the affiliated Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC), the MS have already consented to more coordination of their civil security systems. This effort is still in its initial phase, though. The Lisbon Treaty and consecutive policy initiatives indicate that the MS are willing to deepen their collaboration in crisis prevention, emergency preparedness and disasters recovery. In post-Lisbon period the MS are bound by the Solidarity Clause. The Treaty's wording makes it clear that the Clause refers to civil security challenges which are covered by ANVIL: "The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of **a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster**" (Lisbon Treaty 2009). So far the Clause has not been activated but any future invocation of it can practically show whether MS' coordination in civil security is adequately effective or not.

Even though the Solidarity Clause seems a quintessential part of what EU value-added in MS' crisis management can be, it has not been deemed as piece of information necessary for ANVIL's WP2 country reports. However, we introduce it here as a point to be further investigated in the frame of WP5.

In 2010 the European Council adopted an EU Internal Security Strategy, bringing together the different internal security challenges that the Union and its MS cope with, and urging for a **comprehensive approach** towards their confrontation. Terrorism, cyber-crime, natural and man-made disasters and transport accidents are cited in the Strategy. All these threats are covered by the encompassing definition of civil crisis proposed by ANVIL. Interestingly, the EU Internal Security Strategy concentrates upon crisis prevention and development of networks of European early warning systems. Due to ANVIL's primary focus on emergency preparedness and operational response, these two aspects of civil crisis management have been somewhat downplayed by the WP2 Mapping Protocol. The same occurs with the topic of interdependence between internal and external dimensions of EU security, which has been highlighted by the EU Internal Security Strategy but has not been explicitly referenced by the WP2 Mapping Protocol.

It is important that these key features of EU Internal Security Strategy are eventually addressed by our study. Understanding that the crisis prevention is not the research priority of ANVIL, it still seems to be a key concern of the EU institutions, an area in which the EU appears to be active and in which the MS are willing to closely collaborate with each other. The same applies for the exchange of information between the MS' early warning systems. And even though crisis prevention and early warning per se are not within the scope of ANVIL, they are closely associated with emergency preparedness, one of the key research topics of the project. Therefore, WP5 grasps the opportunity to elevate these perspectives. Besides, they have already been acknowledged by the EU institutions and MS as domains where EU value-added is feasible.

Taking into account the above remarks, the exercise of MS18 will be distinguished into two parts. We will initially be concentrating upon the section of the country reports that refers to the EU and its role for the national crisis management, and will be critically commenting on this specific section; answering what the EU value-added can be for each country's civil security system. In the second phase of this evaluative exercise, we will ask the researchers to communicate our remarks to the national end-users and investigate their reactions. If possible, we would like to confront the national end-users with the Solidarity Clause and the objectives set by the EU Internal Security Strategy and get their ideas of what the EU value-added can be in operational response and emergency preparedness. In our view, this constant interaction with European civil security stakeholders ensures that national end-users are kept informed about ANVIL and interested in participating in the final evaluation workshop. It will also help WP5 leaders to better organize the discussions and content of the workshop. The latter will be taking place in London in November 2013.

In what follows, we present the assessment of what the EU value-added can possibly be for each examined country's civil security system.

EU Value-Added for the Examined Countries

Work in progress

4. WP5 input given to WP3

Work in progress

5. WP5 input given to WP4

Work in progress

6. Conclusion

In this deliverable we have provided a report on the EU-added value of the ANVIL results for policy stakeholders.